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A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE FIELD OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION[1]

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Readers of the popular scientific magazines and papers of to-day are often confronted with the statement of the downfall of evolution; and, though this statement is usually not made in a way that carries conviction, there is a growing feeling among the educated public that behind all this smoke there is some fire. It is the object of this article to make clear the real grounds for this suspicion, and at the same time to give a brief survey of the present state of the theory of organic evolution.

One of the most profound and wide-spread movements of the last century was a growing interest in the historical aspect of nature, a movement in which the theories of the older cosmography gave place to those of modern cosmic evolution. In the midst of this movement stands the theory of organic evolution, the object of which is to explain the steps by which plants and animals have come to their present state. This theory includes the theory of descent with modification and certain explanatory hypotheses, such as Lamarck's hypothesis, Darwin's natural selection, De Vries's theory of mutations, and others. In dealing with organic evolution, I shall give, first of all, a brief account of descent with modification, and afterwards take up, for fuller consideration, the explanatory hypotheses already mentioned.

According to the theory of descent with modification, the existing species of organisms, both plants and animals, have arisen by

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the modification of pre-existing species. This theory is usually put in strong contrast with that of special creation as contained in many of the ancient sacred writings. Although descent with modification was a conception not unknown to the ancient Greeks, it is essentially a modern view. Even Linnaeus, the father of systematic botany and zoölogy, firmly believed that the number of species of plants and animals was strictly limited to those originally created. The first man of science who advocated seriously the theory of descent with modification was the French naturalist Lamarck, who lived between 1744 and 1829. His efforts, however, were without avail, chiefly because of the overpowering opposition of Cuvier; and it was not until the time of Darwin, nearly half a century later, that descent with modification was accorded a fair hearing. After the publication of *The Origin of Species* in 1859, the theory of descent steadily gained ground till at present practically every biologist of any standing whatsoever accepts it. This change on the part of naturalists from an attitude of hostility toward this theory to one of general acceptance was brought about by the accumulation of evidence from at least four independent lines of research: palaeontology, zoögeography, embryology, and comparative anatomy.

The work of the palaeontologist has shown that notwithstanding the enormous obliteration of organic remains in the past, enough have been preserved in the form of fossils to give some idea of the ancient faunas and floras of the earth. When these are compared with one another, it is quite evident that the more ancient the deposit the less do its organic contents resemble the animals and plants of today, and yet between any ancient deposit and that of the present the organisms exhibit a continuity such as would be presupposed by the theory of descent with modification. In many species, as for instance the modern horse, the genealogy of the animal has been worked out with wonderful completeness and detail.

Zoögeography, the study of the distribution of animals, has also contributed much to the advancement of the theory of descent. As a result of such studies it has been shown that the existing animals of a given region are more nearly related to the fossils of that region than they are to the fossils of other parts of

the earth's crust. This is strikingly illustrated by the sloths and armadillos. The modern representatives of these animals are limited to the American continent south of the United States. The fossil sloths and armadillos, though very unlike the modern species, are restricted to approximately the same area of the globe. Such facts in zoögeography are easily understood from the standpoint of descent with modification, but are not particularly significant from that of special creation.

One of the chief generalizations of embryology is to the effect that in the course of the development of the higher animals, they pass through stages that resemble permanent conditions in the lower forms. Thus it has long been known that the embryos of reptiles, birds, and mammals, the air-inhabiting vertebrates, exhibit in the region of the neck gill-clefts which disappear before birth but which correspond to those permanently present in the water-inhabiting forms, the fishes. Many other like examples might be cited. Why the embryos of higher animals should resemble in certain particulars the permanent conditions of the lower animals is not clear from the standpoint of special creation; but from that of descent with modification these conditions in the higher animals are easily interpreted as repetitions of the steps in their evolution. So much of the development of individual animals is made up of a succession of features of this kind that it is now generally believed that each animal in its growth from the egg to maturity passes through a series of stages that portrays, at least dimly, the evolution of its race, or, to put it as Huxley has facetiously done, each animal in the course of its development climbs its own ancestral tree. This state of affairs has been expressed in the generalization known as the Law of Recapitulation, a generalization entirely in accord with descent with modification but quite meaningless from the point of view of special creation.

Finally, from the standpoint of comparative anatomy a fundamental similarity has been discovered in organs correspondingly situated in different animals. Thus it has been shown that the front leg of a quadruped, the wing of a bird, and the arm of a man all possess an internal structure strikingly similar, and are all based upon the plan of structure seen in the pectoral fin of the

fish. These facts have no particular significance from the point of view of special creation, but they are full of meaning when regarded in the light of descent, for they are indicative of blood-relationship.

Furthermore many animals possess organs that are useless and rudimentary, though in other closely related species the corresponding parts may be of the utmost functional value. Thus man possesses muscles for moving the external ear, a vermiform appendix, and other parts, none of which is of any apparent importance to him, though these very parts in the lower mammals are highly developed and functional. Wiedersheim enumerates over a hundred such organs in man alone. What rudimentary organs signify from the point of view of special creation has never been clearly shown. From that of descent with modification they are obviously organs in process of disappearance, and as such lend support to this theory.

The accumulated evidence from the four lines of research, palaeontology, zoögeography, embryology, and comparative anatomy, has gradually grown to such a volume and is in such close accord with the theory of descent that biologists have completely abandoned any other explanation for the present state of the plant and animal kingdoms. Descent with modification is so universally accepted at present that one seldom hears it even mentioned. It may be regarded as one of the established facts of biological science. Whatever there is of uncertainty and dispute concerns not descent with modification, but the way in which descent is supposed to have been accomplished. On this point there is room for much difference of opinion. Of the chief questions in Darwin's day, descent with modification and the methods of accomplishing this, the first, for reasons already given, has been definitely answered in the affirmative; the second is still unsettled. It is my intention in the remainder of this article to take up the three most important explanations that have been brought forward for descent with modification, namely, Lamarck's hypothesis, Darwin's natural selection, and De Vries's theory of mutations.

The substance of the Lamarckian hypothesis is perhaps best stated in Lamarck's *Philosophie zoologique* published in 1809.

In this work the author emphasizes the great importance of the influence of the environment, and he distinguishes what may be termed a direct and an indirect method of influence. Of these the first is well exemplified in many plants. Lamarck, who was a trained botanist as well as a zoölogist, observed that the white water-crowfoot, a common European plant, had finely divided leaves where it grew under water and longer and more simply lobed leaves where it grew in the air. Thus the same plant took on quite different aspects, depending upon its immediate surroundings. The environment then, according to Lamarck, affects *directly* the form of the organism, and hence a changing environment may be a potent factor in bringing about descent with modification. But the environment also exerts a very important *indirect* effect on organisms, an effect which is best seen in animals. To meet a change in the environment, an animal may change its habits, and in changing its habits it may exercise its body so as to increase the development of certain parts or decrease that of others. These bodily changes, the product of use and disuse, when inherited from generation to generation, may so change the individuals that the transformation of one species into another may be accomplished; in other words, descent with modification may take place. Lamarck illustrated this form of environmental influence by his well-known example of the giraffe. He believed the peculiar form of this animal to have been produced by the conditions in central Africa, where the earth is nearly always dry and without herbage and the animals, according to Lamarck at least, are in consequence obliged to browse on the foliage of trees. As a result of this practice, the front legs and especially the neck of the giraffe have been exercised and lengthened generation after generation till the modern form of the animal has been assumed. Thus the ancestor of the giraffe through a change of habit induced by the environment was metamorphosed into the present animal, an *indirect* product of the environment. These in brief are Lamarck's views of the way in which the environment directly or indirectly moulds the organism and thus brings about descent with modification.

Two serious objections can be brought against Lamarck's principles: first, they apply to only a limited range of the features

and activities of organisms, and, secondly, they necessitate a belief in the inheritance of acquired characters. Although Lamarck's principles seem to hold for structures such as bones, muscles, and the like, in the development of which use and disuse may obviously play an important part, it is difficult to understand how these principles can be made to apply to other aspects of organisms, such as protective coloration. Many animals have a most striking resemblance to certain features in their environment; thus moths resemble in coloration the bark of the trees on which they habitually rest, the walking-stick insects are scarcely distinguishable from the twigs amongst which they live, the northern hare has a dun-colored coat in summer and a white one in winter in conformity with the covering of the earth at these seasons. These conditions and a host of others can scarcely be supposed to depend upon the direct or indirect effect of the environment; use and disuse can have had no part in bringing them about. The Lamarckian principles do not seem to afford any very satisfactory explanation of the origin of these phenomena. Many Lamarckians meet this situation by belittling or even denying the existence of protective coloration, but though this attitude may be correct as regards certain extreme examples of so-called protective coloration, it certainly does not hold for the majority of such cases. It therefore follows that even if we admit that the Lamarckian hypothesis is a real factor in explaining descent, it can be successfully applied to only a limited range of the phenomena which any complete explanation of descent must take into account.

Lamarckism, however, is not only thus limited in its application, but even where it seems to apply, it must meet the very serious difficulty of the inheritance of acquired characters. The ground for this criticism, which is one of the cardinal points with the neo-darwinists, is Weismann's chief contribution to evolutionary theory. Weismann very clearly pointed out that in animals that reproduce sexually the body is composed of two fundamentally distinct classes of cells: the reproductive or germ cells (the egg cells in females and the sperm cells in males) and the body cells or somatic cells, such as the cells of skin, bone, or muscle, which make up the great bulk of the body of any indi-

vidual. Weismann further pointed out that since acquired characters are those characters which an organism gains in the course of its individual life by the direct or indirect effect of the environment, by the use or disuse of its parts, they are of necessity changes in its somatic cells, such as the muscle-cells or skin-cells, and since these cells have no observable means of impressing their changed states on the reproductive cells, and die with the death of the individual, there is good reason to believe that acquired characters are never inherited. If this is so, Lamarckism, as Weismann argues, is an impossible explanation of descent with modification.

To ascertain whether the somatic cells have such an influence on the germ cells as to reproduce in the offspring conditions acquired by the parent, Weismann undertook a long series of experiments on the heritability of mutilations. Most mutilations are, of course, changes in the somatic cells, and the question that Weismann had in mind was whether these changes would so affect the germ cells of the individual on which they were wrought as to reappear in its offspring. To test this question the following experiments were tried. The length of the tail was measured in a certain number of mature mice, and these animals were then mutilated by cutting off their tails. They were then bred among themselves, and the lengths of the tails of their descendants were measured after these descendants had become mature. The tails of the first generation of descendants were then cut off and from these animals a new generation was bred, and so on. After nineteen such generations had thus been produced and mutilated, the average length of the tails of the last generation was found to be still the same as that of the first. These experiments have been confirmed on rats and mice by numerous other investigators; and it is now generally admitted that acquired characters, such as mutilations, are not inherited. This conclusion is supported by what is known of many practices of the human race, such, for instance, as circumcision, which has apparently had no influence on the size of the foreskin of the Hebrews.

Although the outcome of the experiments and discussion called forth by Weismann's declaration that such acquired characters as mutilations are not heritable has led most biologists to accept

this conclusion, it is far from proved that acquired characters of another kind, such as those that depend upon the normal action of parts, may not be transmitted. Conclusive experiments of this kind are, however, extremely difficult to devise and carry through. One of the most satisfactory lines of work in this direction is that which is based upon transplanting germ cells. If the somatic cells can impress their characteristics on the germ cells, then germ cells taken from an individual having one set of somatic characters and allowed to develop in another individual with a different set of somatic characters ought in time to show the effects of the new somatic environment. Experiments based upon this line of investigation have been carried out recently by Castle and Phillips on guinea pigs.

The question tested by these investigators was the influence of color of the hair of the guinea pig on the germ cells contained within its body. That the nature of the experiment may be fully appreciated, it is necessary to state in advance that when a pure race of albino guinea pigs is crossed with a pure race of black guinea pigs, the offspring in the first generation are always all black. Bearing this in mind, the following experiment was performed. A female albino guinea pig just attaining sexual maturity was by an operation deprived of her ovaries and in place of the removed ovaries there were introduced into her body the ovaries of a young black guinea pig. Thus the germ cells of a black stock were placed under the influence of a white body. Will the white-haired body of the foster-mother influence the introduced germ cells of the black stock? To test this the foster-mother was mated with a pure albino male. She bore three litters of young, the first about six months after the operation, the last about a year after it. These three litters consisted in all of six individuals and all were as black as the female from which the ovaries had been obtained. Thus it is clear that, so far as the color of the hair is concerned, the somatic conditions of the white stock had no influence in the course of a year on the germ cells of the black stock. Experiments and observations of this kind are not numerous, but, so far as they go, they support the contention that somatic changes in the nature of acquired characters do not influence the germ cells so as to reappear as such in the offspring;

in other words, they support Weismann's contention that acquired characters are not inherited.

Viewed from the standpoint of daily experience, this conclusion seems contrary to all we know. Most persons believe that the industrious or slothful habits of the parent have their influence on the child, but, as a matter of fact, the question in man is a much more complex one than in most other animals. Man is a social being with powers of imitation, and much that we say we have inherited from our parents has come to us in this way. Human inheritance in a broad sense may be said to be made up of physical inheritance, such as that illustrated by the color of the hair, and of what may be called social inheritance, which is dependent upon imitation and is, therefore, mostly educational. In the case of a given trait in an adult man or woman, it is not always easy to say whether it has been inherited physically, that is, is congenital, or whether it has been inherited socially, that is, has been learned. The socially inherited traits, our educational activities from childhood onward, have no bearing on the question of the inheritance of acquired characters as this term is used by the biologist, but they do afford the material which in the popular mind often leads to an acceptance of this view. Yet if the distinction in man or other colonial animals of the two forms of inheritance, physical and social, is kept in mind, confusion will be obviated and man, like other animals, will be found to have afforded thus far no conclusive evidence for the inheritance of acquired characters. The principle of the inheritance of acquired characters is apparently essential for the Lamarckian hypothesis and, since it has thus far failed to receive the support of observation and experiment, the most that can be said for Lamarckism is that, though it may be a possible factor in organic evolution, it is a very improbable one.

The second important explanation offered for descent with modification is Darwin's theory of natural selection, or, as it is often simply called, Darwinism. This theory, which was simultaneously advanced by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, is most fully and exhaustively presented in Darwin's *Origin of Species*, published in 1859. From early manhood Darwin had been interested in the problem of the origin of species, and this

interest led him to look into the origin of domesticated stocks such as the various kinds of dogs and pigeons. On examining the methods employed by animal-breeders, he found that to obtain a stock with a given trait the breeder selected for breeding purposes those individuals that showed some evidence of the desired trait and, continuing this process with the offspring generation after generation, eventually obtained a stock with the desired character in full development. This operation of selection Darwin called artificial selection. He believed that an analogous process could be shown to occur in nature; and this process, which he called natural selection, was in his opinion a sufficient explanation for the origin of species.

The grounds given by Darwin for his belief that natural selection actually took place, may be stated briefly in the following way. Darwin saw clearly that even in plants and animals that reproduced most slowly there were more descendants formed than could possibly reach maturity. He estimated in the case of the elephant, probably the slowest-breeding animal known, that the descendants of a single pair, supposing all the young to live to maturity, would after about 750 years amount to almost nineteen million. That elephants are not increasing at this rate is obvious; hence it is fair to assume that all organisms are producing more offspring than can possibly reach maturity.

The second fact that Darwin recognized was that all individuals, plants as well as animals, differ from one another. As every one knows, even animals of the same litter differ in color, strength, disposition, to such a degree that they are easily and quickly distinguishable. This variability occurs in nature as well as under domestication, and is one of the most conspicuous as well as the most fundamental properties of organisms.

If, now, more offspring are produced than can possibly survive and every individual in the race differs from the others, it follows, as Darwin argued, that those individuals that show slight advantages over the others will in the long run tend to survive, and thus, through a process of natural selection, the individuals possessing advantageous variations will be preserved and allowed to breed and those with disadvantageous features will be eliminated. This process, often spoken of as the struggle for existence, or the sur-

vival of the fittest, would tend to adapt organisms more and more closely to their surroundings, and if the environment was in slow but continuous change, descent with modification would result.

It will be seen at a glance that Darwin's method of explaining descent is based upon fundamentally different principles from those used by Lamarck. The contrast between natural selection and Lamarckism can perhaps be more fully appreciated if we attempt to portray, from the standpoint of the two theories, the steps by which the giraffe's neck may be supposed to have originated. According to Lamarck, as already pointed out, the giraffe's neck was believed to have been lengthened by adding together from generation to generation the slight increments due to the exercise of each individual in reaching upward into the foliage. According to Darwin this lengthening may be considered as due to the elimination in periods of stress of the individuals with shorter necks and the preservation till the breeding period of those with longer necks. Thus Darwinism supposes that lasting modification is occasioned by inborn differences rather than by acquired characters, and it must be evident that it covers all the cases that Lamarckism does. But Darwinism not only covers the same ground that Lamarckism does—it covers more. It explains with complete success such cases as protective coloration, which were by no means easy to understand from the point of view of Lamarckism. Animals whose coloration blends less successfully with their environment are more likely to fall a prey to their foes than those whose markings imitate more truly the backgrounds on which they rest. Thus natural selection can be as effective in cases of protective coloration as in those which have to do, for instance, with muscular activity.

Furthermore, Darwinism does not necessitate a belief in the inheritance of acquired characters. Selection is supposed to be accomplished on the basis of inborn traits which appear in the course of the development of the individual and which, being congenital, are consequently handed on in the germ cells from generation to generation. In this respect natural selection is free from the most serious obstacle that Lamarckism has to contend with.

Weismann, as the central figure among the neo-darwinists, in denying the inheritance of acquired characters, has declared that

natural selection of itself is a complete and sufficient explanation of organic evolution, while others, the neo-lamarckians, have in many instances been inclined to take the opposite view. But though there are well-marked contrasts, as just pointed out, between Lamarckism and Darwinism, it must not be supposed, as many investigators seem to have done, that there is any fundamental antagonism between the two theories. Both may be effective at once. The real question is whether either of them is a true factor in organic evolution. An interesting and significant combination of the two theories has come from several recent investigators, namely, Osborn, Baldwin, and Lloyd Morgan. This combination has been called by some "organic selection" and rests on the idea that a trait which has appeared as an acquired character, and which is retained generation after generation by the continuous action of the environment, may help to preserve a certain stock of individuals till natural selection can reproduce and establish this trait as a germinal character. Thus organic selection is to a certain degree a combination of the principles of both Lamarckism and Darwinism.

But Darwinism, like Lamarckism, is not without its serious objections. For almost half a century it has served as a convenient and acceptable theory for biologists to use in explaining the origin of useful traits in organisms, but in the last decade, during which evolution has changed from a speculative to an experimental science, objections to it have become stronger and stronger, till not a few botanists and zoölogists have come to regard it, not merely as an inadequate and partial explanation, but as absolutely ineffective. It is this charge of ineffectiveness made by a few of the more radical biologists that has unsettled the public mind about evolution in general. But from what has already been pointed out, it must be clear to the reader that this charge affects only Darwinism, one of the explanations of descent with modification, and has nothing whatever to do with descent itself. Those who oppose Darwinism most strenuously are as a rule vigorous supporters of the theory of descent; their contention is that Darwin's particular explanation of descent is probably incorrect.

The chief objection that has been raised against natural selec-

tion is one which was well known to Darwin himself, but which has been gathering strength for some years past. It is to the effect that the initial phases of a favorable variation, as conceived by Darwin, are too slight to be of use to the organism, and consequently they cannot come under the influence of the selective process. When the slight individual differences that Darwin laid so much stress upon are closely scrutinized, it seems scarcely conceivable that they could be, even in the long run, of life-and-death importance to an organism; in other words, that they could afford a starting-point for the formation of a new species. And when closely related species in nature are examined, such as the different kinds of warblers, or of sedges, it seems impossible that the slight differences separating them should represent gaps produced by natural selection through an elimination of intermediate forms. Thus an inspection of nature reveals a state of affairs which many investigators have come to believe to be much too refined to be a product of natural selection.

Attempts to show that natural selection is taking place have been more or less successful, and their results are extremely instructive. Bumpus has reported the selective effect of a severe winter ice-storm on sparrows. After a storm in Providence, R.I., on February 1, 1898, many of the sparrows of that region were found to be much spent and exhausted. Of these birds, 136 were collected and brought within doors, and of this number 72 revived and 64 died. Do these two groups represent two classes of animals, one with slight advantageous the other with slight disadvantageous traits? Careful measurements of spread of wing, weight of body, etc., revealed the fact that the birds that died were less near the normal than those that survived, showing that a heavy body with small wings, or a light body with large wings, etc., was disadvantageous under stress of circumstances as compared with a body of average weight carrying wings of average extent. In this instance, then, natural selection was certainly effective, but it eliminated only the most unfit and was not concerned, so far as could be seen, with those slight differences that make up the distinguishing traits of species. Observations of this kind, as well as the general impression made by inspecting closely related species in nature, has led to the conclusion that

natural selection, though a real factor in explaining descent with modification, is only a partial one. To state the matter in a figurative way, natural selection may be said to be capable of rough-hewing a species but not of putting on the polishing touches. If this conclusion is admitted as substantially correct, it is evident that Darwinism, unlike Lamarckism, must be admitted to be an effective factor in bringing about descent with modification, though its rôle in descent is apparently much less significant than was formerly supposed to be the case.

The objection to natural selection discussed in the preceding paragraphs is not the only one that has been raised. It is, however, the chief one. Students of this subject have called attention to the fact that many organs in animals and plants seem to be more highly specialized than is needful, a valid objection to natural selection as an all-sufficient process. It has also been pointed out that even if we grant that through natural selection advantageous characters were to get a foothold, yet in the beginning individuals possessing these characters would be obliged to pair with others that did not possess them, and thus the new traits would tend to be swamped out and so obliterated. To meet this objection subsidiary hypotheses having to do with isolation, either geographical or physiological, have been devised and put forward, but many of these minor objections have now been minimized, if not entirely swept away, by the recent advances in our knowledge of the laws of inheritance. These have afforded the basis of the modern experimental treatment of evolution, and centre particularly around the names of Mendel and De Vries, the latter of whom is the author of the mutation theory.

The mutation theory, together with what it implies, is undoubtedly the most important single contribution to the theory of organic evolution since the promulgation of the theory of natural selection. Historically it is the third of the major attempts at explaining descent with modification. It is well set forth by its author, Hugo De Vries, in his work entitled *Die Mutationstheorie*, the first part of which appeared in 1901.

According to De Vries the characteristics of organisms are made up of elementary units which are as sharply separated from one

another as the chemical elements. These unit-characters show no intergrades, and any combination of them constitutes what De Vries calls an elementary species. Although these general statements were based by De Vries on a study of plants, particularly on the evening primroses, they have been found to be equally applicable to animals. Thus the color and other conditions of the hair of guinea pigs afford excellent examples of unit-characters. Some guinea pigs are entirely white, others entirely black, and still others are piebald; again some have short hair, others long hair; some have smooth hair, others rough. All these characters are unit-characters and any combination of them may be made, and constitutes, according to the views of De Vries, an elementary species. Thus a guinea pig with smooth, short, black hair belongs to a different elementary species from one with rough, short, black hair, and these two species differ in only one unit-character.

Guinea pigs are known that have rough, long, white hair, thus differing from the first elementary species just mentioned in all three unit-characters. In fact each new combination is a new elementary species. To the older systematists the guinea pig was supposed to be a single species, but from this point of view it is an aggregate of elementary species. De Vries, therefore, calls the species of the older naturalists collective, or Linnaean, species, and this newly described kind, elementary species. Elementary species, then, are separated from one another by the possession of different unit-characters and hence by a cleft unbridged by any intergrades.

De Vries investigated with great care the origin of elementary species and the principles on which unit-characters are inherited. In the course of this work he rediscovered much that had already been brought to light by Mendel nearly fifty years before, but had escaped the attention of biologists. These generalizations, now usually known as the Mendelian principles, are thus the independent discoveries of Mendel and De Vries, and have been abundantly confirmed on both animals and plants. They may be illustrated by the results obtained from breeding guinea pigs, and they are most clearly followed when individuals differing in only one unit-character are used. If a guinea pig of pure breed

whose coat-color is black, is mated with a pure white one, all the offspring, constituting what is known as the first filial generation, are black. If these guinea pigs are now bred among themselves, they will produce a population composed of definite proportions of white and of black individuals. Twenty-five per cent of this population will be composed of pure white individuals and seventy-five per cent of black ones, of which one-third will be found on being tested to be pure black and the other two-thirds to be black, but capable, like their parents, of producing white individuals. Thus the second filial generation is composed of one-quarter pure whites, one-quarter pure blacks, and one-half blacks which, however, will produce some whites. As Mendel pointed out, this second filial generation contains in these remarkable proportions individuals that represent perfectly the parents and grandparents of the stock; for the pure white individuals and the pure black ones are like the grandparents both in appearance and in breeding capacity, while the fifty per cent blacks that will produce some whites are exactly like the black parents in the first filial generation. One of the most remarkable features in simple Mendelian inheritance is that the larger the number of plants or of animals bred, the nearer do the numbers of the several classes in the second filial generation approximate the proportions given, so that there is good reason to believe that these proportions represent real relations.

Mendel was so impressed by the invariableness and definiteness of these hereditary relations that he was led to formulate an explanation the assumptions of which seem even at present to be admitted by most workers in this field. He pointed out that, since the second filial generation was composed of individuals some of which had the character of one grandparent, others the character of the other (in the case of the guinea pig a white coat or a black coat), therefore the first filial generation, although apparently entirely of one character (black in the guinea pig), must carry the other character hidden in it. Hence he declared that in the case of a pair of characters, such as white and black coat-colors in guinea pigs, one might dominate over the other, and that character which thus gained the ascendency he called *dominant*, the hidden one *recessive*. In guinea pigs it is well established

that black—or in fact any color, including the piebald state—is always dominant over white, which is, therefore, recessive. It is also known that short hair is dominant over long hair, and rough over smooth hair.

The second assumption that Mendel made was to the effect that the germ cells, both egg cells and sperm cells, were pure in respect to the unit-character they carried, and this he believed gave an explanation of the very remarkable proportions met with in the several classes of the second filial generation. He assumed that each egg cell or sperm cell could carry only one of the two opposing unit-characters, and that in this respect it could be said to be pure. With this assumption in mind we may now consider the course of events in the three generations of guinea pigs already described. In the two individuals with which the experiment is assumed to start it makes no difference whether the male or the female is white, the outcome will be the same in either case. If we assume that the male is of pure white stock then, on the basis of Mendel's belief as to the purity of the germ cells, we should expect that all the sperm cells produced by this individual would carry the character white and no other. If the female is of pure black stock, then all her egg cells would in like manner bear the character black. Since every organism that has been produced by ordinary sexual methods arises from an egg cell fertilized by a sperm cell, it follows that each offspring resulting from the mating of this pair of animals would come from an egg cell with the black character combined with a sperm with the white character. This combination would in all cases give individuals in which both traits were present, but in which, of course, the black would be dominant over the white, so that all the members of the first filial generation would be black. If now we continue to assume the purity of the germ cells, the males of this generation, since they contain both characters, ought to produce two kinds of sperm cells, those with the character white and those with the character black. Similarly, the females ought to produce two classes of eggs, which we may call, for the sake of brevity, white eggs and black eggs. If, now, we imagine that the two classes of eggs and the two classes of sperms are produced in equal numbers and that their combinations in fertiliza-

tion are purely fortuitous, an interesting proportional relation is arrived at for the second filial generation. It is obvious that there are four possible combinations among the two classes of sperm cells and of egg cells. Once in four a white egg will be fertilized by a white sperm, and this combination will give rise to the twenty-five per cent pure white individuals in this generation. Once in four a black egg will be fertilized by a black sperm, and this will produce the twenty-five per cent pure black stock. Once in four a white egg will be fertilized by a black sperm and also once in four a black egg will be fertilized by a white sperm, and these two classes will produce together the fifty per cent. of black individuals, which, however, are capable of bearing white young. Thus the assumption of the purity of the germ led Mendel to an explanation of these remarkable proportions so frequently observed in the second filial generation. Because of this correspondence and many others based upon other combinations, the purity of the germ, or, as it is often called, the segregation of characters, is believed to be of fundamental importance in breeding; and this conception together with that of dominance, already alluded to, constitutes the chief features in what are often called the Mendelian principles.

These principles, as must be evident, are in complete harmony with De Vries's idea of elementary species, for they show how unit-characters act in heredity, how they are handed on from generation to generation unimpaired and unconfused. They afford in this way a firm basis for De Vries's mutation theory. De Vries maintains that when the differences between individual animals or plants are closely scrutinized, they are found to fall into two distinct categories: the small fluctuating differences that Darwin laid so much stress on in his theory of natural selection, and the larger unit-character differences such as we have seen to exist between the so-called elementary species. The small differences De Vries calls variations; the larger differences, which Darwin considered under the head of sports, De Vries calls mutations. De Vries believes, contrary to the opinion of Darwin, that variations, as just defined, have nothing whatever to do with organic evolution, but that evolution is effected by mutations, by sudden considerable jumps. This in brief is the essence of

his theory. Organic evolution, then, is accomplished by occasional strides rather than by many oft-repeated short steps. This theory is in no sense antagonistic to natural selection. In fact, it works effectively only in conjunction with natural selection, for, after all, what determines whether a race showing a trait produced as a mutation will survive or not is natural selection. The great advantage that the mutation theory has over natural selection, as stated in the old way, is that it obviates at once the difficulty of explaining how a new trait which in its incipiency was too slight to be really useful to an organism could be brought forward to a useful condition by natural selection. Mutations do not arise by any such gradual process but spring fully formed into existence and therefore are at once in a condition to be acted upon by natural selection. The mutation theory, then, affords a most successful means of overcoming the chief obstacle to natural selection, but, as De Vries himself rightly maintains, the mutation theory is significant only in connection with natural selection.

The Mendelian principles and the mutation theory both imply in the process of inheritance a certain rigidity, a certain inelasticity, not ordinarily associated with organic nature. Under these conditions the guinea pig may have either a white coat or a black coat; it cannot have all the intermediate grays, as is implied, for instance, in Galton's theory of ancestral inheritance. And it must be confessed that there is some justification for this idea of rigidity. Evidence of this kind of reproductive inelasticity is not easily obtained from organisms that reproduce by cross-fertilization (a male individual fertilizing the eggs of a female individual) as most animals do, but is more clearly seen when self-fertilization is accomplished, as in many plants, or where the organisms reproduce without fertilization, as among the protozoans, the simplest animals. Investigation in this direction has given rise to what are known as pure-line cultures, first worked out among plants by the Danish botanist Johannsen and among animals by Jennings, who has studied inheritance in the slipper-animalcule, or paramoecium. This animalcule, which is shaped somewhat like a slipper and is just visible to the naked eye, grows in great numbers in stagnant water. If a large popula-

tion is examined, it will be found to be made up of individuals that vary considerably in size, the largest being perhaps seven to eight times the size of the smallest. These animalcules ordinarily reproduce by the simple process of dividing in two and then growing in size. If, now, one of the largest individuals is taken and its descendants observed through many generations, it will be found not to be able to reproduce the condition of the whole population, for its descendants will always be more or less large. In a similar way small individuals will give rise to a stock whose members never attain to the size of the larger members of the whole population. Thus it is clear that in a population of animals—and the same is true of plants—where reproduction is not accomplished by the continual crossing of individuals, the population is composed of separate lines kept within certain bounds,—a condition which supports the general conception of the relative inflexibility of the hereditary process.

But notwithstanding the fact that many characters are inherited in a strikingly rigid way, others are apparently inherited quite differently. Thus when the black race and the white race cross, the offspring is neither a black nor a white individual, but a person of intermediate tint, a mulatto. This form of inheritance, which is often called blended inheritance, is also illustrated by certain characteristics in the lower mammals. If a long-eared rabbit is crossed with a short-eared one, the offspring have ears of intermediate length, and if the rabbits with ears of intermediate lengths are crossed with the long-eared or the short-eared stocks, new intermediate stocks are produced with lengths of ears midway between those of their parents. Thus blended inheritance presents conditions apparently wholly unlike those met with in the ordinary Mendelian scheme. It is true that some investigators have maintained with a good deal of reason that blended inheritance after all is only a disguised form of Mendelian inheritance in which dominance is absent; but, however this may be, blended inheritance shows very clearly that under certain circumstances the rigidity of inheritance is not so marked as it appears to be in the true Mendelian cases.

But more or less direct evidence for the modification of the so-called unit-characters has from time to time also been forthcom-

ing. Castle and Phillips have described a case of this kind in hooded rats. These animals have a whitish coat except for a black, hood-like splotch on the head and a similar streak down the middle of the back. This character behaves as a Mendelian recessive when crossed with the ordinary gray of the common rat. By long-continued selection, as prescribed by Darwin, there were obtained from the ordinary hooded rats two extreme conditions, one in which the hood and stripe were so reduced that the animal was almost an albino, and the other in which these areas were so expanded as to give the animal almost the appearance of a gray rat with a white belly. These two extreme stocks, nevertheless, bred true, and on being crossed with the common gray rat the extreme conditions reappeared in appropriate Mendelian proportions. It appears, therefore, that though many characters are inherited in Mendelian fashion, all are not necessarily so inherited; and even Mendelian characters are open to modification by selection. This is perhaps the most significant criticism that can be made against the mutation theory, the introduction of which has revolutionized the field of organic evolution from that of an observational science to an experimental one. Till this new method of attack has yielded further results, it is perhaps premature even to attempt to pass judgment on the mutation theory.

In conclusion, the substance of the preceding pages may be summarized as follows. The theory of descent with modification is an established fact. As an explanation of descent, Lamarckism is a possible but unlikely factor because of the improbability that the inheritance of acquired characters takes place. Darwinism, or natural selection, on the other hand, is apparently a real factor in organic evolution, at least roughly outlining natural species. Its chief defect, the inability to produce useful traits from small beginnings, is apparently fully met by the mutation theory, which, however, is too novel to be passed on with any degree of certainty. The popular distrust which has recently arisen concerning evolution is based on a confusion of natural selection with descent. As to the effectiveness of the former the biologist has good reason for doubt, as to the reality of the latter he has none whatever.

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FINALISM AND FREEDOM

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One of the things difficult to explain in the world of thought was the sudden and overmastering impetus given to the theory of development by the publication of the works of Charles Darwin. The main idea of that theory, namely, that the higher orders of life had come into being through evolution from lower types, was by no means new; and there is so much among the plainest features of the world's life to suggest the idea, that one can only wonder why, if the scientific mind was waiting for, and wanting, the theory (as it appears to have been doing), it should not have taken it up long before Darwin's time.

Apparently, Darwin invested the theory with just sufficient philosophy to make it immediately the subject of world-wide debate. He gave it enough philosophical dress to permit the rising power of mechanistic belief to claim it and rely upon it; and to make it also, for the time being, the chief bugbear of the church. On the favoring tide of acrimonious discussion the new theory swiftly rose to eminence, and was soon enjoying one of the most notable triumphs of modern times. There are many who still speak of it, in its Darwinian form, with awe-struck tones and bated breath, as if it were a kind of sacred thing which must be held above suspicion and reproach. That, however, is the way in which the populace is apt to regard any popular idol; and it is not a very good certificate of divinity.

We probably owe Darwin an immense debt in that he was the instrument through which the idea of development became available in the world's thought. But concerning what may be regarded as his philosophy of development there has arisen much question; and it is likely to be found more and more deficient as time goes on. Its radical weakness is that it is obliged to rest everything ultimately on a basis of pure chance; for that is a foundation which is intolerable to the rational mind. That mind may be willing enough to allow for a considerable fortuitous ele-

ment running through existence; but it cannot make chance the fundamental ruling principle of the universe, without abandoning its own rationality.

And Darwinism really had nothing else to offer. Its "variations from type" were immediately due, of course, to changes of environment, or to different combinations of the two sexes employed for reproduction; but that those variations appeared in such wise as to enable the struggle for existence to build out of them something like a continuous progressive line, was, so far as it could explain, nothing but chance. That will not answer, in reason. It is impossible for the thinking mind to accept this as a solution of the riddle of the universe. Some further explanation of these variations must be found, before the hypothesis of development can claim to stand on a reasonable basis.

It would seem that in either of two ways the theory might be pieced out and amended to make good the deficiency. It might be supposed that, in the stream of life itself, the power of desire helped to bring forward the needed variation at the opportune moment. The antelope with longer legs was born, that is to say, because, in part, antelopes had a sense of wanting longer legs to enable them to escape from lions prowling in their vicinity. Or one can suppose that above the stream of life there is a power capable of determining the main direction of its flow. But either of these suppositions involves the assertion of a certain amount of directing intelligence; and when we put mind in charge of the process, it is not enough to say that this satisfies the intellectual necessities of the case. We have then to go back and consult the actual facts in order to learn how far they will bear out the hypothesis.

It is just at this point that the battle now rages, and seems likely to rage for some time to come. What do the facts say? What is the evidence in the case? If we had only to produce a satisfactory intellectual scheme of things, at least the main outline of such a structure is not so very difficult to sketch. But, having made a coat for the universe, we are now under the unhappy necessity of trying it on. We must see how it will fit; and there are plenty to tell us, at this moment, that the above suggested alterations in the cut of the garment do not improve the set of it in the least degree.

As to this, however, it is permissible to ask whether such denial of improvement is or is not the testimony of an unbiassed mind. Where there are signs of strong prejudice, we distrust a verdict upon the evidence even though rendered by an expert. Is the scientific mind perfectly dispassionate in its unwillingness to admit that the process of development has been noticeably shaped by a directing intelligence? It rather seems as if the controversial temper in much of this unwillingness were too plain to be altogether ignored or disguised. One does not know why we should expect human nature in scientific circles to be so very different from human nature in other spheres of thought and action; and it is nowhere easy for the mind, in dealing with any set of facts, to divest itself altogether of the prejudice which controversy has engendered.

Certainly, the man of rigid and thorough-going scientific training is now apt to be less scared about being caught in a situation which would put his moral reputation in serious jeopardy than of being betrayed into a manner of speaking which might indicate that he harbored the awful doctrine of "finalism." Better be a drunkard than a finalist, we can almost hear that man murmur, as he looks into the black depths of unreason to which belief in final causes may lead. Even in Bergson one can detect the inveterate feeling of strong disfavor and dislike for an idea which still carries the taint of scientific heresy. And it is not surprising that this feeling should still exist, or that it should have considerable weight in determining those views of existence which many people entertain. The special pleading of theology on behalf of its favorite notion of "design" has been enough to irritate a much more saintly person than the scientific man sets up to be, and the fight to win its freedom which science has been forced to make against the church is too recent to be wholly forgotten. On the whole we cannot wonder if the man of science is still nervous about being brought into too amicable relations with the theologian. He will edge away if he suspects a risk of being tarred with that brush which brands him as the friend and champion of theological ideas. Small blame to him, one must say! There are not so many theologians, even yet, in whose society one can feel either entirely comfortable or very proud; and it is

too much to ask of men who have for the most part sought the truth in entire simplicity and sincerity, that they should cease to remember the unmitigated disgust with which they have seen churchmen resorting to every known device to get away from the truth. But out of such a controversy as the last half-century has witnessed neither side is likely to emerge with an entirely unbiassed mind. And that fact ought to be remembered in estimating the soundness of positions taken on the main question now in dispute, the question, namely, as to what the evidence says about the presence of intelligence within, or over, the process of development.

The answer made to most that has heretofore been urged as an argument for design, is that it is easy enough to make out a case by selecting such facts as happen to agree with it. It is a perfectly good and sufficient answer to much that has been put forward in the past as a doctrine of finalism. But it can also be said that many a case which on the evidence as a whole is fairly entitled to stand, is wrecked if it be judged only by careful selection of the facts that do not agree with it. And one must say that the consensus of opinion among men of science still appears to lie somewhat open to the reproach of that kind of unfair judgment. It has not yet dealt dispassionately with the whole array of facts before us for inspection. It is disposed to make much of one part of the evidence and to belittle another part of it. It will not quite close with the question whether any amount of finalism seems to be involved in progressive development, being much intent upon the slaughter of a certain kind of design which theologians of the past have advocated and upheld. All this is so much in the partisan spirit that we outsiders have some right to discount the testimony which such experts give. The prisoner at the bar being "finalism," we may be inclined to say with them, "guilty, as charged in the indictment," but also we feel moved to say, "not so guilty as you seem to think." We do not consent that the culprit should be ordered to immediate execution. Rather we think he should be given a chance to amend his ways, and we strongly hope that he may yet prove to be a useful member of our household of ideas.

It seems probable that, when the evidence at our command can

be fairly weighed and sifted, it will abundantly justify the conclusion that some amount of intelligence is characteristic of life in all stages of its unfolding. At the present time, whatever may come afterward, we are not in sight of any scientific demonstration of a perfect mind at work in the process of organic development. The contention of religion that nature displays everywhere the unlimited power and skill of such a mind, science will not countenance. But science will have to admit in the end, we may reasonably conjecture, that what we know in ourselves as the phenomena of mind are not altogether absent from the behavior of life in any of its forms.

One may say about this admission, as a certain boy is said to have remarked about learning the alphabet, that it scarcely seems worth while to go through so much to get so little. And yet, all things considered, it is doubtless an achievement to get the scientific intellect to agree that in some measure the universe appears to know what it is doing. The difficulty of screwing that intellect up to this sticking-point is one that makes the career of Bergson, at this moment, decidedly interesting. It would not seem that the amount of wisdom which he is inclined to put into the process need frighten any one very much. Apparently, however, many are quick to suspect that if any wisdom is put back into nature, religion will have been killed all in vain.

However, Bergson appears to have taken that common-sense view of the situation which every candid mind will have to come to in the end. The point at issue is never likely to be settled by a demonstration, one way or the other. It is a question of the balance of probability, as all the evidence attainable is brought under survey. And when we come down to it, there appears to be likeness enough between ourselves and external nature to make it seem absurd to say that life is intelligent in us and wholly unintelligent outside. We may have all kinds of fine-spun theories to show how this other life gets on and makes progress, without in the least degree knowing what it wants, or seeing any next step before it. But after all, what is the good of these theories? They only serve to lead us back to that unthinkable foundation of chance. Meantime, the obvious conclusion is that life, everywhere, shows at least traces of mentality. What is the use of

asserting over and over that instinct in animals is not, and cannot be, but only looks as if it were, intelligent? That is the way it looks, and that is the way it is. If there be any mind in us, there is some mind there; and wherever there is mind, it is entirely proper to predicate purpose, finalism.

The quality which the theory of development needs to lift it out of the category of chance, where it stands as the despair of a rational intelligence, is the quality which can be read into it without difficulty from the most indubitable of all records; that is to say, a mental quality, sufficiently conscious of its needs and wants to determine the direction in which the stream of life shall run. The biologist, for his purposes, is not required to suppose anything like a perfect mind guiding the course of development. Indeed, he is likely to insist, to the end, that, so far as the evidence goes, it will warrant only the hypothesis of a quite limited intelligence. But so much he might grant without doing violence to any of the probabilities of the case. And the sooner he does grant this, the sooner he will free himself from a burden of useless and thankless labor; for the only great difficulty is that of thinking up ways by which to evade the rather patent certainty that, in some measure, the great powers of being understand what they are about.

This may do for the biologist; but obviously it comes far short of the requirements of the theist; though if the latter shall limit himself as he has latterly shown some disposition to try to do, to the idea of divine immanence, it is hard to see why he and the biologist are not practically one. A God who is merely "in the machine" has, it would seem, to accept the limitations of the machine. If there be no more of him than what is involved in, and implied by, its working, then its character is substantially his character. Theism, when it will have none but an immanent Deity, rather ties itself down to the biologist's standards. The only way by which it can then escape his thought of a limited mind at work in the world is to deal with the facts in a fashion which no biologist can sanction. Some people profess a theism thus capable of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds at the same moment; but probably their system of thought, stripped of pretence, would show only in rabbit-like

proportions. Other people frankly accept the alternative presented to them, and put up with a Deity who knows rather less than they do themselves; one who has perhaps something like equal power with them to guide the course of events; though why they should call this poor being God, and try to build their belief on him into a religion, is one of the surprising mysteries which an unaccountable human nature is always presenting to us.

By theism I do not mean anything bound up in these infantile swaddling-clothes. It is now sufficiently evident that, when the intellect proceeded to grind the world into mincemeat through its process of development, it did not grind the idea of creation out of it; though for a time it thought, with some glee, that this was what it had accomplished. By the same token, one might say, the idea of transcendence still survives that process of desiccation. Two atoms or two worlds swimming round each other, what does it matter? You have the same mystery in either case. Nothing constrains modern theism to give up the thought of divine transcendence, or to limit itself to the thought of immanence, unless it may be a kind of frantic desire to get rid of every last vestige of the idea of miracle; and if that be its purpose, decidedly the game is not worth the candle. Miracle, also, can be chopped up into very small pieces; but only to the superficial sight does it thereby disappear.

Let us boldly say that theism demands a Deity who, however he may be "in the machine," is not altogether of it; one who may not choose to interfere with the ordinary sequences of nature, but who is nevertheless big enough to upset them if he were so inclined. And if anybody asks where theism can get a Deity like that, perhaps it is enough to say that he can easily be found in that same storehouse which has furnished atoms and ions and light-bearing ether and various other things which eye never saw nor ear heard. That modern science, after some of its excursions in speculative fields, should come back accusing theism of being too fanciful, is simply a piece of what is called on the street "colossal cheek." Some philosophers may still say of God that they "have no need of that hypothesis." But a good many of us seem to realize a considerable need of that kind; and there is no

reason why we should be bashful in anybody's presence about taking what we want. Only, of course, we too have to reckon with the facts.

But what I should wish to point out is that our reckoning is by no means required to be identical with that of the biologist. He, so to speak, limits himself to a study of the machine, and he does not intend to go one step beyond what that study discloses to him. Theism starts out with an idea which transcends these limits. It is all folly to ask whether or not the facts of the outward world will prove its assumptions. It knows, or ought to know, at the beginning that it cannot prove its case from external nature. It does not get its ideas from that source, and it can hear without the least dismay that they have never been discovered there.

What theism has to do is to reconcile its ideas, in some measure, with existing facts. Where the biologist can only say that nature seems to display some limited degree of intelligence, theism is required to explain how that might be, though the intelligence behind nature were practically unlimited. And so long as it can make such explanations, in a fairly satisfactory way, it is not likely to ask leave or license of anybody for cherishing its faith.

Without doubt the difficulty of getting our theistic belief sufficiently in line with our knowledge of the world about us to relieve it from the charge of extravagance and unreality, has been of late somewhat increased. This thought of a low kind of mentality and an inadequate degree of energy evinced by the story of development looks like one that might be hard to get over. If all that we have to trust to is Life,—with a big L, to be sure, but only a feeble and fumbling life, after all,—that leaves us so far short of those heights where religion has heretofore supposed itself to be walking that climbing back seems quite out of the question. For with this millstone of a verdict hung about our necks, that the record proves a strictly limited intelligence at work, how can we climb at all? We could almost wish that the biologist had stuck to his former opinion of no intelligence at work; for then we knew he was simply guessing, and we were at liberty to disregard his guess.

But just here there is a suggestion to be made which appears

not to have received thus far the attention it deserves, and which much eases the situation. Theism has always had some trouble in adjusting itself to the facts of human life. The evil and sorrow of the world, as many have thought, could not be reconciled with the idea of an infinite goodness presiding over the life of man. Indeed, this difficulty must long ago have extinguished theistic belief, but for one of the assertions of our consciousness which no theorizing could ever quite put to silence. That, of course, is the assertion of an element of freedom in our life. Faith can take refuge in the thought that God does not intend or design these miseries which afflict mankind. They are the products of man's wrong use of the alternatives left to his choice; and God bears these miseries, with man, for the sake of having him trained and educated in freedom. The price of suppressing them would be the abandonment of man's essential being; and that price God is unwilling to pay. I do not see why, both in theory and practice, this is not an entirely sufficient answer to one of the difficulties which theism has to face. Not only so, but it appears to contribute to faith some of the noblest features it has ever attained. Both the character of God and the nature of his creative task are thereby much ennobled and enriched.

And now, I desire to ask, what hinders us from applying this same explanation to the whole field of organic life and the whole process of development? What right have we to assume in ourselves a monopoly of freedom any more than we assume there a monopoly of mind? It becomes increasingly probable that the roots of our faculty of conscious knowing go far down into primitive types of life below us. In this respect the creation of man begins very early in the history of development,—for aught we know, indeed, with the very first cell of living protoplasm. Is it not probable that our faculty of will is brought from an equal distance, and begins its training somewhere on the lower levels? And if one of the properties of life, from the very start of its career on the planet, has been some power of self-determination, then the method which we apply at the top to account for what we take to be shortcomings in humanity, will apply all the way down. What appears to be the work of a limited intelligence is just that; only it is not God's intelligence which is thus shown to be imper-

fect, but the intelligence of his creatures painfully learning to take some tiny steps alone.

In other words, are we not apt to be still rather incomplete evolutionists, making too sharp a line of division between ourselves and the orders of life beneath us? and when we fully realize that we can be what we are only because there was some promise and potency of us in that out of which we have come, shall we not learn to regard the whole gradually unfolding line as something which was on its way, by the admixture of an element of freedom, toward the higher reaches of personality?

As for the tiger in man, we explain his persistent survival by saying that God has no power to stop him off; no way, that is, which would not involve desertion of the method by which personal life is brought into being. Have we any reason to think that this view of the case does not apply with equal force to that tiger which precedes man in the order of creation? If an element of freedom or self-determination runs through the whole course of organic development, in some measure that process has always held its fate in its own hands and cannot be judged as if it adequately or accurately represented at every moment the wish and purpose of an intelligence presiding over its course. The moment we stop thinking of development in mechanical terms, and begin to think of it in terms of life (as we know life in ourselves), we are able, it appears to me, to adjust our theism to the facts without doing damage either to them or to its essential meaning. And I see no more difficulty in combining the thought of divine oversight of the world with the thought of a certain amount of autonomy granted to what we call life than I find difficulty in asserting this of the relations between parent and child.

Meantime, if there is nothing to forbid our entertaining the suggestion that both freedom and purpose should be reckoned into the process of development, something remains to be said more positively concerning its applicability to the facts as we know them. That same "tendency to variation" which the original theory so calmly assumed might well be used to support such an interpretation.

Perhaps no bigger problem was ever more deftly covered up by a specious phrase than when this form of words, "a tendency

to variation," was adopted. For the whole behavior of life, as contrasted with that of other forces, is thereby summarized. It is as if one should speak of gravitation as a tendency of bodies to approach each other; supposing himself, by this description, to have explained all that needed explanation. Surely this inward pressure of life against the limitations that hem it in, to find some new outlet, speaks of a power that has a certain wilfulness or waywardness of its own. I do not mean to say that we can prove it to have freedom; but I do say that it will bear that hypothesis, if one is inclined to make it, rather better than it bears the character which mechanism puts upon it.

Still more, when we come to contrast those fields of existence in which development is manifested, with the larger fields of existence outside, the thought that some freedom must be affirmed of the former realm gains enormous probability. When we try to picture to ourselves what is going on in any cubic inch of space above our atmosphere, we see that we are face to face with an inconceivable perfection. Through that little point in the wide heavens pass an innumerable number of lines of light and gravitation, perhaps also of electricity, at every conceivable angle. We can only figure these as lines of pulsation or wave movement. At all events it is movement of some kind. In fact, at every point it is such a bundle or network of movements as our imaginations cannot begin to grasp. These different lines of force pass through each other, at staggering velocities, making such a texture as was never woven on any of our looms; and not the slightest jostling or inaccuracy can ever be detected where they thus meet and pass. The universe, in this broader aspect of it, must strike us as an entirely perfect machine. It is such a product as infinite skill and infinite power might well bring forth. It so far surpasses all the inventions we have made and all our imaginations of what human wisdom may one day achieve that we can only gaze in mute wonder upon these triumphs of a creative mind.

But when we turn to the province of life, we get a different impression. There we are not made to feel such precision of movement or such superabundance of power. We are shown, indeed, remarkable adaptations and contrivances; but they do not rise to the standard of perfect workmanship. It is said by

oculists, for example, that nowhere is there an entirely perfect eye. A few of the forms of nature seem finished and complete. The cat tribe, perhaps, might be considered the last word in physical perfection of a certain sort. But other forms appear clumsy, unfinished, and grotesque. As Hamlet said of certain men, one could imagine that "nature's journeymen had made them and not made them well." If at this moment we have anywhere a fresh, unbiassed, and original impression of the character of the life-stream as a whole, we get it perhaps through the mind of Bergson. Plainly it is the impression of a stream of energy barely sufficient to carry through the enterprises it begins; not always indeed sufficient, but sometimes failing or only succeeding by chance in surmounting the obstacles in its way. It is either a stream which holds some measure of a remarkable intelligence, or which simulates the possession of such intelligence in a curious way; but it does not impress Bergson, and can scarcely impress us, as the kind of intelligence one would like to worship.

Is not this, then, a very striking contrast? Throughout interstellar space, and pervading the form of every planet and sun, forces are at work whose action, so far as we can judge, is absolutely perfect. The movements of the heavenly bodies so synchronize, down to the minutest fraction of a second, and their revolutions are so maintained without halt or tremor, that we are left without the smallest chance to find fault in their behavior. Whether the universe grew or was made, at all events it is in this aspect a piece of work which we might fitly ascribe to the Almighty as being in every way worthy of his limitless mind. But with regard to the force that we know as life, it is a different story. There we have a manifestation of being which appears to feel its way, somewhat uncertain of its immediate ends, proceeding often by indirection toward what appears to be its destined goal, and displaying sometimes marked inadequacy to reach its end at all.

Are we not entitled to ask what such things mean? And what explanation can we devise for these facts better than that which theism is able to present? All that is, we say, comes forth from Infinite Mind, and in the larger mechanism of the universe this mind displays a power and skill, so far as we can judge, without

limit. But in our little corner of the universe this mind appears to have started a process whose end has been the evolution of personal beings. This process has not been merely mechanical. All along its creations have taken form, not alone as they were stamped in a mould of circumstance, but as they themselves have in part determined. To some extent this world of living things has created itself. An overruling intelligence has worked with it in such wise as to prevent utter failure on its part; yet, as we may conjecture, has trusted it to the utmost verge of safety to make its own way, and has displayed endless patience with it for the sake of bringing out its gift of self-determination. From first to last life shows limited intelligence, because God has waited for it to try its own experiments. No doubt it has brought forth much that is useless and much that is not seemly, but it has found its way at last to the creation of man; and may we not say that the whole of its history, whether of failure or success, stands thereby justified?

Is it not reasonable to affirm that the creation of such beings as we believe ourselves to be could have been brought to pass in no other way? The old Hebrew tradition has it that God fashioned man of the dust of the earth and then breathed into him the breath of life. But such a method, one may perceive, could have produced nothing better than a mechanical toy. Personality, as we know it, could only come, as it has come, out of long ages of free endeavor. Once we are accustomed to the thought that all growth implies an element of freedom, we can see that the failures of growing things give us no ground on which to impeach the divine wisdom and goodness. And with man here finally as the ultimate fruit of the great tree of life, shall we not declare that, whatever his cost, he is abundantly worth the price?

The price has been, indeed, incalculable, bewildering to think of. The groaning and travailing of creation to bring forth this son of God has been so awful that the little we can see of it almost overwhelms us. Yet give man the immortal career which religion proposes for him, and who will say that the suffering has been too much? If we might personify Mother Nature, let us rather imagine that, with all her agony, she was glad when her man-child was born.

THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY[1]

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What is absolute certainty? Where is it to be found? Does it exist? Is there any belief of mankind which can be claimed as absolutely certain?

It is difficult to define an absolute in any kind. One can only say that the absolute is that which wants nothing to make it complete. The absolute does not even want a philosopher to tell the world what the absolute is. So long as it wants a philosopher to expound it, to that extent it is not complete, and is therefore not the absolute.

Spinoza saw this, and made it the corner-stone of his thought. He saw that Perfection must be capable of telling its own story. It cannot at one and the same time be perfect and yet in need of a human spokesman to explain it. A dumb absolute which needs you to give it a tongue, an unintelligible absolute which needs you to make it rational, a dead absolute which needs you to make it live and interesting, would be no absolute at all. So Spinoza begins his great treatise with admirable humility by defining God as the being who defines himself; who, just because he is all-perfect, needs no explainer, being fully competent to explain himself. God asks for no champions; wants no apologist; seeks for no witnesses. If he did, he would not be God. But Spinoza went too far.

Among those whom I am now addressing there are many who might be called, without extravagance, the champions of God. They have taken upon themselves vows which justify me in so describing them. The world recognizes them in that character, and with a certain "high humility" they so recognize themselves. It is pretty plain therefore that the God whom you serve is not the Absolute in the strict sense of the term. If he were, he would

[1] An address delivered before the Provincial Assembly of Non-subscribing Ministers of Lancashire and Cheshire, England.

not need your championship, and your occupation would be gone. An Absolute who needs nothing cannot need *you*.

Let us apply this to the question of absolute certainty. What do we mean by the words? An absolute certainty, if it is strictly absolute, will be insusceptible of further attestation. The process of verifying it is complete. Being complete, all further witness on its behalf is a work of supererogation. Being absolute it has passed the point where doubt can assail the truth. Being perfect it has got rid of all the germs which would lead to its disappearance or decay. Nothing that you can do, nothing that you can say, will make it more certain than it is; for a truth which is in danger of perishing or capable of becoming yet more certain cannot be absolutely certain.

Why, then, do you propose to enter your pulpits next Sunday for the purpose of bearing further witness on behalf of your faith? You may answer, "Unless I were absolutely certain of my faith I should not bear witness to it." Granted. But if *it* were absolutely certain, everybody else would be in the same condition as you are, and your office next Sunday would be a mere mission to the converted.

I infer, therefore, that the truths to which you are all bearing witness are not absolute certainties in the strict sense of the term. Risks still attend them which it is your office to meet. Doubts assail them which it is your office to ward off. They lack something of their full manifestation and convincingness, which it is your office to make good. And you love these truths for that very reason, though not for that reason alone. Just as a mother's love for her child is partly rooted in the knowledge that the child needs her for its sustenance and for its development into a full-grown man, so your love for these highest truths, your very devotion to them, is partly rooted in your knowledge that they need you for their witness, and without you cannot be made perfect. And just as there is no more tragic moment in a mother's life than that when she realizes that her first-born needs her no longer, so it would be a tragic moment in your life if truth declared itself independent of your testimony.

However widely our views of truth may differ in detail, on one point at all events we are likely to be agreed. Truth in its total-

ity is not a fixed quantity but a growing organism. It is always passing on into a future which is richer and fuller than the past. Not all parts of the kingdom of truth grow at an equal rate. Some portions are relatively stable, others are relatively fluid. Thinking of the whole kingdom as a circle, we might say that the centre is occupied by the mathematical sciences; next to these come the sciences of nature; from them you pass to the science of man, until at last you reach the highest and subtlest form of truth, which is the science of God. Here you reach the very growing point of truth. The theologian stands at that point. He, less than any other, is entitled to treat the truth as something which lies neatly packed within the four rigid corners of any formula. He more than any other must be careful to state the truth, in forms which admit of further development. He must leave the way open for the more which is yet to come. If he fails to do so, he will deprive truth of the chief interest it has at the point where he handles it. And for that reason he must beware how he affixes the word "absolute" to the certainty which he seeks, or professes. A certainty whose very nature is to grow ever more certain, a certainty which needs him to aid in its enrichment, cannot be called absolute, unless the term is used in a purely subjective sense.

Now it cannot be denied that plenty of certainties exist which it is practically impossible for any human mind to doubt. I say practically, and by that I mean that nobody could act upon the doubts he might choose to profess. If he had to do so, he would be destroyed, and his destruction would be an element in the proof that he was wrong. But theoretical doubt is always possible. There is no truth either of science or common sense which cannot be theoretically placed in question by a person who is determined to question it. Many so-called unquestionable truths owe their air of finality to the fact that nobody, or scarcely anybody, does question them. But granted the will to raise questions, and there is not an axiom of logic or of science which might not be put upon its trial. Absolute in the sense of being forever exempt from the possibility of cavil none of them are or ever can be. "Two and two make four," you say. To which the caviller replies, "Two drops of water added to two drops of water do not make four

drops, but one drop four times as big as each of the constituents." "The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," you say. "There is no such thing as a triangle," answers the caviller, "there is only this triangle or that triangle, and if you put this or that triangle under a microscope, you will find inequalities in its angles which invalidate your conclusion." And in general it requires no great ingenuity to show that the alleged absolute certainties of mathematics are artificial. They assume the constitution of the human mind to begin with, and you have only to suggest that other minds may be differently constituted and the absoluteness of mathematical truth vanishes. Mathematics is like a game played according to certain rules or conventions. These rules or conventions—conventions as to the nature of space and the nature of number—can always be called in question by anyone who has a mind to do so; and when questioned all the results which follow from obeying them are seen to be hypothetical. Now such questioning is perfectly safe so long as it leads to nothing but argument. But act upon your doubts, and swift repentance will follow.

Or take what one may call the primal certainty of life. I mean the belief a man has in his own identity. There is nothing of which I am so sure as I am of my personal identity, and yet there is nothing I am less able to prove if challenged for a proof. There is nothing, moreover, about which I could raise so many doubts myself, were I determined to raise them. How, for instance, can I make it absolutely certain that I, who am delivering this lecture, am identically the same person as he who received the invitation to deliver it three months ago? I may be under an illusion. I may have been dreaming. An evil spirit may have deluded me. Perhaps I am the wrong man. "But no," you reply, "the committee who invited you are here to testify that you are the man they invited. And the audience is here to support their testimony." I answer, How do I know that the committee are not the wrong men? Before their testimony can make me absolutely sure of my identity, they must be absolutely sure of their own. Perhaps the committee is under an illusion. Perhaps the audience is composed of people who are not the people they think they are. Whatever reason I have for doubting my own

identity, they have equal reasons for doubting theirs; and either party must beg the whole question before it can accept the testimony of the other. How then can we make sure that we are not all in Bedlam together? We cannot make it sure by any manner of means. But why? The answer is simple,—we cannot make it sure, simply because it is sure already. No one who was really and utterly in Bedlam would ever raise the question whether he was there or not. Be that as it may, the instance is interesting because it shows how much easier it is to raise doubts concerning our primal certainties than to give proofs of them. Provided you *choose* to raise them, provided you are determined to raise them, the scope for doubt is simply limitless. But what difference do the doubts make to our certainty? Not one iota. Our inability to solve the conundrums I have just suggested leaves our belief in identity untouched. Nay, I go further. Were some heaven-born philosopher to appear on the instant and present us with an irrefragable proof that we are the men we think ourselves to be, we should tell that philosopher that he had brought coals to Newcastle, we should be unmoved by his logic, we should go away not one whit surer of our personal identity than we were before the proof was offered. Possibly the proof might work in the opposite direction. Our belief in our personal identity, we might feel, loses something of its security by being made to rest on an argument. The argument may be good, but on the whole we prefer the grounds on which we believed before the argument was given. I am reminded of a saying attributed to Samuel Greg. He could always believe, he said, in the immortality of the soul, except when he was listening to arguments in defence of it. And I imagine there are quite a number of important beliefs which are all the more secure when we refrain from defending them. In the intimacy of personal relationships we entertain beliefs concerning the character and fidelity of those we love which certainly would gain nothing by being made the subject of an argument. They are rooted in the silence, and would actually lose something of their cogency if we tried to justify them before the public. We resent the notion of putting them to the test of argument, rightly feeling that such a proposal is itself an act of treachery.

We are now in a position to give a summary answer to the question with which we began: Where is absolute certainty to be found? The answer is, Nowhere. And the answer may be given with entire lightness of heart. There is no need to make a long face over it, as though some cherished ideal were being abandoned. Absolute certainty is, for beings constituted as we are, simply a meaningless phrase,—a phrase which expresses no human ideal, which represents nothing we cherish and nothing that we suffer by giving up. A truth so certain as to stand in need of no further witness; a truth so accurately stated that a finer accuracy is unattainable; a truth so utterly proved that no ingenuity of man can raise a doubt against it; a truth so indubitable as to defeat the perverseness which is determined to question it; a truth so rich that a fuller enrichment is impossible; a truth so self-sufficient as to call for no champions, no defenders, no prophets, apostles, and martyrs,—truth absolute in that sense never has had and never can have the slightest interest for any human being. Were truth of that kind to arrive upon the earth, the mind of man would simply be put out of commission, and the curtain would fall irrevocably on the drama of human life. The one instance in which we seem to have attained this absolute certainty—the science of measurement and number—is not a real exception. We attain finality in these sciences only because we agree in advance to discount everything which would prevent our doing so. That is the rule of the game. But the rule is not applicable to any concrete reality of human life and is wholly impossible in all reasoning on the things of the spirit. When the geometrician informs us that the triangle whose properties he has proved to be such and such, is not any actual triangle as drawn by a human hand, but an abstract triangle drawn by the pure intelligence, his statement is at once accepted as in harmony with the rules of the game. But what should we say to a philosopher or theologian who should tell us that the man whom he has proved to be immortal and free, is not any concrete Smith, Brown, or Robinson, but an abstract man, who is neither Smith nor Brown nor Robinson, nor anybody else in particular? We should reply at once that he has answered a question in which we have no interest, and failed to answer the question we origi-

nally asked. We should say that whether or no there be such a thing as an abstract triangle, there is certainly no such being as an abstract man. Nor should we be greatly reassured if this philosopher were to reply that by proving man in the abstract to be immortal, he had proved man in the concrete to be not far short of immortality, not far short of free, not far short of a child of God. This, we should say, is nonsense. In short, may we not say, without further laboring the point, that certainties so established have no application in the field with which we are here concerned. The process of making them absolute, the process of abstraction, has the unfortunate effect of making them worthless. We let them go therefore without a sigh. We are abandoning no ideal. We are declaring no skepticism. We are merely arming ourselves against the disastrous mistake made by the hunters of the snark, who, you may remember, set out on their famous enterprise without first inquiring whether there was a snark to hunt, only to find in the end that the animal they had made such elaborate preparations to catch was not a snark but a boojum.

And now let me call your attention to a paradox which rears its head in a very sudden and startling fashion at the present point of the discussion. If there are in this audience, as surely there must be, persons with a turn for dialectics, they will have perceived this paradox and be ready to use it as a means of convicting me out of my own mouth. The paradox is this. In my efforts to get rid of this bogey—I will not call it an ideal—of absolute certainty, I seem oddly enough to have stumbled by accident and in spite of myself on something which upon the face of it looks as though it were absolutely certain. Have I not committed myself, with perhaps an excessive air of dogmatism, to certain unequivocal propositions concerning the nature of truth? Have I not said that the nature of truth is such that it stands in need of a perpetual witness? Have I not said that truth lives in the living witness which is borne; that no truth can be considered absolutely certain so long as it can be made more certain, or even more illustrious, by the testimony of your life or mine? Yes, I have said all this; and because it happens to be the basis of my convictions, and because also

I have learned not to be afraid of dialectical traps, I desire to say it again and to say it with all the emphasis I can command. I repeat, then, that truth in its essence is not a theorem but a Cause; a cause forever sacred, and forever incompletely victorious; forever needing such service as I can render, and for that very reason far dearer than if it were independent of me. I go further. In thus defining truth I am introducing a whole philosophy of life. Who and what is man? He is a witness to the truth. Bearing testimony sums up the end, the fundamental business, of his life. For this cause he came into the world. I speak to many who have taken upon them the office of minister of the Word. The Word needs your ministrations to complete its work; otherwise you would not be what you are. But in being what you are you have only made explicit what is implicit in the office of every man. All ages, all races, are involved in the task of bearing witness. History in its manifold and endless phases, whatever is tragic, whatever is victorious, whatever is fiercely combative, or calmly expectant, or submissively resigned in the chequered life of the ages—the truth needs it all as testimony, and needs ever more to the end of time. Great is the company of the preachers. All nature is involved; the whole universe is confederate. So that you who have vowed yourselves to the service of Truth have grappled to the central purpose of the world; you have hitched your wagon to the stars; you are marching in step with the cosmic forces; the ark of the testimony goes before you; and there is not a flower by the wayside, nor a bird singing among the branches, but wishes you god-speed as you pass.

Well, here are statements enough—enough and perhaps to spare. Are they absolutely certain? If they are, what becomes of my consistency? If they are not, what is the use of making them?

I do not pretend that any one of these statements is absolutely certain. If it were so, it would not require me to advocate its truth on the present occasion. That a measure of certainty has still to be made good is implied in the very fact of my taking all this trouble to win your assent to what I have to say.

But vary your question a little and see what a different answer

you will get. Ask me not what the truths are in themselves, certain or uncertain, but what my state of mind is regarding them. Am I absolutely certain that I am speaking the truth? Yes, I am. Like many another man who has made bold assertions, and subsequently been found in error, I take my risk. But I could not take it with more willingness, nor with less hesitation. In that sense, and in that sense only, can I claim to be absolutely certain.

Will you forgive me if for a brief moment I indulge in a chapter of what I venture to call my philosophical biography? My only excuse for doing this is that I know of no other way of illustrating the obscure statement which has just been made.

Long ago it was borne in upon me by a series of painful experiences that the Author of my being was bent upon compelling me to face a certain intellectual risk, or rather risks, for there were many of them. I did not understand at the time that this was a most beneficent arrangement. I thought it was unkindly done and tried to escape from it. But by no manner of means could I succeed. Do what I would to find a position of absolute safety, I was continually haunted by the sense of my own fallibility, so that whenever I found a position that seemed to be safe, the thought instantly occurred that perhaps I had made a mistake. In this distress I had recourse to the various infallible systems which had come into existence for the express purpose of relieving distress such as mine and which continue to exist by the support of people in my then condition. But I soon found that the authors of these systems were almost as fallible as I was myself. It was the old difficulty of trying to prove your personal identity by the witness of people whose identity is just as much in question as your own. So that had to be given up. Then somebody advised me to trust my own reason and look to that for guidance, assuring me that I should thus reduce my risks to a minimum. This, like most young men, I was very willing to do, and I well remember the self-satisfaction with which I entered on the undertaking. But the self-satisfaction was of short duration. A wholly unexpected difficulty presented itself. I soon found out that the thing I trusted, and took for my reason, was very frequently nothing of the sort. In the name of reason I

began making the most foolish, the most childish mistakes. "Reason no doubt is a very good guide," I said to myself, "provided you know when you are reasonable. But this is precisely what nobody knows. Such is the frailty of man that many a one who thinks he is trusting to reason, is in reality on the point of becoming insane." And, looking round, I saw a multitude of men who in the name of reason were doing the maddest things under the sun. So thus, instead of minimizing my risks, I found I had increased them to a maximum: that also had to be given up.

Next I turned my attention to various philosophers. I understood them all fairly well but liked some of them far better than others. At last I found one who seemed to me to have the root of the matter within him. And so I still think he had; but he was unfortunately obsessed by the passion for absolute certainty, and in order to gratify it he ran out his thought into a perfect knife-edge of dialectical subtlety so fine that the least error in the understanding or even in the emphasis of a single word was attended with the most appalling consequences. If that philosopher had been more modest, or less ambitious, I should have remained his disciple to this day. But as it was he caused me to feel that the fate of the universe hung upon a breath; his certainties became synonyms for everything that was most precarious; and at last I literally ran away from him after a frightful fit of panic, caused by trying to balance myself on the knife-edge of his dialectic.

At this point things began to grow very black all round me. Universal skepticism was not far off, and began to beckon me on with a promise of freedom from every kind of intellectual risk. Nor was I long in yielding to the promise. But in all my life I was never less sure of anything than I was of my universal skepticism. I soon realized that of all my experiments this was quite the most disastrous. As I groped about in the confusion it seemed to me that instead of escaping danger I had found my way into the breeding-place of all the risks before which human spirits cower and quail. The very air was tainted—tainted with the spirit of cowardice; for the place was crowded with people who, like myself, had run away from the risks of life. We were

all cowards there; there was not a man among us who was not secretly ashamed of himself, so that I verily believe a more feeble or miserable crew was nowhere to be found under the wide compass of the heavens. Nevertheless, on looking back, I am glad to have been there. I learned some lessons that have served me well. I learned, for example, that this world is so arranged that skulkers always get the worst of it—I got the worst of it myself. I learned that running away from one's risks is precisely the way to encounter them in their most overwhelming form. I saw what an essentially ignoble thing the cult of safety is. I saw that its devotees are of all men the least secure and the most unhappy. I saw that I must face my risk once and for all, if I would be a man.

The rest can be briefly told. Bitter experience had taught me that the quest for absolute safety—which is the same thing as the quest for absolute certainty—is the most surely self-defeating of all human enterprises. I saw that the will of man, as well as his intellect, is involved in this affair; that there is a will to doubt as well as a will to believe; and it became very plain to me that many of the doubts which are most ventilated have their origin in nothing better than a love of argument and a desire to prove other people in the wrong; and that many notable skeptics, with a great reputation for impartiality, have deliberately manufactured the whole body of their unbelief.

Such were my conclusions. But I am far from professing that they were absolutely certain, or that they are so now. There is not one of them for which I would not welcome further evidence, and I hope to continue the search for it as long as I live. But though I am not absolutely certain of these things, I am more certain of them than I am of anything else. Life is a choice among difficulties. We have to stake our existence on something. Let us be content therefore to choose the risk which has the better reasons on its side. I say "the better" reasons, and these are seldom the most numerous, and they are never the most plausible. If you go on the principle of merely counting heads you will always find that doubts are in the majority. But it doesn't follow that they ought to rule. Perhaps they are there to be ruled. At all events we shall do well to allow a certain

principle of aristocracy to guide us in this critical choice. Let us choose our risk in terms of quality rather than number. Perhaps the biggest risk of all is precisely that one which it most becomes our manhood to choose. Better be wrong with the eagles than right with the owls. Better the real danger of the mountain heights than the spurious safety of a hole in the rocks. Better far the tragedy of the cross or the hemlock-cup than the slow putrefaction of a soul which has surrendered the noblest of human rights,—the right to purifying pain, the right to suffer for the cause! If fall we must, let us fall with the loyal. Absolutely certain? No! But tell me, if you can, of anything that is more certain than this.

The world has never fully made up its mind as to what it expects of philosophers. I have often thought that one reason why philosophers have not done more for mankind is that mankind has never clearly stated what it wishes the philosophers to do. Philosophy after all is a social function. Philosophers exist not merely by the toleration but by the connivance of society. Their office, like that of the doctors, the lawyers, and the statesmen, corresponds to the demand for some sort of service; the difference being that while the demands on the others are perfectly definite, no one seems to know exactly what this particular function is. No profession suffers so much from the vagueness of the demands that are made upon it. It is as though a patient came to a doctor and said: "Something serious is the matter with me, but I don't know what. There is a pain somewhere, but I cannot tell you whether it is in the head, the heart, the foot, or the hand. I cannot describe my symptoms. Nevertheless I expect you to discover the disease and to provide the remedy."

I am not here to plead for philosophers. I will only suggest that some of their more serious failings are due to the constant vagueness and the occasional absurdity of the demands which the public make upon them. Not knowing exactly what society expects them to do, they are only too ready to take any hint, no matter how unenlightened the source may be from which the hint proceeds. Thus many of them have embarked on the quest for absolute certainty simply because absolute certainty is what

a thoughtless section of the public asked for. Another demand, equally thoughtless but somewhat more pathetic, comes from that bewildered class in the community who, at the present day, are crying out for positive construction. Yielding to this there are some philosophers who have deliberately set themselves the task of constructing the truth. Some have even gone the length of what they call "constructing experience." You might as well try to construct a living soul. I cannot repress a suspicion that these philosophers, among whom are to be found some of the greatest intellects, have been taken in. They have not paused to reflect that the very persons who are crying out for construction will be the first to knock the constructions to pieces. They always have done so, they always will. We are making a very great mistake if we suppose that the will to doubt will ever be appeased by feeding it with constructions. I have had some experience with these would-be constructive thinkers, and my impression is that they are the most rapidly disillusioned class among all those who are now handling the things of the spirit. They are fighting their battles on ground which has been chosen for them by the enemy.

The chief service which philosophy can render seems to me of another kind. Unfortunately the service is one of which few of us perceive we have need; and even when the need is revealed to us, we are none too anxious to confess it. We are all the victims of many illusions, and the best philosopher, if I am not mistaken, is precisely he who helps us to get rid of them. Philosophy is not the process of teaching the blind to see; still less does it make eyes to see with. Its function is rather to push aside the veils and tear off the bandages and destroy the unnecessary spectacles with which we obscure and distort our own vision. In setting out to explain the universe, I think philosophy has been too ambitious. A more modest programme would be more successful: that, for example, of teaching us so to think as not to prevent the universe explaining itself. The universe is not as dependent on us for its elucidation as we are apt to think. If we were a little less eager to tell the universe what we think about it, and a little more willing to hear what the universe thinks about us; if we would admit, occasionally at all events, that there are some things in the uni-

verse that can not only take care of themselves, but take care of us as well, I think we should all learn more in the long run and come out better philosophers in the end.

There are many voices in the world; and the voice of man is only one of them. There are many voices in each of us; the voice of our argumentative faculty is only one of them. All these voices claim attention; all are worth hearing; all have something important to say. None of them can claim an exclusive right to declare the truth. The witness which truth requires is in the harmony of them all. But our philosophy has been too much of a monologue; the logician has silenced the other speakers and done all the talking himself. But there is nothing the head can say which does not evoke an answer from the heart. To every thought which the thinker utters concerning life, life replies by a reaction, by a comment; and the answering comment thus provoked is fully as significant, nay, often vastly more significant, than the thought which provoked it. The universe is apt at repartee, especially when a philosopher is talking. A true philosophy would recognize this. It would give all voices a hearing. It would let the universe have its say. It would become a dialogue. History and metaphysics would converse across the table. Concrete life and abstract thought would talk to one another. Logician, poet, man of action; the head, the heart, and the hand; the reason, the imagination, and the will,—all these would speak, and each would be as eager to hear the other as he was to utter himself. What a running commentary on life such conversations would be! How much richer than the monologues in which we now indulge! It is thus, perhaps, that angels and purified spirits philosophize, and such things may never be in this world of vain contentions and loud disputes. Yet, even here and now, those other voices cannot be utterly silenced. They do answer. They do compel us to listen. We work ourselves to the fever heat of eloquence and are on the point of clinching our argument, when suddenly another voice breaks in. "Be still," it says, "be still and know that I am God."

TWO FORGOTTEN CREEDS

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For the modern theologian there is an all-encompassing bond of perfectness in the New Testament in the doctrine of the Logos, found in the Johannine gospel and epistles. It links together the christology of the Synoptic writings, Mark, Matthew, Luke-Acts, and that of the epistles. It combines the primitive doctrine of Jesus the faithful "Servant" of God, glorified and exalted to God's right hand—a doctrine of "apotheosis," as Baur called it —with the Pauline doctrine of "incarnation,"—Christ a pre-existent being, agent of creation, in the form and likeness of God, but self-emptied and abased, made for a little while lower than the angels, that for the suffering of death he might be made eternally higher than they, heir and lord of the creation. In the one—the Petrine christology, as we may call it because it is mainly represented in the speeches of Peter in Acts 2–5—the residence in heaven is an episode. God has taken up his faithful Servant for a short interval to his own right hand, delivering him out of the power of death, that, when his people have repented of their wicked rejection of him, he may send him again as the Christ, to restore the kingdom to Israel and reign forever on the throne of David in the renewed and glorified Jerusalem. In the other christology—the Pauline—the residence on earth is the episode. The drama's beginning and ending is in heaven. Viewed thus "under the aspect of the eternal" the brief period of abasement, poverty, and suffering, undertaken for the "reconciliation" of the animate world, is scarcely a moment of time. For our sakes the eternal Son of God "became poor," he emptied himself and took upon him the form of a slave, and became obedient unto death, yea, even the (slave's) death of the cross; but therefore also "God highly exalted him and gave him the Name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."

Here, combined already by Paul, are two doctrines of the sonship of Jesus literally as wide apart as heaven and earth. The one had been propagated on Hebrew soil, where the Messianic hope had been gradually transcendentalized until the Redeemer of Israel could only be conceived as operating from "the clouds of heaven." The other had been propagated on Hellenistic soil, where doctrines of the descent, conflict, and ascent of redeemer-gods (*avatar*-doctrines) furnished the moulds of thought, as having long been the most vital element of popular religion.

Centuries of perpetual adjustment and adaptation have veiled for us the difficulties of harmonizing these two opposite modes of religious thinking. Having been taught the creeds of Christendom from our childhood, we think it nothing strange that our religion should have this double ancestry, and throughout its history should have found the chief task among all its doctrinal debates to be the work of so defining its doctrine of Jesus as Lord as to lose no atom of value from either its Hebrew or its Hellenistic inheritance. But time was when the amalgamation was still a problem. Beyond all other factors in the adjustment wherein the church ultimately rested was the Johannine element, an adaptation to their problem of the logos-doctrine of Heraclitus and the Stoics. A full generation after the death of Paul there appeared at Ephesus, birthplace of Heraclitus and chief seat of the mission work of Paul, a gospel which reinterpreted the story of Jesus as it had become current through the Synoptic writers. Everywhere the new gospel was recognized as "the spiritual gospel," because it presented the story of Jesus in its theological significance. At the beginning it supplied that Pauline doctrine of pre-existence so conspicuously lacking in its predecessors. Indeed, it exhibited the entire life of Jesus, including his death and resurrection, as a "manifestation of the glory" of the incarnate Logos, enlightening and "reconciling" the world. The gospel story no longer appeared merely that of a man who from time to time in his earthly career, and ultimately in his resurrection, had been "glorified." The transfiguration extended throughout.

In view of its late appearance, and the fact that it does not seem to have been originally put forth under any apostolic authority, the march of the Fourth Gospel and its accompanying epistles

toward general acceptance in the church must be deemed rapid. Opposition was made at Rome, and lasted well into the third century; but this opposition assailed the Ephesian canon as a whole, being particularly directed at the Book of Revelation. It arose through dislike of the doctrine of Montanus and his followers, who had brought with them from Phrygia these "Johannine" writings and rested on them. The obnoxious feature accordingly was not the logos-doctrine of the gospel, but the millenarian doctrine of Revelation, which is not really akin to the gospel and epistles. For this reason we hear much less of the opposition to these. With the exclusion of the Montanists and the very general discrediting of Revelation, opposition to the gospel soon faded out. "Johannine" christology became the generally received orthodoxy of the church Catholic, as indeed the doctrine of the logos in somewhat different forms had already found acceptance in Ignatius (A.D. 115) and Justin (153), though without appeal to "John." In these two writers, both intimately connected with Ephesus, it is just possible (in Ignatius scarcely possible) to make out traces of acquaintance with the Fourth Gospel. But both, while the authority to which they appeal is drawn from Synoptic tradition, yet have a doctrine of the logos kindred to that of the Johannine writings. Justin's form of the doctrine may even be said to be modelled after it. Here is the great and significant difference between the last quarter of the second century and the earlier time. It is not that there is no logos-doctrine in the earlier (Paul himself has a pronounced doctrine of the logos, though he avoids the word), but that after A.D. 175 the doctrine begins to be "Johannine" and to appeal to the Fourth Gospel as authority. When we come to Irenaeus (185–200), the battle for Johannine christology is already almost won. Now the authority of the Apostle John is directly invoked in its favor. Irenaeus, indeed, still inveighs against "those wretched men" (anti-montanists) who in their dislike of "the gift of the Spirit" recently poured out (in Phrygia) "reject that aspect of evangelic truth presented by John's gospel, setting aside both the gospel and the prophetic Spirit" (in the book of Revelation). But the opponents of the Ephesian scriptures were fighting against fate. Already the canon of four gospels which Irenaeus advocates had been generally

adopted in Syria (Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch), and Irenaeus himself was quite in harmony with the prevailing disposition of the church. Men were ready to welcome the Fourth Gospel as at least on a par with its predecessors. For the orthodox mind of the second century it met a long-felt want. Gentile thinkers, trained in the school of Paul but unable to find in the older gospels adequate anchorage for their doctrines of pre-existence and incarnation, felt that at last the story of Jesus had been adequately presented. Clement of Alexandria expresses the mind of the age in asserting that John had read the work of his predecessors and had approved it as correctly relating "the external things," but wrote his own gospel at the solicitation of friends (an inference from Jn. 21^{24}) to present the spiritual significance of the matter.

How interesting, then, it would be, might we but bring again to life some unsophisticated Christian of Rome of the period before the doctrine of the logos had made its way thither, and draw out his christological ideas! There is the letter of Clement, written to the Corinthians on behalf of the church in Rome, about A.D. 95. Clement knows the letters of Paul and quotes them. He refers specifically to that which the Apostle had written to the Corinthians (our First Corinthians; Second Corinthians is not mentioned). With the anonymous Epistle to the Hebrews he shows himself very familiar. He has traces of acquaintance with First Peter and James, though they are not referred to under any names. He also in two passages quotes at some length words of Jesus. The first quotation corresponds to Mt. 5 7, 6 14, 7 1, 2 and Lk. 6 31, 36–38; the second corresponds to Mt. 26 24, 18 6 and Lk. 22 22, 17 1, 2. Neither quotation employs the terms of either of our gospels. Both are introduced with the formula, "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus." Beyond this Clement is scarcely affected by any New Testament writing. "Scripture" to him, as to the New Testament writers, is still simply "the Law and the Prophets"—with considerable latitude as regards canonicity. Clement recalls, and expects his readers to recall, "the good Apostles Peter and Paul," who after many labors and sufferings had "gone to their appointed place of glory." He repeats in one or two passages expressions which remind us of Paul's

doctrine of pre-existence. He tells us (42 1) that "Jesus Christ was sent forth from God." In particular he adopts the phraseology of Hebrews 1 3–5, 7, 13 in speaking of Jesus (ch. 36) as the adopted Son of God, a mirror of the Father. In short, catholicity is almost his distinctive trait. But Clement is too strictly dependent for his religious ideas[1] on training of Jewish type, to show any trace of real sympathy with Hellenistic doctrines of redemption. One may question whether even his reverence for Paul makes him actually share the doctrine of his christological authority with regard to the self-abasement (kenosis) of Christ Jesus, though he seems to echo Paul's thought in referring to Christ (ch. 16) as "the sceptre of God" who "came not in the pomp of arrogance or of pride, *though he might have done so*, but in lowliness of mind, according as the Holy Spirit spake concerning him," quoting thereupon Is. 53 1–12. In reality Clement's fundamental conception of Christ is identical with that which forms the small distinctive element of First Peter. There are even many passages where he unmistakably rests upon this epistle, though his conception of Jesus as the suffering "Servant" of Deutero-Isaiah cannot be solely derived from it. This conception is fragmentarily traceable in nearly all the New Testament writings, though in none does it form the distinctive note save in documents which directly or indirectly put forward the name of Peter. Luke-Acts has a special application of it; First Peter mingles it with its copious borrowings from Paul; Clement makes it predominant. Elsewhere it comes to the surface only in a few ritual prayers and other incorporated early material distinguished by a peculiar employment of the Isaian messianic title, the "*Servant*" (παῖς) of God. We naturally expect no traces in Clement of the Johannine doctrine of the logos. As already stated, it is not even clear that he fully entered into the doctrine of pre-existence which he found in Paul and Hebrews.

With greater reason we might expect to find in Clement's christology some trace at least of the primitive "Adoptionism"

[1] Harnack (Sitzungsberichte of the Berlin Academy, 1909) takes exception to the general critical judgment which pronounces Clement a Jew. Harnack, however, would not deny that his religious ideas show in marked degree their Jewish schooling.

which characterizes our Gospel of Mark. This gospel represents the earliest known attempt to outline the career of Jesus. It is so early that although many allusions exist to further evangelic material, scarcely any of it has survived save that here included. When our first and third gospels were written (90–100), scarcely anything else of a *narrative* character was deemed worthy of admission. The Gospel of Mark, we should infer, was a writing of extraordinary influence and authority, and ancient tradition and modern criticism concur in assigning its origin to Rome, not far from A.D. 75. Now the anecdotes of Mark are put together in the supreme interest of the evangelist's christology. The purpose, from the story of the baptism with the voice from heaven to the testimony of the centurion at the foot of the cross, and of the angels at the empty tomb, is to prove Jesus to be the Son of God. For this the words and deeds of Jesus are related, especially the wonders wrought by him, and the voices and signs from heaven at the beginning, middle, and end of his ministry. But Mark's picture of "Jesus the Son of God," while unavoidably embodying certain traits of the portrait of the suffering Servant, makes a radical alteration of the type. Not "the meekness and lowliness of Christ" are the predominant traits, but a "demonstration of the Spirit and of power."

To Paul, as doubtless to other evangelizing "apostles" of the new faith, the phenomena of the Spirit, miracles, "prophecy," "tongues," had been the proof that Jesus *after his exaltation* was endowed with "the powers of the age to come." They were the ocular proof to hearers of the gospel message that he had ascended to the right hand of God, from whence he was "pouring forth" the Spirit. The "gifts" and miracles were a guarantee to believers of their inheritance "reserved in heaven" for a new age about to dawn. Neither Paul, nor Hebrews, nor First Peter suggests in any way any occurrence of them before Jesus had been glorified. On the contrary, "he was crucified through weakness." Mortality, suffering, subjection to the common lot of those "born of women," are the features emphasized in his earthly career. In Mark's collection of anecdotes the "gifts" and "powers" are carried back into the hitherto neglected period of Jesus' earthly career. The reader now learns—for the first time, so far

as we are informed—that Jesus was not first "declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1 3), but that he was so declared from the moment when the Baptist (the promised Elias) anointed him, and "the Spirit" with all its gifts of revelation and power descended "into" him. At that moment a "voice from heaven" declared his true character. The manifestation, as Mark further relates, had been repeated and emphasized in the presence of three intimate disciples immediately after Jesus' declaration that as the Christ he must suffer the death of the cross, and pains are taken to explain how the story had failed to become current until "after the Son of Man was risen from the dead." In fact, the most brilliant characterization of the Gospel of Mark which has appeared in our generation finds its distinctive editorial characteristic to be just here. The evangelist has introduced a supernatural Being upon the stage; he finds himself continually obliged to explain how this could be and yet produce so slight effect even on the disciples; and he meets the difficulty by an adaptation of Paul's doctrine of the hardening of Israel.[2] Jesus purposely "concealed" his messiahship.

The appearance of the Gospel of Mark could make nothing less than an epoch in the history of christology. It is not likely to have been the only, or even the first, attempt to prove Jesus the Son of God from the events of his earthly career; but it was at any rate so much the most important that it practically superseded all others. But from Mark alone it is impossible to derive any doctrine of the person of Christ which transcends "adoptionism." As Wellhausen says: "In Mark Jesus descends into the Jordan a simple man. He comes up out of it the Son of God." "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ" in this gospel parallels the beginning of the Christian life of every believer. Normally, the convert's experience is expressed in the phrase, "And when they were baptized, the Spirit fell upon them and they spake with tongues and prophesied" (Acts 10 44 ff., 19 5 ff.). To Paul life under control of the Spirit had been the proof of "adoption" (Rom. 8 14). It was natural that Mark should conceive the sonship of Jesus in similar terms. But Paul had also

[2] With Mk. 4 11 f. compare Rom. 11 8.

a doctrine of a pre-existent Christ, a doctrine which he nowhere brings into express relation to the primitive christology of exaltation of the "Servant" (Is. 52 13, Ps. 110 1), and this finds no expression whatever in Mark. That Jesus had been exalted to "the right hand of God" far above all angels, principalities, and powers was matter of common belief. That was implied in the common confession of Jesus as Lord. The distinctively Pauline doctrine, which finds no place even in the later Synoptic literature, though adopted in Hebrews and First Peter, is the identification of the glorified Christ with the pre-existent Spirit. To Paul "the Lord is the Spirit" (2 Cor. 3 17), through whom, as the divine Wisdom, the world was created, and by whom "all things consist." The creation of the world was to him in so real a sense the act of Christ that those who "have Christ's mind" are thereby admitted to the secret (μυστήριον) of the cosmos, in a manner which no mere cosmological speculation can rival (1 Cor. 2 6–16, 8 6). As Christ was manifest in the creative Wisdom of God, the agent and "artificer" of the universe according to Hebrew philosophy, and the "effluence" from God that "holdeth all things together" (Wisd. 1 7, 7 21–8 1), so also he was manifest in the giving of the Torah, always to orthodox Judaism the supreme Wisdom (Dt. 4 6; compare, for instance, Ecclus. 24 23–29). Paul agrees with the author of Baruch (Bar. 3 9–4 1) that the words of Dt. 30 12, 13, on which he builds his own, "Say not, Who shall ascend into heaven? Who shall descend into the abyss? The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart," apply to the divine Wisdom-Spirit. He goes beyond Baruch and orthodox Judaism when he specifically identifies this redemptive Wisdom-Spirit with Christ (Rom. 10 6–9), and the "word" with "the word of faith which we preach."

This was the new point of Pauline christological doctrine, not that Jesus had been exalted far above all angels, principalities, and powers, but that "he that descended [into the lower parts of the earth] is *the same also* that afterward *ascended*" (Eph. 4 10). This, accordingly, is what Paul labors to prove from Scripture, as well as from the present testimony of the outpoured Spirit. We observe, then, that it is from the Pauline epistles and not from Synoptic tradition that our fourth evangelist derives

his conception of Jesus as having unbroken remembrance while on earth of "the glory which he had with the Father before the world was," and as able to tell "heavenly things," the things which he had "seen with his Father," as none but an incarnate heavenly being could (Jn. 3 12 f., 31 f., 17 5). Paul thought of Jesus as a being who, "though he was rich, yet for your sakes became poor," who "emptied himself" and took on him "the form of a slave," and yet in the "emptying" had not relinquished identity of consciousness. His "mind" still retained the consciousness of the creative purpose, his will was the same will which set the example of supreme self-abasement and obedience unto death (2 Cor. 8 9, Phil. 2 7 ff., 1 Cor. 2 11–16). To understand the New Testament, nothing is more vital than an appreciation of this amalgamation of Pauline with Synoptic christology as we see it ultimately accomplished in the Johannine writings. Our present purpose is to look at two relatively forgotten writings from the very midst of the transition.

There was small reluctance on the part of Paul's fellow-laborers in the faith to accept his "mystery of godliness," even though it did not profess to have been "received." The pre-existence of Jesus as the divine Wisdom-Spirit seemed to them a perfectly reasonable belief. But how and when the descent and incarnation of this Wisdom-Spirit had taken place Paul had omitted to state. Hence the incessant restatements regarding "the beginning of the gospel." To Mark, as we have said, the beginning was Jesus' *adoption* to sonship by the descent "into" him of the Spirit at his baptism, impelling him to his career. Jesus had experienced to the full what to believers is partial. In the language of an early uncanonical gospel, "The whole fountain of the Holy Ghost descended upon him." The obverse of this emphasis on the baptismal adoption in Mark is the omission of an important element of the primitive christology—the fact that Jesus had been "of the seed of David according to the flesh" (Rom. 1 3, 9 5; compare Heb. 7 14, Clement of Rome 32 1). Mark not only omits the genealogy, but places in the mouth of Jesus an argument to prove that the basing of the claims of the Christ on his Davidic pedigree is a mere fallacy of "the scribes" (Mk. 12 35–37). With the author of Hebrews Mark holds that the office of the Christ is "without a genealogy."

The average modern Christian naturally reads the Gospel of Mark through several pairs of spectacles furnished by later evangelists and interpreters. Are they not all orthodox men, Christian men? And does it not follow that they all say the same? But ancient readers saw decided differences. Cerinthus and those who drew a distinction between the spiritual aeon Christ and the man Jesus, preferred this gospel, because (to their view) it represented that the man Jesus became at his baptism the "receptacle" of the Christ-Spirit, which again withdrew from him before the tragic end.[3] Conversely, orthodox evangelists hastened to amend its all too vulnerable "beginning." Matthew and Luke not only restore the genealogies establishing Jesus' descent from David, but present independently new narratives of his birth, to prove in forms the most emphatic the Jewish mind could conceive that Jesus had not become "the Son of God" at his baptism, but had been such from his mother's womb. But even this, as our fourth evangelist perceives, is far from satisfying the requirement of the Pauline doctrine. The "beginning" according to John is with the logos "in the bosom of the Father" before the foundation of the world.

The facts we cite indicate how great readjustments of thought would be sure to follow, and did follow, the appearance of our Gospel of Mark. Its doctrine of the sonship of Jesus was not a mere commonplace of the times. If Clement, writing his long epistle from the same community and only a score of years thereafter, shows no trace whatever of acquaintance with it, and presents a conception of Jesus modelled wholly after the pattern of the suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah and First Peter, we must lay it to predisposition and not to ignorance; for Mark cannot have been unknown to him. To some of Clement's contemporaries at Rome its christology must have come as the solution of a great problem. There is evidence that the Roman church was agitated over the questions raised by the opening chapters of Matthew about A.D. 119. Certainly it had then not yet been affected by the logos-doctrine of the Ephesian evangelist. Mark's gospel was to Clement far from new, but it surely stands for what was then advanced christology. Especially would it appeal to the

[3] Irenaeus, Haer. i, 30 13, iii, 11 7.

convert of gentile birth, harmonizing his ideas of the divine Lord, the Son of the living God, whom he had learned in the church to worship as redeemer and giver of eternal life, with the little he could learn from tradition regarding Jesus' earthly career. How instructive, then, if we could light upon the testimony of some primitive Roman Christian, a convert from paganism, forced as best he could to adjust to the doctrine of the church his ideas of the attainment of immortality through aid of redeemer-gods! How would he deal with Paul's "mystery" of Christ on the one side, and with Petrine tradition on the other?

Now in the things which we are saying the chief point is this. We have such a witness, a contemporary of Clement at Rome, one who refers to Clement by name as still charged with the particular duty of "sending to foreign cities" such writings as we know he had sent to Corinth, and that which our author hopes he will now put in circulation.[4]

Hermas, the Roman freedman, author of the primitive Christian allegory entitled *The Shepherd*, is better known to us in matters of personal character and history than almost any other Christian of his day. Much appears in the book itself. In addition we learn from the Muratorian Fragment (A.D. 185) that it was "written very recently [as compared with the apostolic writings], in our own times, in the city of Rome, during the bishopric of his brother Pius" (A.D. 138–154). The lateness of the date thus assigned is probably an exaggeration due to the fragmentist's strong disapproval of the canonical standing others were according to the book. The contents are quite too primitive to admit it. Obviously it would be irreconcilable with the mention of Clement as foreign secretary of the church, unless this reference were the subtle device of a forger, and the *Shepherd* is anything but subtle. Moreover, the heresies of Marcion (140) and Valentinus (145) have not yet appeared above the horizon. Finally, the remarkably strong position occupied by the book among the writings admitted to public reading in the church, in spite of its more than meagre literary pretensions, would be unaccountable after 140. The fragmentist, an opponent of the "Cataphrygian" (Montanist) heresy, is forced to protest against the *Shepherd* being "read

[4] Hermas, Vis. ii, 4.

in church to the people" as if it could be numbered "among the prophets" or the "writings of the apostles." Still, he does not treat the book with the severity of Tertullian. It is not to him "adulterous" or apocryphal. He thinks "it ought to be read" as edifying, though not as authoritative. The fragmentist accordingly, at about A.D. 185, stands at the parting of the ways. He has a double battle to fight. Hermas must be excluded; the Johannine writings must be included. But the support of the *Shepherd* could hardly have been so strong, had the book been as "recent" as its opponent declares. In A.D. 185 at Rome Hermas represented the old theology, John the new.

Hermas, then, may be regarded as a later contemporary of Clement. But what a difference! Clement's sixty-five chapters are occupied in about one-third their length by copious extracts from the Greek Old Testament, a Bible which he almost knows by heart, not only making its exposition the basis of all his own instruction but commending it to his readers as "oracles of God" which "cannot be broken" and must be "searched into" for all truth. Of the ideas of Hellenistic redemption-religions he shows no trace whatever. No wonder his conception of Christ is almost a transcript of the suffering "Servant" of Deutero-Isaiah. Hermas, in a writing of considerably more than twice the length, has but one "Scripture" quotation. It is not too long to cite in full: "'The Lord is nigh unto them that turn unto him,' as it is written in *Eldad and Modat*, who prophesied to the (chosen) people in the wilderness."[5] The contrast is not all to be accounted for by difference of subject. Hermas does indeed rely upon his "angel of prophecy" as the source of authority and edification rather than "the Scriptures" which are looked to by Clement. But while he knows something of their general story, and certainly would not have denied their authority, he has nothing of the control over them which to a teacher of Jewish training like Clement makes them the indispensable medium of both his thought and his expression. The contrast is that between a convert from Judaism and one who, like Ignatius, uses moulds of thought inherited from the pagan world.

[5] Hermas, Vis. ii, 3. Eldad and Modat was an apocryphal romance of which little is now known. Its characters were taken from Num. 11 27.

In respect to New Testament writings the contrast is far less marked, though mainly because Clement himself quotes so little from them. Hermas too has probably read Hebrews, though as compared with Clement his reflection of its phraseology is very slight. He has, however, a relatively large number of reflections of the so-called Epistle of James. Here and there he shows traces of acquaintance with the two epistles of Paul most used by Clement, First Corinthians and Ephesians, and also some with First Peter.

But these relations, while of value as showing the type of Christian thought prevalent at Rome at the beginning of the second century, are of subordinate interest. What most concerns us is to observe how the mind of Hermas is affected by the doctrine of Jesus as redeemer of the world; for such was the missionary proclamation of the new faith.

Hermas' employments of gospel material are too slight for the determination of literary dependence with precision. In most cases the utmost we can say is that he shows acquaintance with Synoptic tradition, passages recalling the phraseology of Matthew being, as usual, relatively frequent, with no certain trace of either Luke or John. On the other hand, if we ask by what influence his conception of Jesus as "Son of God" has been formed, the contrast with Clement is marked. For the first time outside the New Testament itself we come upon traces of the employment of our second gospel. Actual passages from Mark are not cited, but Hermas' doctrine of the person of Christ is hardly explicable without it. In particular his employment of the title "Son of God" seems to show Mark's influence, standing as it does in extraordinary contrast with Clement. The latter in all his long epistle has but one occurrence of the title, namely, that where (36 4) he briefly reproduces the argument of Heb. 1 5 ff. Equally striking is the total absence from Hermas of any mention of the names "Jesus" and "Christ," which occur forty-eight times in Clement.

We come thus after preliminaries which, if protracted, have not been without their definite purpose, to the particular phenomenon which justifies the title under which we write. Hermas' doctrine of "the Son of God" is emphatically a "creed outworn."

If any reader doubts the fact, we shall venture to class him with those who, if once familiar with this practical but somewhat prolix father, have not recently refreshed their memories, and who may therefore be willing to take a second look.

At the outset we encounter little that need seem strange in a church nourished upon the Pauline epistles. In the ninth Similitude the interpreting "Shepherd," who (be it observed) is not Christ but "the angel of repentance," explains the significance of Hermas' vision of the great tower founded on a rock in the midst of waters. It represents the church, the (new) chosen people, the stones which compose it being brought through the water (in baptism) and built into it by angels. Chapter 12 runs as follows:—

> "First of all, sir," say I, "explain this to me. The rock and the gate,[6] what is it?" "This rock," saith he, "and gate, is the Son of God." "How, sir," say I, "is the rock ancient but the gate recent?" "Listen," saith he, "and understand, foolish man. The Son of God is older than all His creation, so that he became the Father's adviser in His creation. Therefore also he is ancient." "But the gate, why is it recent, sir?" say I. "Because," saith he, "he was manifested in the last days of the consummation: therefore the gate was made recent, that they which are to be saved may enter through it into the kingdom of God. Didst thou see," saith he, "that the stones which came through the gate have gone to the building of the tower, but those which came not through it were cast away again to their own place?" "I saw, sir," say I. "Thus," saith he, "no one shall enter into the kingdom of God, except he receive [in baptism] the name of his Son. . . . Didst thou see," saith he, "the multitude that is building the tower?" "I saw it, sir," say I. "They," saith he, "are all glorious angels. With these, then, the Lord is surrounded as a wall, but the gate is the Son of God; there is this one entrance only to the Lord. No one, then, shall enter in unto Him otherwise than through his Son. Didst thou see," saith he, "the six men, and the glorious and mighty man in the midst of them, him that walked about the tower and rejected the stones from the building?" "I saw him, sir," say I. "The glorious man," saith he, "is the Son of God, and those six are the glorious angels who guard him on the right hand and on the left.

[6] The doctrine of Christ as the gate (πύλη; not θύρα, "door") plays an important part in early Christian apologetic (cf. Hegesippus' account of the martyrdom of James in Euseb. H. E. ii, 23 8). The reference is to Ps. 118 20. "This is the gate of the Lord, the righteous shall enter in by it."

> Of these glorious angels not one," saith he, "shall enter in unto God without him; whosoever shall not receive his name, shall not enter into the kingdom of God."

We are familiar from the Pauline epistles with the idea of Christ as the creative Wisdom of God, which in Pseudo-Barnabas (*cir.* 133) already takes the definite form that "God said to the Son, Let us make man in our image."[7] Revelation (1 4, 3 1, 4 5, and 5 6) has familiarized us more or less with the (Persian) "seven spirits of God" ever before his throne and "sent forth into all the earth." If we can adjust our minds to the mixture of metaphors by which at the same time the "Beloved Son" of God is first the Rock on which "the whole creation is sustained," including the tower the stones of which are the redeemed people of God, and secondly the Gate which admits to the tower, and thirdly the great and glorious Man surpassing in stature the tower itself (though he walks around it and in it)—if we can further deliberately close our minds to any thought of the historical Jesus, and think only in terms of "the heavenly Man," the second Adam, and similar transcendental beings of the unseen world, we shall have no great difficulty in taking Hermas' point of view. From having had practically no significance in Clement, that phase of the doctrine of the person of Christ which is concerned with the pre-existence has suddenly occupied the field of vision. Hermas adopts almost the language of 1 Pet. 1 20, sharing Clement's use of this epistle but with a widely different christology. As Wisdom-Spirit Christ was the counsellor and agent of God in creation, "sustainer of the universe" and Rock of its foundation. He had also become by incarnation and glorification at the end of time, the Gate of access to the kingdom of God. First Peter 1 20 adopts in similar phrase the doctrine of Paul. But how does Hermas relate this transcendental drama of divinity to the story of the Prophet of Nazareth? What of the work of his ministry, his cross, his resurrection? Do these actually have no place in Hermas' scheme of salvation? The answer to our question is contained in Hermas' fifth Similitude, his "parable," as he terms it, of the vineyard.[8]

[7] Barn. 5 5. In Irenaeus the utterance of God in Gen. 1 26 is said to be addressed to "his Wisdom."

[8] Hermas, Sim. v, 2–7; cf. Mk. 12 1–8 and Is. 5 1–7.

Hear the parable which I shall tell thee relating to fasting.[9] A certain man had an estate and many slaves, and a portion of his estate he planted as a vineyard; and choosing out a certain slave who was trusty and well pleasing, held in honor, he called him to him, and saith unto him: "Take this vineyard which I have planted, and fence it till I come, but do nothing else to the vineyard. Now keep this my commandment, and thou shalt be free in my house." Then the master of the slave went away to travel abroad. When, then, he had gone away, the slave took and fenced the vineyard; and having finished the fencing of the vineyard, he noticed that the vineyard was full of weeds. So he reasoned within himself, saying, "This command of my lord I have carried out. I will next dig this vineyard, and it shall be neater when it is digged; and when it hath no weeds it will yield more fruit, because not choked by the weeds." He took and digged the vineyard, and all the weeds that were in the vineyard he plucked up. And that vineyard became very neat and flourishing, when it had no weeds to choke it. After a time the master of the slave and of the estate came, and he went into the vineyard. And seeing the vineyard neatly fenced and digged as well, and all the weeds plucked up, and the vines flourishing, he rejoiced exceedingly at what his slave had done. So he called his beloved son, who was his heir, and the friends who were his advisers, and told them what he had commanded his slave, and how much he had found done. And they rejoiced with the slave at the testimony which his master had borne to him. And he saith to them: "I promised this slave his freedom if he should keep the commandment which I commanded him; but he kept my commandment and did a good work besides to my vineyard, and pleased me greatly. For this work, therefore, which he hath done I desire to make him joint-heir with my son, because, when the good thought struck him, he did not neglect it, but fulfilled it." In this purpose the son of the master agreed with him, that the slave should be made joint-heir with the son. After some few days his master made a feast, and sent to him many dainties from the feast. But when the slave received the dainties sent to him by the master, he took what was sufficient for him, and distributed the rest to his fellow-slaves. And his fellow-slaves, when they received the dainties, rejoiced, and began to pray for him, that he might find greater favor with the master, because he had treated them so handsomely. All these things which had taken place his master heard, and again rejoiced greatly at his deed. So the master called

[9] The preceding chapter relates to the fast which Hermas has been observing, and which he calls "keeping a station." The Shepherd has applied to it doctrine reminding us of Is. 58 and Mk. 2 18–22.

> together again his friends and his son, and announced to them the deed that he had done with regard to his dainties which he had received; and they still more approved of his resolve, that his slave should be made joint-heir with his son.

In spite of some apparent reminiscences of the gospel parable of the householder who, going to a far country to return again, appoints to his slaves their various tasks,[10] we have little difficulty in recognizing that here, as the Shepherd presently explains, "The lord of the estate is He that created all things and set them in order and endowed them with power." We might perhaps also recognize, without resort to the key, that "the vines are this people whom He himself planted (Ps. 80, Is. 5 1–7); and the fences are the holy angels of the Lord who keep together his people; and the weeds which are plucked up from the vineyard are the transgressions of the servants of God." But where does Jesus Christ appear? Is Christ the "slave," who was intrusted with the vineyard and did more than he was commanded? Or is he "the beloved son, who was the heir" of the master, whose place is never regarded otherwise than in the mansion, along with "the lord of the estate" and "the friends who were his advisers"? The slave is a faithful and obedient worker, who when he has done all is not restricted to the confession, "We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which it was our duty to do" (Lk. 17 10), but can lay claim to more. His obedience earned him his freedom. His works of supererogation drew to him the gracious favor of the lord of all, who with the approval of the beloved son, the heir, and the counsellor friends (afterwards explained to be "the holy angels which were first created"), gave him participation in the inheritance. As a foretaste of this he receives "dainties" from the master's table, and these he shares with his fellow-slaves, obtaining thus their intercession which still further assures his master's favor. In some respects this may correspond to our idea of the ministry of Jesus, but it certainly is not that of Mark, nor of the Synoptists, still less that of John. So far as sonship is attributed to the slave at all, it is only by anticipation. He is, indeed, destined to ultimate exaltation, and receives a token of it in gifts of "dainties" from the heavenly table, which are subsequently explained to be

[10] Mt. 25 14–30 and parallels.

"the commandments which God gave to his people through his Son." But aside from this there is nothing in this present world, if ever, to separate the slave from his fellow-slaves. He does not even intercede for them, but they for him. On the whole one is more disposed to look to "the beloved son, the heir," as the representative of Christ, and the slave as only a type of faithful Christians who in the end become sons according to Paul's saying: "If children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ" (Rom. 8 17).

It is time, then, that we called in to our aid the angel-interpreter. For Hermas, too, had misgivings as to the propriety of this representation, and asks: "Wherefore, sir, is the Son of God represented in the parable in the guise of a slave?" The answer is instructive:—

> "Listen," said he; "the Son of God is not represented in the guise of a slave, but is represented in great power and lordship." "How, sir?" say I; "I do not understand." "Because," saith he, "God planted the vineyard, that is, he created the (chosen) people, and delivered them over to his Son. And the Son placed the angels in charge of them, to watch over them; and the Son himself cleansed their sins, by laboring much and enduring many toils; for no one can dig without toil or labor. Having himself then cleansed the sins of his people he showed them the paths of life, giving them the law which he received from his Father. Thou seest," saith he, "that he is himself Lord of the (chosen) people, having received all authority from his Father. But how that the lord took his son and the glorious angels as advisers concerning the inheritance of the slave, listen. The holy pre-existent Spirit, which created the whole creation, God made to descend into the flesh which he chose and dwell there. This flesh, therefore, in which the Holy Spirit dwelt, was subject unto the Spirit, walking honorably in holiness and purity, without in any way defiling the Spirit. When, then, it had lived honorably in chastity, and had labored with the Spirit, and had co-operated with it in everything, behaving itself boldly and bravely, he chose it as a partner with the Holy Spirit; for the career of this flesh pleased the Lord, seeing that while it possessed the Holy Spirit upon the earth it was not defiled. He therefore took the Son as adviser and the glorious angels also, that this flesh too, having served the Spirit unblamably, might have some place of sojourn, and might not seem to have lost the reward for its service; for all flesh which is found undefiled and unspotted, wherein the Holy Spirit dwelt, shall receive a reward. Now thou hast the interpretation of this parable also."

At first glance the reader of this succinct history of redemption is not likely to be struck with the resemblance to the prologue of the Gospel of John, though in point of fact the author of John 1 1–5, 9–14, 16–18, is really dealing in his own way with the same problem. The confusing thing to the modern reader is the use of the term "Son of God," which is the *only* term used by Hermas for the Redeemer. He applies it primarily to "the holy pre-existent Spirit, the creator of the whole creation," and thinks of the entire work of redemption (wherein the cross plays no part whatever) as effected by this Spirit. The Spirit-Son, accordingly, resembles the "Wisdom of God" in the Sapiential books much more closely than the Greek logos; for it is not merely a creative, but also a redemptive, Spirit, "loving mankind," going to seek them as they wander in the paths of folly, "in every generation entering into holy souls and making men to be prophets and friends of God." [11] In this sense the Spirit-Son "cleansed the sins of the (chosen) people." As the creative logos in John 1 1–18 was from the beginning "the light of men" coming into the world and enlightening it, though unrecognized, "coming to his own though his own people received him not,"—as the logos ultimately "became flesh and tabernacled among us," so also in Hermas' more primitive christology the Spirit-Son received charge of "the people" from the beginning. He at once appointed the angels, who in Jewish angelology are called "the watchers," "to watch over them." This is represented in the allegory as the "fencing" of the vineyard. The Spirit-Son next engaged in the disciplinary process of the Old Testament revelation, "weeding out" the wickednesses of the (chosen) people, and "giving them the law which he received from his Father." At this point in the interpretation no distinction is made between the Mosaic and the Christian law, though previously the "dainties" of the "parable" had been explained to be the "commandments which [God] gave to his people through his Son." Hermas makes no real distinction. Both are thought of together as "showing the paths of life." But at this point comes a break. The Shepherd, having shown how the Spirit-Son had been in his own person "Lord of the (chosen) people,"—as against the "watcher" angels

[11] Wisdom 1 6, 7 23–27.

of the gentile nations,[12]—proceeds to the specific incarnation of gospel story. It belonged to God's administration of his vineyard to cause the Spirit-Son to "dwell down" in the flesh that he chose. When in the particular instance in view (the ministry of Jesus) "this flesh in which the Holy Spirit dwelt had been completely subject to it, walking honorably in holiness and purity," doing even more than the commandment, the glorious first-created angels[13] were called in council together with the Spirit-Son, with the result that "this flesh" was made immortal. As specific type of mortal man, he was given a "place of sojourn" in the heavenly court and made co-heir with the Spirit-Son. Such is Hermas' understanding of the doctrine that Jesus was "declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1 3). He was the supreme exemplar and nothing more.

We are dealing with a naïve attempt to explain how "the holy pre-existent Spirit which created the whole creation" can be the son and heir of God (according to Paul's teaching that "the Lord is the Spirit"), without at the same time doing injustice to the "Petrine" christology of the "exalted" Servant. Hermas' creed is the antithesis of that of his earlier contemporary Clement; for he approaches the matter from the standpoint of Greek dualism, while Clement approaches it from that of Hebrew messianism. Neither could survive; for both lack the solvent of the Johannine doctrine of the logos. Hermas is not in reality a trinitarian at all. For all that logic requires, he might be a unitarian. In point of fact he is neither. We can call him nothing else than a "dualitarian." The only strictly divine beings in his heavenly court are the Father and the pre-existent Spirit-Son. He has an "adoptionist" doctrine of a certain sort, but it does not affect the earthly life of Jesus; for the slave does not really become the Son of God until taken up into heaven. The title is applied to him generally, but only in a proleptic sense. While on earth Jesus was a "vessel of

[12] Compare Clement's interpretation in ch. 29 of Dt. 32 8 f. (LXX).

[13] That is, the six archangels "that were created first of all, unto whom the Lord delivered all his creation to increase and to build it, and to be masters of all creation" (Vis. iii, 4). Hermas' heavenly court has points of strong resemblance to the Mazdean. Alongside of Ahura and Mithras stand the six Amesha-spentas and the host of Fravashis.

the Spirit" in the same sense that Paul is so called in Acts, though in higher degree. This sense is made unmistakable by the Shepherd's application of the "parable" which immediately follows:

> "I was right glad, sir," say I, "to hear this interpretation." "Listen, now," saith he. "Keep this thy flesh pure and undefiled. that the Spirit which hath descended to dwell in it may bear witness to it, and thy flesh may be justified. See that it never enter into thine heart that this flesh of thine is corruptible, and so thou abuse it in some defilement. For if thou defile thy flesh, thou shalt defile the Holy Spirit also."

Like his orthodox contemporaries, Hermas is emphatic on the doctrine of "the resurrection of the *flesh*,"[14] and applies to it the practical teaching of Rom. 8 1–17, whether he can see his way to reconcile it with 1 Cor. 15 50 or not. But except as to the slave's taking the lead and setting the example for his fellow-slaves, who also receive the "commandments" the Spirit gives him, there is no distinction between its "dwelling down" in him and its "dwelling down" in Hermas or in other men.

Especially instructive is the contrast between Hermas' interpretation of the "cleansing of the sins of the people" and Clement's. In Clement, as in First Peter and the New Testament generally, this is the work of the suffering "Servant," by whose stripes we were healed. Not so here. In Hermas it is the work of the pre-existent Spirit-Son, who "weeded out the transgressions of the servants of God" not by a vicarious sacrifice, but by the laborious husbandry of the Old Testament dispensation. Death of the Spirit-Son was of course inconceivable. The death of Jesus is never mentioned, or even alluded to.[15]

These two almost contemporary writings from the church at Rome in the sub-apostolic age, Clement and Hermas, may probably be taken as fairly typical respectively of the Jewish and gentile elements among Paul's converts. We see in them the effect produced upon their minds by the doctrine of Jesus as the

[14] The original Greek of the so-called Apostles' Creed has "I believe in the resurrection of the flesh" (σαρκός), not "body" (σώματος).

[15] Harnack, in his recent reconstruction of the primitive Aramaic source Q, notes as the most astounding fact in connection with it, that it yields "no trace of that which in Mark is the chief theme, Jesus' death and resurrection." Sprüche und Reden Jesu, p. 171.

Son of God as it came to them from Petrine and Pauline sources respectively. "Creeds outworn" they are; and such are not generally esteemed to be interesting or profitable. But when one is seeking a genuinely historical understanding of his own creed, there is nothing like a return to this forgotten past, a time when the great problem of adjustment of Jewish and gentile religious thought was still unsolved, and when the Gospel of John was still below the horizon.[16]

[16] Since this article was placed in the editor's hands an important study by J. v. Walter, of Breslau, of the christology of Hermas as exhibited in the passage here considered (Sim. V.), has appeared in the Zts. f. utl. Wiss. xiv 2 (1913). Von Walter explains the inconsistencies as due to later supplementation by the author. Sim. V 6 4^{b}–7 was added to obviate the objection to the parable which would be felt by any orthodox reader of Heb. 1–2, that the slave (Jesus) was placed on a lower rank than the angels. In this interpretation the slave is only "the flesh" in which the holy, pre-existent Spirit dwelt, and which served it, whereas the parable both calls the slave himself the Son of God, and speaks only of his service to "the people" in obedience to "the Lord." If this reasoning be admitted, we have still further interesting evidence of the clash of christological opinion before the introduction of the logos-doctrine as a solvent. In fact the very pages of Hermas in themselves considered will exemplify the collision between apotheosis doctrines and incarnation doctrines.

THE MYSTICISM OF A MODERNIST

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The current conception divides religious from scientific belief, so that it seems almost as if religious belief supplied our emotional needs and scientific belief did not. Put into crude terms, this is the sense in which all maintainers of old creeds, who are not merely obscurantist, oppose the dismemberment of tradition. They even say that it is not the mere sentiment which attaches to an inheritance from the past that makes an old creed seem necessary to an intelligent man. For this intelligent man must have in his life a glamor such as science can never give, and the glamor comes from the religious creed. On this ground the mysticism which has always accompanied and exalted intellectual views of the universe must be sought from our traditional creeds, for it can never arise from science and history.

It is our purpose here to maintain the opposite. We shall endeavor to show how a mysticism may arise from the acceptance of science and history as the only possible intellectual views of the universe. So that what has been the chief argument for the maintenance of inherited creeds will be seen to be false. It does not in fact follow that the highest religious life can *only* arise from the acceptance of traditional creeds, simply because in the past there has been this connection. We are willing to admit that in the thirteenth century mysticism and deep religious feeling depended upon a belief in the eucharist as the physical body of Christ; but it by no means follows that the intellectual disagreement with such a belief implies a desertion of mysticism. This may seem very obvious; but we mean more. We mean that the highest mysticism does not depend even on the belief in a personal God, for the emotional needs of man are just as completely supplied by science and history as they ever were by any theology.

This is not, however, an argument against any form of theology. It is to be understood that if the evidence seems to show the

existence of a personal God, we must believe in his existence. But if the evidence shows nothing of the kind, we cannot excuse the continuance of our belief in a personal God on the ground that such a belief satisfies our emotional needs. We cannot, if we think that the evidence does not prove the resurrection of Christ, continue to teach children to believe it on the ground that it may give them comfort; because as much comfort may come from scientific formula or the statements of history.

Our argument depends on a conception that the continuity of religion is a continuity of form and not of content. What is called religion by the most orthodox today is no more like the "religio" of the old Romans than the religion of the fortieth century will be like the orthodoxy of today. We use the word religion therefore to indicate a life of enthusiasm for the ideal, implying some sort of belief in the value of that ideal, at least to the minds of men. Whether the ideal is conceived as a force outside us or within us is merely a matter of metaphor. "Inside" and "outside" have no meaning with reference to what is not spatial.

It will follow from this conception of religion and of religious knowledge that mysticism cannot refer solely to a form of theological sentiment; for an emotion flows from modern science, history, and philosophy, which is at least as transforming as any that ever came from theology. The new belief is not less valuable for the emotional needs of men. I shall not attempt to explain why it is possible to conceive religion and religious knowledge in such a way as I have expressed. There is indeed a law of development in this as in other kinds of experience; but for the sake of the present argument I shall assume that the enthusiasm connected with social reform and ideals of individual life is what in our day takes the place of the old devotion to the will of God and the attempt to reach heaven. I have called this enthusiasm "religion," and have therefore implied a connection between the attitude expressed in such a document as the Apostles' Creed and the attitude of the modern scientist, historian, or reformer. But I do not wish to make it a matter of words, and if "religion" cannot be so used, some other term may be found. The essential truth remains: we have today an enthusiasm for civilized intellect-

ual life in the individual and a better arrangement of society, and we have also a view of the universe very different from that of the authors of the creeds or the Bible. One cannot separate the elements of any attitude, for the complex should be judged as one whole; and therefore we may compare the modern intellectual attitude as a whole with the intellectual attitude of the thirteenth or the third century. The emotional results of these attitudes differ, and so we may compare the enthusiasm of the thirteenth century with its modern representative, and this modern enthusiasm we call by the old name.

For just as enthusiasm for social reform and individual civilization has taken the place of resignation and the desire for heaven, just as doing one's work well has taken the place of ritual, so also the insight of the philosopher, the scientist, the historian, or the reformer has taken the place of that theological sentiment which used to be called mysticism. Whether we should call this new insight "mystic" or not is another question which I do not intend to discuss; for I mean to use the word in this new sense, just as I use "religion" to express the attitude of the reformer.

The continuity of language is hardly ever a coherence of meaning. The content of a word is sometimes deliberately changed, sometimes vaguely modified; and sometimes, when the experience has changed completely, the old words are used because they are flexible and adaptable, whereas new words are hard and not easily made current. Thus we have now in use such words as "economics," the meaning of which would astonish Xenophon; "tragedy," "sacrifice," and "vote" are all used with meanings which would astonish the thirteenth century. And so I extend the meaning of the word "mysticism."

It now becomes necessary to observe, at least in a summary fashion, the psychological nature of that experience which I have called religion. It differs from the aesthetic or the purely intellectual experience of the artist or of the scientist. It is an enthusiasm for an ideal life depending upon an emotional but at the same time intellectual view of the nature of the world.

In the first place, the moods of every man vary, and with them probably his view of what is most worth doing. No man pursues with a continual enthusiasm any one definite purpose. There

are many ends, most of them good, which are pursued by every individual; for at one time he thinks of the supply of food and clothing which he needs, at another of the companionship he must maintain or increase, at another of music or painting, and at another of the retirement and rest which should follow labor. Among such moods one may be called religious; for the religious man, even in the simplest meaning of the word, does not always feel the enthusiasm which he would call religious; and the attempt to keep any mood artificially prominent produces morbidity. Among all these moods, however, unless there is a mere confusion or an entire absence of thought, there are acknowledged differences of value. Most men will admit that, however it may be in abstract philosophy, the supply of food and clothing is of less importance than the opportunity for hearing music; and one purpose may have to be sacrificed for another, or one may be regarded as means and the other as end. So that there is some sort of connection between these different purposes other than that bare connection which is implied when we say that they are the purposes of the same individual; and it may be possible, within limits, to suppose that one purpose so dominates others that it may become the ruling passion of a life. As with the purposes for which a man works, so with the moods through which he passes, one tends to dominate the others and to form the *temperament* of the man.

Now if absolutism reduces all the variety of life to mere appearance and therefore explains away life itself, the new realism, as far as I understand it, makes of this variety only a monotonous succession of disconnected facts. Against realism we must urge the differences in value in different experiences; and against absolutism, the reality of every experience, however transient, and by reality I mean that such experiences are irreducible and not to be smoothed out into a flux or a system.

It seems that we can go farther than realism generally does in relating our experiences to one another, and we cannot go so far as absolutism generally does. That there are hints, half-meanings, and implications in every sentence seems to be true, and therefore the exactness of realism misrepresents life; but on the other hand we cannot make these hints and implications, as absolut-

ism does, the ground for erasing the distinction between true and false. So that in the end we accept as a description of the modern man an account of various moods, one not destroyed by the other, and of various purposes, one not destroyed by the other. The connection of such moods is organic, and therefore the acceptance of an intellectual statement such as that of evolution changes all the other beliefs of the man. The complex whole which results may be called the modern mind; and it is impossible to suppose that the emotion flowing from modern views is in any sense the *same* as that which came from theological beliefs. Absolutism should not extinguish the variety of intellectual statements in a mere flux of feeling. The emotional view resulting from science is not the same in value as the emotional view coming from mediaeval philosophy. One creed is not as good as another. One mythology is not as good as another.

But what of this modern emotion?

At certain moments there comes an insight which transforms the world and reinterprets the individual life. Whether we say that then new facts come under observation or that then we are momentarily capable of observing more exactly, the result is the same. These moments of insight are used for guidance in the more normal episodes of life. And so in the midst of historical research or of scientific investigation an occasional moment seems to transform the world, just as to the old theologians of the middle ages there seemed to come a sudden divine illumination. For if we read in St. Bonaventura or St. Thomas of the moment at which intellectual labor seems to pass into divine vision and then turn to read in Darwin or in Creighton of the transformation in the scientist or the historian, we seem to perceive a like process ending in a like emotion.

Again, as, in the individual, life varies in value through its different moments, so in the race one individual varies from another. In questions of art one man has insight and another has not. In science one man may learn by rote all the details of fact and yet preserve untouched an antiquated view of the world, while another will see the whole aspect of things in a new light when he has appreciated scientific truth. Again, whether new visions of fact come into existence or certain men are more capable than

others of seeing fact, does not at present concern us: the result is the same. There is a difference of value in the visions of reality among different men. And, once again, this is what we read in the old literature of religious experience of the distinction between the mystic and the unilluminated. So that we are compelled to recognize in modern terms, as successors to the old visionaries, not the worshippers of cabalistic signs and symbolic phrases, but the scientist and the historian. But since in reference to religious experience there is prevalent a very great amount of nonsense, something must now be said as to the claims of visionaries. Mysticism is a dangerous word, because it is sometimes used to hide an entire absence of intelligence. Claims to special insight are made by men ignorant of science, history, or philosophy, and often as deaf to real music and blind to real painting as it is possible to be. Their claims are made on the ground that religious experience is their special province,—that, ignorant as they may be, blind and deaf to every art, yet they have an enthusiasm which may be justly called religious.

Now we have admitted the distinction between religious and other experience. We shall also admit that there may be religious genius, as there may be scientific or artistic genius. Even if "religious" means only moral or only political, still there is a distinct region of fact to which this word refers. But in the first place having religious experience does not entitle a man to respect as an authority on historical or scientific questions. If you have an enthusiasm for an ideal of life, it does not follow that those statements are true which you say are necessary for the maintenance of that enthusiasm. The Christian preacher may be virtuous and he may produce virtue in others, and yet he may be quite wrong both as to the fact that Christ was born of a virgin and as to the fact that virtue even in himself depends on such a belief. To be believed on the former point he should be a trained historian, and on the second point he should be a psychologist. The man who says that his finest enthusiasm "depends upon" a theological creed may be wrong: the enthusiasm even in him may depend upon modern views of the world which he breathes in during his every-day life and of which he is almost unconscious. And, again, religious enthusiasm is of varying degrees; or we may

put it that religion has various stages of development. It may be that the religious enthusiasm is of the primitive kind: that enthusiasm may be directed, let us say, only to the life of the soul. The gospel of resignation may be preached, so that the starving man is told to be content and virtuous and to live a worthy life, even though his body is dying. Religion may be directed to the production of such an attitude. But that would be a very primitive form of religious enthusiasm, because it is childish to suppose that the soul of a man can progress if his body is dying by inches. The fallacies of inadequate thought on this subject are countless, and most of them are due either to the approval of a whole because the part is good or to the calling a less evil good because there is a greater evil.

Now my present point is that a primitive religious enthusiasm may have connected with it a special insight, but that insight cannot be regarded as more valuable than the insight of a more developed mind. It is easier to imagine and perhaps to experience the insight of a simple form of enthusiasm than it is to understand or feel the insight of a greater knowledge. Therefore "real" insight is often confounded with its most primitive form. But it is reasonable to suppose that the mind grows as a whole; and therefore there is every reason to suppose that the finer intelligence may have also the finer religious experience. All forms of intuitional philosophy either involve the mistake of setting back the clock or are used as excuses for maintaining a primitive experience. Bergson seems to set us back for the obtaining of truth to a mere awareness of the flux of life. At least his interpreters often set aside the insight of the scientist in favor of the bare perception of the common man. Intuition, if contrasted with intellect, is misleading. And in the same way Eucken seems to seek some very restricted way and not the plain road of intelligence in order to reach the vision of the divine. The life of the spirit is divided from that of nature; and again the clock is set back. We are supposed to find the finer religious experience only in unscientific or non-historical minds. The insight of the barbarian is contrasted with the learning by rote of a civilized man: the learning by rote is then called science or history, and the conclusion is evident that such science and history are not so

valuable for the understanding of life. But no one ever supposed that learning by rote was science or history except for the purpose of avoiding labor or excusing ignorance. If the science or history, not of school-boys but of constructive and critical minds, is contrasted with the finest insight of the barbarian, it will be seen how much more of religious enthusiasm there is in the more developed mind. We cannot complain against science and history as barren unless we understand the passion that made them. The appreciation of a feeling of general flux which may arise when all the detail of science and history is blotted out is no better understanding of the nature of life. It may be better than a learning of formulae: it is not better than an appreciation of detailed scientific knowledge.

Now if we suppose that there is no sacred and special way towards knowledge of fact, but that insight is as much to be experienced in abstract science and detailed history as in the vaguer and more primitive philosophy of the creeds and the Bible, then it follows that the insight of a man of science and historian is more valuable than that of the ignorant in proportion as the civilized life is more valuable than the barbaric. Nor is it possible to suppose *a priori* that "religious" insight is higher when scientific knowledge is more primitive; although it may seem that such is the case. The evidence must be reviewed. We must compare the religious insight of the present with that of the past. The evidence shows that one past age excels in painting and another in architecture; but we cannot, unless we are mere *laudatores temporis acti*, say *a priori* that any age of the past excels the present in *any* sphere. And the evidence at present seems to show an enthusiasm arising out of modern knowledge which transforms life as much as the older creeds did.

I am inclined to believe that the facts which appear, or the life which seems good, at exceptional moments in the average man's life is the same as that which appears normally to the exceptional man. When death draws the curtain for the average man, he sees the same fact which is seen more continuously by the philosopher. The resulting emotion may be called mystic, but it is very different in quality from the emotion that follows upon appreciation of an orthodox creed. I do not now compare the

two. I state simply the existence of a transforming emotion derived from an appreciation of the modern view of the world. That is the mysticism of the modernist. That, and not the sentimentalism due to hearing a creed recited or seeing a ritual, is the true mysticism. For the associations of an old creed and ritual certainly produce in the mind an emotion; it is the emotion of memory. Mysticism is the emotion of hope. It looks forward and not back. It builds anew, it does not simply reinstate the old.

This is the point of growth in modern religion. It is here, where the normal touches the exceptional, that the advance is being made which preserves the genuine life of religion. For whereas the modernist has to explain to the orthodox that he values the tradition of the past, he must keep clear in his own mind the appreciation of the future. More Catholic than the pope, he allows not merely for the past but for the revelation which is to come. And what sort of world appears when we use exceptional moments of our own or the continued insight of exceptional men in order to make our philosophy?

To begin with the more practical issue as to the ideal life, it is clear that the individual life is not to be valued with reference only to success and failure. For, not knowing the effects in the far future, we cannot judge of success and failure. And yet we can say that certain efforts are worth making, as for instance Mazzini's, and certain efforts apparently more effective, as for instance Napoleon's, are not so much worth making. It seems to me also that we can say that the issues of good and evil in life are not all to be rendered in the terms of temporal consequences. From all such statements arises an emotional enthusiasm which is the true mysticism.

As to the life of the race in which our own individual life is lived, it seems clear that the idea of progress is mistaken. Progress within a certain limited time there certainly is.

> "We build like corals, grave by grave,
> That have a pathway sunward."

But the worlds of life which have now disappeared seem to prove that the present system of life will eventually decay. Whether

a better or more "spiritual" will take its place or not, most of what we now hold valuable will disappear. "The old proud pageant of man" will conclude with a jest or a tragedy, and, whether the gods laugh or weep, the play will be over. But our statement of all this results in lifting us high above the mere succession of things.

As to the scene upon which life appears, that too changes its appearance when it is seen at exceptional moments. High up above the blue which bounds our normal sight is the open space of other stars and skies. Deep down within the normal appearance of our daily life are the vast facts of destroying passion and inevitable death, but also of transforming joy and the disdain of death.

If I end now with no clear statement of any transforming vision, it is not because such a vision is impossible or even at present non-existent. My hesitation is due not to the weakness of my own conviction but to my respect for the convictions of others. It seems as though we had come to the summit from which we look out upon a new and unexplored ocean, as those first Spaniards looked out over the Pacific. Most men come to such a point at some moments in life, and exceptional men live more continuously close to the summit. But the world which all see is the same.

THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

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No one who has studied the history of the last century can fail to be struck by the great changes which have taken place in human thought, affecting the whole outlook of man in his relation to the world both within and without and constituting a revolution in the intellectual life of our times. The most permanent forces in human life have been brought face to face with new facts, new conditions, and new ideas, and nowhere do we find the evidences of this change in outlook greater than in the sphere of religion, where the old problems and the old controversies are passed or passing. One of the great questions of today is, as a recent writer has said, "whether Christianity can come to terms with the awakening self-consciousness of modern civilization, equipped with a vast mass of new scientific knowledge and animated for the first time by ideals which are not borrowed from classical or Hebrew antiquity."[1] But Christianity itself has already been deeply influenced by some of the changes which have taken place. The great forces of history press steadily upon all the institutions of society and the form or expression of the religious life is profoundly affected by the movements of thought or changes in sentiment which take place in human society.

A favorite illustration has long been to liken the Church to the Ark in which are gathered those who are to be carried safely across the stormy sea of Time to the haven where they would be. The figure has other suggestions, however, than the old ecclesiastical one. The church may be a ship floating upon the stream of time: the controversies, disputes, differences, agreements, and opinions are all of interest, but meanwhile the stream is bearing the ship onward, and quite as interesting a matter, and a more important one, is the question, Where is the stream taking it, and what doing to it? The cross-currents and eddies which dis-

[1] R. W. Inge, Faith and its Psychology, p. vi.

turb the surface of a river often blind us to the real fact that these whirlpools which seem to endanger the vessel are themselves swept steadily forward by an invisible current which constitutes the real force of the stream. If one can get the direction of this current and calculate the forces which are sweeping it on, one gets a clearer view of the meaning of things than if he considers a narrower group of phenomena.

What, then, are the most vital forces in our present history? What ones have acted most effectively during the last hundred years? Though civilization is an organic growth, and history an unbroken chain, we can still characterize each age by the way in which certain elements of its life have taken the lead in shaping the mind and the mood of the world. It is not an exaggeration to say that no other two ideas or forces have had such influence in the last hundred years as Democracy and Science. Whether one likes or dislikes them,—and there are many whose dislike is most unfeigned,—it cannot be disputed that, as shaping forces in the life of the world today, no other ideas have had such a vital influence as these.

The warning cry which Goethe uttered against "the Anglo-saxon contagion" was at bottom a protest against rising democracy, and in the next generation, Renan, the most accomplished critic in Europe could see in the growing power and influence of the people only the huge, half-human form of Caliban. Yet the political institutions of Europe have been transformed by the democratic spirit, and those countries which have done the most for civilization and are now the most powerful, are, at least in theory and law, the most democratic. One of the most thoughtful students of the great forces of history today has said: "It is no mere platitude that we have reached the threshold of a new age. Democracy, Nationality, Socialism, the constitution of the modern State, the standing of the churches—all have come within the attraction of forces hitherto unknown." [2] Every social disturbance, every national movement, every theoretical discussion of the great problems of history and civilization, is influenced by this full and vital idea of democracy. Its growth is one of the mysteries of history, and its definition defies all categories. It is not political

[2] John Morley, Critical Essays, vol. iv, p. 281.

equality, civil rights, representative institutions alone. It is all these and much more,—a new spirit in the world, which looks out on life from a new point of view, a burning consciousness of personality bound up with the sense of wide and universal relations. This it is which makes democracy the most powerful social force of the modern world. When it has been resisted, revolution has invariably followed. It has inspired the passion for national independence which changed the map of Europe during the last century. When it has been opposed or suppressed by authority, it has gone to extremes and formulated theories of socialism and anarchy which are not its natural evolution. It is the most dissolving force ever brought to bear upon old institutions and the ancient organization of society and the most penetrating spirit which has touched the mind of the modern man. It seems to work with the relentlessness of a physical law. For more than a hundred years it has been moving steadily forward through the civilization of the western world, and now, strangest sight of all, this most revolutionary and fiery force of modern history is disturbing and inspiring the immobility of the East.

To political institutions and political theorizers it is the greatest portent in history. To some it is the hag at the foot of the guillotine, counting the heads of the aristocrats as they fall into the basket; to others it is the young goddess upon the mountain top, with the Phrygian cap upon her head and something of the Phrygian madness in her eye. It has no traditions and cherishes few memories, is devoid of reverence or respect for the past and has about it something of the ruthlessness of the glacier. All anachronisms, all unreality, are swept away by the slow-moving torrent.

On the side of social and political privilege democracy has been brought into conflict with religion or religious institutions, and it has again and again been called irreligious and atheistic because of its attitude towards these institutions. When we look at history frankly, without personal or party prejudice, we see that the vast mass of Christian institutions have been anti-democratic in their origin; that is, they rest upon privilege. All religious institutions and organizations follow the type presented by the social development and constitution of the age in which they

arise. In the reconstruction of society after the fall of the Roman Empire and before the consolidation of the modern states, while the mass of the population was still heathen, Christianity was the religion of the governing classes, with the cities as its centres, and when the villagers or pagans were christianized, they became members of a church already based upon aristocratic principles. As a result, when any political disturbance has seemed to trench upon the hereditary powers, the great rallying cries have always been "Throne and Altar" or "Church and King." There is nothing discreditable to religion in this attitude; it is simply the struggle between the past and the future; and whatever the abuses and tyrannies of the past have been, democracy is now the spirit which holds the future in its hands.

As a consequence of the century of struggle, we find that the church, as a privileged institution and a legal establishment, has been steadily losing ground. The oldest political institution in Europe, the papacy, is shorn of all its temporalities, and as the nations one by one advance in culture and intellectual progress, the church is everywhere being displaced from its position of privilege. One need not say, as its opponents often do, that the church is in spirit essentially and necessarily anti-democratic; the contrary might be affirmed without much question; but as an historical institution it has seemed for many centuries to be on the anti-democratic side of human affairs, and with the rise of the new social order the disestablishment of every church in Europe seems inevitable. So high a representative of the existing order as the late Lord Coleridge, chief justice of England, felt the difficulty of reconciling an established church with the democratic spirit.

Not only as an institution has the church felt the influence of democracy; it has also been affected in its interior life. Democracy knows nothing and cares nothing for historical precedents; what it demands is efficiency. The doctrine of efficiency may seem to some to be overworked in the present day, but in opposition to the historic platitudes which are continually brought forth by ecclesiastics and theologians, it has vitality, for it represents the working convictions of a huge mass of sincere and upright, though unlearned, men. Tell such as these of the great

antiquity of certain institutions and of their unquestioned right to demand the acquiescence and obedience of men; this has to them much the air of political party appeals, and democracy is cold, feeling that the age of an institution is rather proof that it needs to be overhauled and adapted to the needs of the modern situation. No doubt in many if not most instances this is totally wrong in theory and springs out of an intelligence exceedingly crude and sadly disrespectful to history. But the great democratic mass goes on serenely, neither caring for criticism nor heeding complaints. Accomplished facts are what make to it the most convincing appeal.

To be a prevailing force, religion must recognize the essentially religious nature of each individual and recognize that the only strong appeal is that of actual life and not of historical or philosophical theory. Nothing is more striking than the diffusion of the democratic spirit in the churches of our own land. Those which represent this instinct of the masses are far more extended and far greater in numbers than the purely historic churches; for the membership of the Roman Catholic church is to a great extent of comparatively recent immigration. Even this church, with all its anti-modern tendencies, has to reckon with the democratic spirit. When a representative of the people which has traditionally been most loyal and submissive to the Holy See says, "We will take our religion from Rome, but not our politics," we see that a new spirit is abroad and that the union of submission and freedom will soon break, on one side or the other. In our own land at least, a church which does not recognize that to succeed or fail with the plain people is to succeed or fail as a religious institution, is in a bad way. It was told of a thoughtful English scholar that when an attempt was made to excite his alarm against the church of Rome by quoting the number of aristocratic families or parts of families which had been converted to that church, he replied: "Show me where the grocer and the workingman is turning to the Church of Rome and then I shall begin to feel uneasy about the Church of England." The real problem is not to win over the rich or the fashionable, but to get hold of the common people. So the church which will make itself most effective, and will have the largest influence in shaping

the social life and moral growth of the nation, is the one which recognizes the full meaning of the democratic spirit.

In addition to the expressed or unexpressed desire for efficiency, first, last, and always, there is a deep, inarticulate wish, springing out of the heart of democracy, for simplicity. And by simplicity is meant something real, effective, connected directly with the moral and spiritual life, and necessarily something which can be stated so clearly and plainly that the wayfaring man will not misunderstand. A noble English missionary bishop once said, "There is nothing essential to the gospel of Jesus Christ which cannot be made plain to the dullest savage in five minutes." If this be not true, the universality of the gospel is at once destroyed. If it be true, there is much in the way in which the gospel is presented to men that needs to be corrected. Such a process of simplification would indeed make terrible work with theology, but it would help men to get hold of what is vital, and that would be an immense advance over the incredible abstractions which have been and are still set forth to men as the things by which they shall live. The attitude of the democratic spirit towards all these subtleties of theology is one of indifference as well as ignorance. It does not understand them nor does it pretend to understand, and, with all respect, it does not care to understand.

What shall be done with this recalcitrant mass which cries out for simplicity? We know too well what is done,—the plausible theories, the so-called "truths of the gospel," the barbarous and vulgar inventions which are set forth in the name of simplicity. The cry of the Roman proletariat, "panem et circenses," has found its echo in many of the efforts which the necessities of the case have developed in this modern world, with its burden of ignorance, poverty, and seething unrest, and, as a result, much is done under the name of Christian charity which sacrifices true manhood and nobleness of character. This however seems to be unavoidable. The problem of presenting religion to a large, free, and to a great extent unintelligent democracy has never before been attempted by the Christian church, and it was to be expected that many blunders and mistakes should be made before the energy could find its proper expression and exert its full power.

Simplicity does not mean crudeness or vulgarity, though these are often mistaken for it. A real faith in democracy involves the highest appeals and the noblest response, or at least the possibility of these; but the process of readjustment to new conditions must be slow, with many halting steps and many backward glances to the old paths on which past ages moved. Though circumstances change, though social conditions are profoundly modified, though new economic and moral questions present a different front to the anxious eye, the underlying facts of human nature and the eagerness and restlessness of the human soul are still the same, and they are groping for and dumbly craving the old eternal satisfactions. The absolute freedom of democracy in the field of the spirit brings to light new and morbid excesses and strange, even grotesque, expressions of the religious instinct. Probably few more unscientific, unphilosophical, and unreasonable religious movements have spread so widely and so rapidly as those we find in our own so-called enlightened democracy of today. It is these things which rouse contempt and fear for the uncertain ends of a democratic age. Yet these same things reveal the real ineffectiveness of the general religious attitude towards the broad movements of our social life. If truth is intended for men, if they have a natural appetite and capacity for it, then it is possible to present every truth, even the most abstract and subtle, the most profound and spiritual, to every man. One of the great reasons why Phillips Brooks exercised such a wide and noble influence was that this was one of the deepest convictions of his own soul, and he applied it always with fearless confidence. "The people will get the heart out of the most thorough and thoughtful sermon, if only it really is a sermon. Even subtlety of thought, the tracing of intricate relations of ideas, it is remarkable how men of no subtle thought will follow it, if it is really preached."[3]

As one looks over the tumult of our modern democratic society, it often seems to be entirely without idealism of any high and inspiring character; all its ends are material, all its convictions utilitarian. Yet the paean of "Triumphant Democracy" which was chanted in rather strident tones a generation ago, has already

[3] Lectures on Preaching, p. 113.

lost something of its force and is less and less assertive, as moral unrest and spiritual hunger disturb its self-confidence. It is beginning to be understood that the denial of idealism has brought the cheapening of life, the vulgarizing of the human soul and the repudiation of those "high instincts" which make the worth of life, and that the vindication of the reality of man's spiritual nature is the first step towards a sure appeal to the multitude. Religion is idealism, and in the directness and simplicity of its appeal lies its moral efficiency. The prime necessity of a democracy is character, for character is the foundation of national life. A thoughtful English historian says, "The essential qualities of national greatness are moral not material."[4] To strengthen this conviction and build upon it will widen the power of religion and bring the spiritual significance of life before men as the most impressive and important of realities.

To say, however, that democracy as we now understand it is to be the ultimate form of human society is to deny the law of social evolution, which is progress; to define the outcome of that progress is at once to set the bounds and end the movement of our social life; but for the present and the immediate future, democracy is the great factor in the political evolution of the most modern and progressive nations.

Far removed from the turbulent life of the crowd, the noise of success and defeat, the strife of parties and the struggle of politics, exists another movement quite as significant, yet to the vast mass comparatively unknown and unintelligible,—that is, the progress of science. Its economic and material effects are part of the means by which our modern industrial and democratic society has been able to establish itself. These, however, are but the outward application of conceptions which have profoundly changed the whole order of human thought. For the real meaning and worth of science to the student of history is the change in the world of thought, the new horizon and the new methods. Since the time when the Copernican system swept away the cosmology that had ruled the world from the Babylonian days, the new knowledge and the new conceptions have been creating a new world and a new mind in that world.

[4] Lecky, History of England, vol. i, p. 490.

In its broadest aspect, science is the organized expression of that passion for truth which has always been the distinguishing feature of man's history, but in its more technical sense it means that body of laws and truths which are most specifically the result of the application of the inductive method to the field of human investigations. To many, science, on account of its revolutionary character, has seemed to be but another name for atheism and destruction, and its progress only wider devastation. This feeling no doubt has some ground in what has been said and written on both sides of the question, but much of it is due to a confusion of terms and a misunderstanding of the real problem. "The controversy between science and religion," as it was once called, is now seldom heard except among those vociferous orators who always seek an audience and find the warmest welcome where there is the least intelligence. But the much-discussed controversy was in fact misstated. There never was any controversy between science and religion. The battle was between science and theology and often between scientists and theologians, in both of which cases the problem is entirely different. Theology is simply the thoughts, theories, and reflections of men upon problems which are forever with us and upon which we may always expect more light. That any conclusions should be infallible to any degree, if there are degrees in infallibility, depends entirely upon the knowledge and power of the individual mind. To take these conclusions, no matter how carefully drawn or from whatever sources of knowledge, and then affirm their undying truth, their unchanging form and their everlasting authority, is simply to affirm that progress in knowledge has finally ended. Nowhere has such an assumption been more conclusively denied than in theology itself. Science therefore is but the living continuation of the same conviction in a new field and with new methods. How it has altered, when it has not destroyed, many of the theological theories of the past can be seen by contrasting with them any of the most elementary handbooks on geology, astronomy, or biology, to go no farther afield. But religion, or the religious instinct, has not been destroyed and is no longer denied. Rather it is affirmed with unfaltering conviction by the most severely scientific students and thinkers of our own day.

The three primary factors in all our thinking, God, the universe, and man, and the two elements of religion, man and God, have been entirely changed in their relation to each other, and new conceptions have sprung out of the new knowledge. God is no longer the mechanician, standing outside of and apart from a universe which he has constructed and which requires his constant care and attention lest it get out of order, as was thought by Paley and the deists; but he is the living energy which moves forever:

> "A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things."

The universe is a vast organism in which the divine life finds its manifestation. Mind and will, thought and cause, play in endless expression through the changing evolution of the visible. The bright glare which revealed the outlines of a stiff and rigid mechanism is veiled in mystery through which the energy of a vital will is forever throbbing. Man, his own greatest mystery, stands no longer as a fallen angel whose degradation fills life with an unspeakable melancholy after the supreme moment when heaven lay about him in his infancy. But in the midst of vast cosmic forces which through endless time have slowly evolved the conditions of his existence, he stands at last and looks back to the darkness out of which he came, to the depths from which he rose.

The moral value of the difference in point of view is enormous. The new standpoint checks the rashness of the dogmatist and the audacity of the anarchist. Civilization is seen to be not the degradation of a lost race or the contrivance of a selfish despotism. It is the result of a long travail which stretches back beyond the rim of history and rests upon the movement of the stars. At its roots lie the prayers and struggles which through the long ages of the life of humanity have followed the sun round a sorrowing world. The scientific interpretation of the universe has given a new meaning and a new worth to civilization. We see that the difference between barbarism and civilization does not lie in material achievements or intellectual conquests but in the ethical values which have come after fierce struggle, awful waste, and

mighty conflicts between striving ideals. So the solution of history lies not in physical conquests or material success, but in moral growth, and that means time and suffering.

It is the method of science rather than its results, the conceptions upon which it rests rather than the conclusions which it has reached, that are most significant for theology and religion. It is but little more than fifty years since Darwin placed before the world the first results of his great investigations. His tone was so modest and the significance of his work so little apparent that some years passed before the full meaning of his vast generalization was recognized. There are those now living who can remember the cry of fear and horror which then rose upon the air. Many careful constructions of theologians and philosophers which had been built up so painfully through the ages were swept away. The skilful theories which had sought to interpret the divine mind were shattered as they stood. God, man, the universe, religion, all the tender and noble memories and instincts of the race, seemed thrown down in one wide and universal ruin, while a blind and mysterious force in unknown ways moulded unconscious matter into the things which are. Many of these passionate champions of orthodoxy would rub their eyes if they were to enter into the inner life of the world's best and most inspiring thought today. The fundamental conception of the scientist has become the heart of the world's most vigorous thinking. The theory of evolution is the working hypothesis of every great and progressive science which occupies the mind of man.

In its sweep and operation the scientific spirit has many resemblances to the democratic, and works unconsciously for the same ends. Science is as jealous of prerogative and privilege as democracy. It recognizes no sacred preserves and has invaded the territory hitherto so jealously guarded by the ecclesiastic and the theologian. It refuses to believe that any class of men are endowed with the power to work a daily miracle or speak authoritatively the mind of God. Religion itself has become the study not of the theologian alone, but of the psychologist, philosopher, and scientist. Philology too, working on the strictest scientific principles, has opened up new fields of knowledge, and the theory of evolution is the power by which are called forth

the secrets of archaeology, the history of man, and the primitive institutions of society. In the field of church history, including the history of doctrine as well as of institutions, the play of universal laws is recognized and the development and growth of all ideas and institutions is seen to conform to the principles which prevail in the whole order of things. The foundations of Christian doctrine are uncovered and shown to rest, not as was once supposed, entirely in the Christian consciousness, but largely in historical conditions and metaphysical theories. Everywhere the story is the same. There are no sacred regions, no closed territory where science cannot venture and evolution must be excluded in the interests of theological or historical systems and theories.

Like democracy, science asks for reality, and the only reality it recognizes is that which is demonstrated in the facts of life and character. So though it touches religion with no partial eye or tender hand, it grasps the problem with a wider conception than lay behind much of the theological interpretations of the past. It assumes the validity of all forms of religion and recognizes their truthfulness as expressions of the essentially religious nature of man, while it differentiates them not on the basis of race, history, or theology, but on ethical and spiritual grounds. The revelation of the divine in the world is from everlasting to everlasting, but the highest revelation, the truest religion, comes through the struggle for existence, and stands as the highest because it survives and proves through life and history its working value and its spiritual worth. This scientific point of view is often shocking to sensitive and reverent minds, but it has this great merit at least, that it is founded on reality and so satisfies one of the requirements of democracy.

When we compare these two forces of our modern world and penetrate into their inner constitution and meaning, we find that they have many resemblances and are working in the same direction though not on the same plane. In its general view of society, science asks for laws and facts scientifically understood instead of theories based upon ignorance, prejudice, or selfishness. Science like democracy is a striking illustration of what may be called the economy of the universe. A single force once set in motion

may and does produce a variety of effects as it moves in different fields of activity and operation. To enumerate all the modifications and influences which have sprung from this creative idea would involve a view of all the activities of human thought. It not only suggests unknown results in the future, but it throws an illuminating light upon the past. The theory of evolution enables us to understand, as no other theory does, the story of the past of man as an organic development of partial truths and imperfectly apprehended ideas working out to a completer and fuller expression through the infinite vicissitudes of life. When we regard this new theory from the point of view of co-operation with the great forces of democracy, we see that the effectiveness which the latter calls for is embodied in the working of principles and laws which lie behind the origin of society itself and antedate the beginnings of man's history. It declares also that these laws, or laws working by this method, will rule through all the ages yet to come. Man's achievements are not left to the passion or pride of his own will but rest upon that sublime obedience which is the glory of the stars and the moral splendor of the saint. The simplicity in religion which democracy demands is asserted as the divine method by the fundamental conceptions of science, and for the wilful choices of men it substitutes a uniform system of laws, thus strengthening and re-enforcing the affirmation of the theologian that the law of the Spirit never varies in its operation or changes in its results.

To the eyes of many the whole course and tendency of these great forces seems ominous and burdened with disaster. They are "the two-handed engine at the door" which "strikes once and strikes no more." Sacred traditions, venerable institutions, long-established theories, and time-honored convictions seem falling into one huge ruin. The actual achievements seem but a poor and inadequate compensation for so much that is vanishing and soon to pass away. The red spectre of anarchy lurks in the shadow of the ruins of our social and political institutions: the golden glow of a vivid faith which made life radiant to so many beautiful souls in the ages gone by fades away in the cheerless gloom which gross desires and austere conceptions seem to create. The whole movement and process seems critical, nega-

tive, and destructive. No preserving power for the high sanctities and the inner life of the soul seems to issue from these forces which are sweeping society into new fortunes and new faiths. But, "though much is taken, much abides." A period of great change in history always means advance and progress when it is the result of a vigorous and energetic movement in the world's life, and surely no century since the sixteenth has had so splendid a story as the one we have just passed through, turbulent and revolutionary as it has been.

Let us glance at some of the things which abide and which stand today with new meaning, new values, and new power. With reference to the stability and permanence of civilization both the forces we have named are of immense significance. The broad basis of a democratic self-consciousness is a firmer foundation for social order than the narrow support of the most intelligent aristocracy. In the one case the strength is inherent in the whole organism, in the latter it belongs only to a part of that organism even if it be the better part. In the case of science we not only find a new and strengthening element in the conceptions of history which tends to deepen the meaning of the social fabric, but there is also added to the life of the community a great class of thoughtful and cultivated minds who divide with the old leaders many of the duties and all the responsibilities which belong to civilization.

When we consider the spiritual elements which are at the basis of the new type of character begotten by both these great forces, we see the emphasis laid primarily upon the idea of freedom. Both science and democracy assume the necessity of freedom. Now liberty is not, as many think and have thought in the past, a means to an end. It has always been the attitude of authority and privilege to make this confusion, or at least to accept it and to puzzle the instinct which was working for liberty, by making reforms in society and feeding the passion of the soul with the things of the body. Freedom is not a mere privilege or opportunity for truth, but a supreme spiritual truth itself. It is not the right to think this or that particular thing, but the atmosphere of the soul itself, the very necessity which impels to all the highest realizations of life and character. For the man of science,

freedom is the breath of life. Without it he may attain results, but he does not achieve that nobleness of mind which is the finest expression of truth. The only inconsistency which freedom will not forgive is the inconsistency of not being free. For truth is not truth to the soul unless it is voluntarily and gladly, yes, passionately, sought and obeyed. Freedom is as necessary as truth itself, for it is necessary to truth. Often in its energy and activity it seems radical, eccentric, and revolutionary, but it is the fundamental condition of life in this new world which has grown out of the old, and is the underlying power of both democracy and science.

As a creative element in the growing life of the soul, freedom has sharpened and emphasized the consciousness of personality until at times man feels alone and unfed by human hands. The man of science is an individualist by virtue of his purpose and his freedom. He cannot be otherwise. The democratic passion for liberty has fired the heart of the martyr, and the martyr is the most perfect individualist the world knows. For individualism is only the expression of the belief in the supreme worth of each soul, which has its origin and inspiration in the heart of the gospel. The ecclesiastic, with his reverence for the authority of the past, and the socialist, with his contempt for it, join hands in denouncing the "exaggerated individualism" which is the child of the freedom they both fear. These exaggerations are necessary stages in the process of evolution and are in time corrected by the workings of experience. For individualism in the true sense of the word, the deep appreciation of the essential elements of personality as primary in the growth of life, strengthens the social instinct and accepts as holy the law which guards the social organism. The strength of a vital and stable as well as progressive society lies not in the mere aggregation and coherence of its parts, but in the elevation and development of the social units.

Christianity itself has not escaped the influence of this vast scientific movement, and one of the most significant results of this last century of its history lies in a field which seems purely technical and remote from the living interests of the ordinary man. For more than a century the New Testament has been the storm centre of one of the most active controversies which

have ever taken place in the history of the Christian church. The various results which have been attained need not and could not be here stated, but one which is of supreme interest to the world is the new conception of the character and person of Christ. The forms of expression have not so much altered as the sense of his life and person which are of the greatest spiritual significance. Never before has he been seen as he is now seen, even in the apostolic age. The theories which have been identified with him, and to which he has too often been subordinated, have fallen away as the shadows that darken the fountain to which men come to drink are banished by the light. He stands out now more clearly, in the simplicity of his moral and spiritual power, than he has ever before been seen. Those who first knew him and loved him most, did not and could not see all that he was and all that he would be and would do for man and in man. It is the historical reality of this personal influence through races and ages, through the infinite variety and conflict of different forces and stages in civilization, which makes him the profoundest fact in our modern life. As a spiritual force he is related to men in their highest endeavors and most lasting achievements everywhere. He is the Universal Man, the Son of Man, the Divine Democrat, "the purest of the mighty, the mightiest of the pure, who with His pierced hands lifted a world." His message comes clear and straight, answering to the deepest needs of man's deepest nature. He stands before the soul that is swathed in the grave-clothes of selfishness, sin, and death, bound hand and foot by the fetters of custom, tradition, and ignorance, and the clear voice, in calm and conquering tones, utters the command: "Loose him and let him go."

CHRISTIANITY AND MINISTERIAL ORDINATION[1]

AMBROSE WHITE VERNON

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The Dudleys occupy an honorable place in the history of Harvard University. The first American Dudley was Thomas, second governor of the Massachusetts colony. It was he who signed the original charter of the University in 1642 and the revised charter in 1650. His son Joseph also became governor of the colony, and of him President Josiah Quincy said, "Of all the statesmen who have been instrumental in promoting the interests of Harvard College, Joseph Dudley was most influential in giving its constitution a permanent character." Joseph's son Paul was the founder of this lectureship. He had a judicial career of forty-nine years, for the last six of which he was chief justice of the supreme judicial court. Believing, as he evidently did, that religion was the primary fountain of justice, he chose to show his interest in his college by providing her with funds so that four subjects of great moment to him should be discussed publicly, one every year. There is small wonder that the Validity of Non-episcopal Ordination, which is the subject set for our consideration tonight, should have interested him. While he was a student in college, this question which had hitherto been regarded as settled in Massachusetts colony, at least, was violently reopened. Sir Edmund Andros, the new governor sent by

[1] The Dudleian Lecture, delivered at Harvard University, April 29, 1913, on the following subject, prescribed by the founder, Paul Dudley, in 1750:

"The fourth and last Lecture I would have for the maintaining, explaining, and proving the validity of the ordination of ministers or pastors of the churches, and so their administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion, as the same hath been practised in New England from the first beginning of it, and so continued at this day. Not that I would any ways invalidate Episcopal Ordination as it is commonly called and practised in the Church of England; but I do esteem the method of ordination as practised in Scotland, at Geneva, and among the Dissenters in England, and in the churches in this country, to be very safe, scriptural, and valid; and that the great Head of the church, by his blessed Spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them accordingly and will continue so to do to the end of the world. Amen."

James II, had determined to introduce the Church of England into the colony that owed its existence to a conscientious flight from its jurisdiction and to support that church by public taxation. One of the governor's friends, the licenser of the press, wrote to the Bishop of London: "I press for able and sober ministers and we will contribute largely to their maintenance; but one thing will mainly help, when no marriages shall hereafter be allowed lawful but such as are made by the ministers of the Church of England." The sequestration of the property of "factionists" was threatened; at a public funeral there was an open rebellion when the episcopal minister attempted to read the committal service; and it looked as if the war against episcopal pretension and arrogance must once more be fought through. Had Judge Dudley witnessed the expulsion of two colonists for sedition fifty years earlier merely because they insisted upon worshipping according to the rites of the Church of England, his feeling about ecclesiastical arrogance might have been quite different. As it was, however, he retained the sense of the universal horror at the threatened loss of simple and spiritual worship which had clouded the days of his youth until he came to make his last testament. Therein he ordered that at the college which had stood so sturdily for the simple polity of the colonists, there should be delivered once every four years a lecture "for the maintaining, explaining, and proving the validity of the ordination of ministers or pastors of the churches, and so their administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion, as the same hath been practised in New England from the first beginning of it, and so continued at this day." And the curious fact is that even today it is not altogether unnecessary to defend the liberty of prophesying.

Now not only my immediate predecessors in this lectureship, but a number of other scholars of the highest rank, not only in the mother-country, not only among non-conformists, but among bishops of the Church of England, have made it clear that the ordination-ceremonies in the early church were certainly not those of the Church of England against which Judge Dudley was protesting in the formation of this lectureship, and that the idea of apostolic succession did not arise until the apostles' bodies

had lain in their obscure graves for fully fifty years. But it is by no means so clear that ordination, even of the simple sort of our New England fathers or of that more stereotyped method of the Congregational churches of today, existed in the churches that were founded by the apostles and were governed by the Holy Spirit. The question that should concern us today, I feel, is not so much the validity of non-episcopal ordination as the validity of ordination itself. That episcopal ordination is contrary to the usages of the early and apostolic church seems to me thoroughly established; the question I should like to raise is rather this: Is any sort of ordination contrary to the customs of the early church or inimical to the spirit of Jesus? Underlying even this seemingly fundamental question is, of course, the question regarding the nature and validity of the church,—a question which we shall not be able entirely to evade.

In answering this question concerning the nature and validity of ministerial ordination, so far as light is thrown upon it from the study of the New Testament, we must take our stand upon that wide consensus of New Testament scholarship of our time that differs perceptibly from the consensus of Judge Dudley's time. In his time the court of last resort regarding the validity of any ecclesiastical custom was the New Testament. In our time this is no longer true. Helped largely by the interest in this very question that Judge Dudley lays before us tonight, the scholarship of today appeals for two reasons from that ancient court of last resort. In the first place, it has been shown that the New Testament is not a single book of uniform credibility and authority but a library covering a period of from fifty to a hundred years, and that certain portions of the New Testament are to be preferred to others as witnesses to the practices of the primitive church. And in the second place, we have discovered that the early churches were no more infallible or impeccable than the churches of today, that to find out the custom even of the primitive church is not to find out the right custom, that each age has access to the Spirit of Christ, the final authority of the modern Christian man, and that where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. I shall therefore ask you in the first place to consider with me whether in the utterances of our Lord, or in the

earliest documents of the church, we find any clew to the nature of ministerial ordination, and in the second place to consider its significance and value for to-day.

The earliest entire documents in the New Testament are the early epistles of Paul but those portions at least of the Synoptic gospels probably antedate them which are contained in the Gospel of Mark and in the Logia—that collection of the sayings of our Lord which underlies the present Gospels of Matthew and Luke. The situation reflected in the Pauline letters will be clearer if we consider the place the church occupied in the mind of Jesus, as that mind is revealed by the Synoptic gospels. And we immediately find that Jesus is recorded as speaking of the church only twice. But neither of his utterances about the church comes from either of the two primitive sources of the Synoptics. The sayings are both of them found in the Gospel of Matthew alone, and the authenticity of each is, to say the least, questionable. One of them is almost clearly of later date than Jesus and of a different spirit. Jesus is thereby represented as saying to his disciples: "If thy brother sin against thee, go show him his fault alone or take with thee witnesses that every word may be certified." "And if he refuse to hear them," we suddenly read, "tell it unto the church: and if he refuse to hear the church also, let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican. Verily I say unto you, What things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." "Let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican"; but the parable of the pharisee and the publican and Jesus' treatment of Zacchaeus remind us how foreign to Jesus' spirit it is to make a publican synonymous with an outcast. One of the most frequent taunts cast at Jesus was that he ate and drank with publicans and sinners. It is therefore scarcely conceivable that in laying down an ecclesiastical rule he should have spoken of them in the accents of a pharisee. Moreover, when he spoke these words, there was no church of any kind which could refuse to hear anybody. There were disciples who went about the lanes of Galilee at the side of Jesus, and who went with him into the synagogue to worship, just as there were disciples of many a Jewish rabbi. The word church comes into

the narrative quite unheralded and unmotived. The passage at many a point bears earmarks of its late origin, and because it does, it makes us suspicious of the only other passage in which Jesus is represented as even mentioning the word church. This is the famous passage in which he declares that Simon is Peter, and upon that rock will he build his church, and that the gates of hell will not prevail against it. Here indeed the church may be considered as still in the future, and therefore the passage may not necessarily be charged with being an anachronism. Yet there are two reasons which tend to confirm our suspicion of the authenticity of these words. In the first place, they fail in the earlier account of Mark, which has evidently served as the skeleton of this. Moreover, just those words fail, and only those which emphasize the supernatural dignity of the church, a most fatally familiar conception of later times. And in the second place, we are amazed to discover almost precisely the same words which in our former passage were addressed to the disciples in general now addressed to Peter alone. For we read, "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." This sentence, in anything like an honest interpretation of it, is so completely foreign to the spirit of him who said, "Suffer the little children to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven," that we cannot seriously reckon with it as a word of the Lord. These two passages, against whose authenticity both external and internal evidence witness, are the only ones in which our Synoptic evangelists represent Jesus as mentioning the church. Both the Gospel of Mark—the earliest gospel—and the Gospel of Luke went out to confirm the certainty of the things wherein Christians had been instructed with no single word from the Lord about his church. It is quite clear, I think, that we cannot regard Jesus as the Founder of the church in any literal sense of that term. The conception seemed foreign to him. He was careless not only about its rites and ordinances but even about it. The Kingdom of God filled his heart; the church is utterly unessential to his discipleship; if it be Christian at all, it is so only because it is a convenient means of establishing the Kingdom of God on earth.

We are confirmed in our conviction that these sayings of Jesus about the church are apocryphal by observing that, according to the early records incorporated in the Acts of the Apostles, the disciples never thought of segregating themselves for worship until the Jews drove them to do so. They worshipped God in the synagogue until that worship was forbidden them and until the development of their hope made it evident that they were completely shut up to another spiritual fellowship. But it is well-nigh inconceivable that this course could have been taken if Christ had really insisted upon the founding of a church.

This omission of direction of Jesus to his disciples about the gathering and ruling of a church explains the situation which meets us in the undoubted letters of Paul, to which we must now briefly turn. In the unquestioned words of the Lord we find no clew whatever to ministerial ordination; there seems to have been nothing to be ordained to: how shall we fare with the earliest datable documents in Christian history, preceding by decades the Gospel of Matthew as it now lies in our hands?

In the early letters of Paul there is absolutely no mention of any kind of ordination. One may read the entire epistles to the Thessalonians and the Galatians and the Corinthians and the Romans and find no mention of any office concerning which the question of the validity of ordination has arisen. Twice the apostle gives a list of the individual activities and services of church-members, but in neither list is a bishop or an elder or a deacon so much as mentioned. To the Romans he writes: "Having gifts differing according to the grace that was given to us, whether prophecy let us prophesy according to the proportion of our faith; or ministry, let us give ourselves to our ministry; or he that teacheth, to his teaching; or he that exhorteth, to his exhorting; he that giveth, let him do it with liberality; he that ruleth, with diligence; he that sheweth mercy, with cheerfulness." In this catalogue the only possible categories under which bishops and deacons could be subsumed are "ministry" and "ruling." If it be "ministry," the word would mock pretensions of lordship; if it be "ruling," it is to be noted that the apostle ranks that particular gift rather low. And it is most likely that under neither rubric did the apostle think of the future lords of the

church. The position of "ruling" between "giving" and "shewing mercy" is quite a clear indication that all three designate private activities of Christians. "Ruling" probably refers to the function of a parent in the home or of a master among his slaves. The catalogue the apostle addressed to the Corinthians is even fuller, but the ordained officers of today have an even poorer chance. The gifts of the Spirit which the apostle mentions are the word of wisdom, the word of knowledge, faith, gifts of healings, workings of miracles, prophecy, discernings of spirits, tongues, and interpretation of tongues, and the Christian occupations are enumerated as follows: "God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, then miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, divers kinds of tongues." Here, again, only "helps" and "governments" suggest deacons and bishops respectively. "Governments," however, may be translated "wise counsels," and of how little vital importance these two gifts were in the eyes of the church Paul betrays by immediately exhorting the envious Corinthians in these words: "Are all apostles? are all teachers? are all workers of miracles? have all gifts of healings? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret?" It is evident that whatever the somewhat obscure "helps" and "governments" may have been, they were not sufficiently important to be coveted. Indeed, the entire conception of office and officers seems to have been utterly undeveloped. This is noticeable in these very catalogues, where the gifts and those who exercised them are jumbled unceremoniously together, as though the gift were the important thing and as though it might be a transferable grace. When Paul tells the Galatians of his unfortunate introduction to those who were of repute in Jerusalem, he not only declares, "Whatsoever they were, it maketh no matter to me," but proceeds, "God accepteth not man's person," the idea of respecting an office apparently not having dawned upon him.

It is, however, only just to say a word about the possible ordination of the Christian functionaries who are mentioned first in the Corinthian catalogue, namely, the apostles. For while it is at once evident that their office is not that either of the bishop or deacon or pastor of today, it is quite possible to regard them

as holding an office to which ordination is essential. The word "apostle" at once suggests a messenger, and the only earthly body of which an apostle could be a messenger is a Christian gathering. But how much of an official commission an apostle had, or how this commission was bestowed, is now quite obscure. We are certain, however, of three things in connection with the office. First, we know that the word "apostle" did not signify a member of a self-perpetuating board of supernaturally endowed directors of the Christian church. It was not confined to any original twelve. In the Epistle to the Corinthians and in the closing chapter of the Epistle to the Romans there are indications that Paul had no thought of the twelve when he spoke of apostles. The same usage prevails in the Book of Revelation. Even in the Acts, Barnabas as well as Paul is spoken of as an apostle, and in so late a document as the Didache we find a large number of persons spoken of by that term. Secondly, we cannot find that any apostle possessed any official standing in the community by which he may have been commissioned: the word rather suggests that he was qualified as a messenger to other communities, so that if there were any ordination to the apostleship, ordination could not have been regarded as bestowing any authority in the community which ordained. And, thirdly, Paul was most earnest in asseverating, when his apostleship was called in question, that he was an apostle neither from men nor through man but through Jesus Christ. While this asseveration indicates that apostles were at times commissioned by churches or by Christians, it also indicates clearly and unmistakably that Paul did not regard himself as so commissioned, and so did not regard any such commission or putative ordination as essential even to the apostolate. Indeed, the word apostle is used in the Didache interchangeably with the word "prophet," an officer whose ordination can least be assumed. The origins of the function and the nature and source of its possible commission are too obscure for us to say more. But however commissioned customarily, their rights are meagre. It appears that the churches were bound to support them as long as they labored among them, but even this right Paul found of doubtful expediency. He was not able to persuade Apollos to follow his advice, and even Titus simply "accepted his exhorta-

tion." He does speak of setting the practices of the church in Corinth in order when he comes, but it is fair to suppose that he might as well be thinking of the influence that would accrue to the founder of the confused church as of any divine authority. Indeed, he expressly declares to these very Corinthians that he has no lordship over their faith. "We preach not ourselves but Christ Jesus as Lord, and ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake."

As for other officers and their rights, in all the exhortations of these long letters there are only two expressions that hint at them. The Corinthians are urged to be "in subjection unto" the house of Stephanas, the first-fruits of Achaia that "have set themselves to minister unto the saints," but before we have time to wonder at the expression, "be in subjection," the apostle takes the edge off his injunction by adding, "and to every one that helpeth in the work and laboreth." We are further enlightened as to the meaning of the apostle by remembering an injunction in the letter to the Ephesians: "Subjecting yourselves one to another in the fear of Christ." This is not the sort of subjection which could uphold the hierarchical idea. Consequently we are left to wrestle with a single sentence in the first letter to the Thessalonians: "We beseech you to know them that labor among you and are over you in the Lord and admonish you, and to esteem them exceeding highly in love for their work's sake." If this sentence stood alone, we might indeed infer the presence of a hierarchy thus early in the life of the church. But as we have seen reason to suppose that all those who were endowed with any kind of spiritual gifts would be considered by the apostle to be "over" the church in those particular functions and services, it seems unnecessary to build so portentous an edifice as an ecclesiastical hierarchy on so unsteady a stone. Moreover, in the very next sentence the apostle turns from these supposed dignitaries to the rank and file of the church to which the letter is addressed, with these words: "And we exhort you, brethren, admonish the disorderly, encourage the fainthearted, support the weak, be longsuffering toward all." Over against this single utterance we may well place the entire spirit of all these letters. It is not in personalities nor in officers nor in ordination nor in churchman-

ship that the apostle puts his mighty trust, but in the gospel that he proclaims. "Though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach unto you any gospel other than that which we preached unto you, let him be anathema." "What, then, is Apollos? and what is Paul? Ministers through whom ye believed." Indeed, the very foundation of Paul's joy lay in his belief that a Christian had escaped from all dominion of men and had entered upon the freedom of the world of the Spirit. "Ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you." And Paul was in no doubt as to the manner in which the Spirit of God took possession of a man. The magical or sacramental method never entered into his mind. To him there were only two conceivable ways of salvation. These he mentions to the Galatians in his self-answering question: "This only would I learn from you, Received ye the Spirit by the works of the law or by the hearing of faith?" Or again, "Christ redeemed us . . . that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." Any man who had received that Spirit by a simple act of faith was removed from the world where the judgments or customs of men counted, or where their authorities could be recognized. To every Christian—bishop (if there were a bishop), prophet, apostle, miracle-worker—his question reached: "Thou, why dost thou judge thy brother?" And to every Christian also reached that other more daring question: "Know ye not that the saints"—those who have received the Spirit of God—"shall judge the world?" How could there have been authoritative ordination in churches ruled by conceptions like these?

And when we come down the century a little further and take up the group of the captivity-epistles of Paul, the result is but little different. Here, again, there is no mention whatever of ordination. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of the ordination of a prophet or of a man possessed by the gift of tongues. "The lion hath roared, who can but tremble with fear? The Lord Jehovah hath spoken, who can but utter his message?"—that conviction is of the very essence of prophecy. These gifts of the Spirit which were the most widely coveted shut out the idea of ordination; it was, I suppose, as a guard against them that in later times the bishops and deacons were ordained to direct the

churches in their stead. And here in the letter to the Philippians we have the first datable mention of bishops and deacons. Paul addresses perhaps the most unecclesiastical of all his letters to "the church at Philippi with the bishops and deacons." That both words are used in the plural when designating officers of a single local church leads us to premise that the first officer mentioned is rather the present elder than the present bishop. But it is noteworthy that here they emerge from the realm of supposition into the realm of history. It has been cleverly guessed that the reason why Paul sent the letter in part to them and to the deacons was that it was through these officers that the gift was gathered and brought to him for which the letter to the Philippians returns thanks. However that may be, they are not again mentioned in the letter nor in the more churchly letters to the Colossians and to the Ephesians. But even in them the same free atmosphere is about us. The Holy Spirit is given upon faith, no officer is permitted to discipline a brother. No man is to judge another "in meat or in drink or in respect of a feast day or a new moon or a sabbath day." Here the catalogue of functionaries includes only apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors and teachers. The bishops and deacons are not mentioned, though the pastors appear, and the more primitive gifts of the spirit—miracles and tongues and interpretation of tongues—have disappeared. There are also two sentences in the Epistle to the Ephesians which strike us as a departure from the full freedom of the more undisputed letters of Paul. Instead of the old straightforward declaration, "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ," we read, "Ye are . . . of the household of God, being built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief cornerstone." But a more dangerous departure from the spirit of him who said, "Why callest thou me good? none is good save one, even God," is the phrase in the letter to the Ephesians, "holy apostles and prophets." It is only fair, however, to add that in the same letter we read that "each several building groweth into a holy temple in the Lord," and that at a later period we find in one of the Pastoral letters the injunction that the men everywhere "lift up holy hands" in prayer. We cannot therefore say that there is

any insistence in these letters of the captivity upon ordination, least of all upon that ordination which takes a man out of the ranks of his fellows or bestows any special grace or holiness upon him.

When, however, we come down the century still further and touch perhaps the confines of the next, the atmosphere is different. In the Acts of the Apostles and in the Pastoral epistles we seem far away from the vigor and freedom of the early letters of Paul. In the Acts of the Apostles we are dealing with ancient authorities and an editor. We cannot always separate one from the other, and it may be on this ground that we find traces both of the old freedom and also of a more systematized life in the churches, or—perhaps we should say—of church government. Baptism becomes prominent. Prophets retreat behind elders and far behind apostles. The nomenclature indeed is not yet fixed. The elders are once called bishops, and an apostle is said to have not an apostleship but a bishopric. At times the Holy Spirit falls on people in the good old way, but at times it seems to be transmitted through the laying on of the apostles' hands. Not even here is the Holy Ghost confined to the good offices of an apostle, to say nothing of a bishop, but there are some startling accounts. Not only did some Ephesians who were baptized into John's baptism and had never heard of the Holy Spirit receive the same when Paul, happening that way, laid his hand upon them, but men who had believed Philip and had been baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus, received the Holy Spirit only after Peter and John had prayed for them and laid their hands upon them. Even Paul did not receive the Holy Ghost until Ananias, to whom curiously Paul never alludes, lays his hands upon him. This transmission of the Holy Spirit through the hands of good men as well as through their words may not, of course, necessarily imply any sacerdotal powers. But it is to be noted that just at this time also we begin to have records of ordination. We are told that in the earliest days of the church the apostles laid their hands upon seven men elected by the church and thus set them apart for the service of tables. We are fortunately told, however, that one of the men on whom these hands were laid was full of the Holy Ghost before the sacred ceremony. Barnabas

and Paul too, though both already full of the Holy Ghost, were separated by certain prophets and teachers for an apostleship to certain regions near, by a revelation and by the laying on of hands. Church government begins to have at least the first hint of authority. Paul and Barnabas "appoint elders for every church," and Paul delivers to the churches "the decrees which had been ordained of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem,"—decrees, by the way, which Paul, speaking to the Galatians of the same conference, never mentions. But, ecclesiastical as is the atmosphere in the Acts, it is, I think, still more marked in the Pastoral letters, which modern scholarship is more and more widely denying to Paul. Here the catalogue of functionaries in the churches is quite different from those in the letters to the Romans and Corinthians and Ephesians. We hear no word of a prophet. Bishops and deacons and widows bulk large instead. Their qualifications, harmless and Christian enough, are given in great detail. Titus is bidden to reprove with authority and to appoint elders in every city. We hear for the first time of the "washing of regeneration," afterward so emphasized in John. But, most noteworthy of all, "Paul" writes to Timothy about his ordination in most dubious language. He seems to refer to it five times. Once he speaks of "prophecies which led the way to thee," as though some prophet had chosen him for his office of evangelist by a free word of the Lord. Again he bids Timothy: "Neglect not the gift that is in thee which was given thee by prophecy and by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." Even here, however, the free word of prophecy has its part to play in the ordination. But at still another time "Paul" does not scruple to charge Timothy to "stir up the gift of God that is in thee through the laying on of my hands." Here certainly an unprejudiced rendering of the words would seem to imply that spiritual gifts were dependent upon apostolic ordination. It is true that all these three passages seem to refer to the same event, and that, after a prophet had selected Timothy by revelation for the work of an evangelist, the elders and "Paul" laid their hands upon him and ordained him to that office, but it is a fact that this last expression is contained in a different letter from the others and seems to convey a different theory of the event. It may indeed

be a shift of the apostle's memory, but whatever it is, it would appear as if, at the time the second letter to Timothy was written in its present form, the sacerdotal conception was no longer an impossibility. The letter is full of offices and of induction into those offices of which the earliest Christian documents betray no knowledge. The emphasis has certainly changed, and in spiritual things a change of emphasis betokens a change of living and of believing.

These are facts, and are far surer than any explanation of them. And yet it does not seem difficult to guess the reason for this shifting of emphasis from the freedom of the spirit to the orderliness and statutoriness of ordination and systematic church government. It was already necessary at the earliest time to warn the Thessalonians, who were themselves expecting the coming of the Lord, not to despise prophesying, and it was a hard matter to straighten out the tangles in which the freedom of prophecy had involved the Corinthians. As it seemed so impossible to keep the spirits of the prophets and the ecstatics subject to them, the churches began to desire them to be subject to more ordinary men. And as prophecy sank in favor, the atmosphere in which it thrived disappeared. Gradually churches found themselves without prophets, and the bishops (elders, as we would call them) and deacons performed their tasks. In the early *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* we find it enjoined to give the first-fruits to the prophets, "but if ye have no prophet, give them to the poor." And a few sentences farther on we read: "Appoint for yourselves bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord; for they too render you the service of the prophets and teachers. Despise them not therefore." It is interesting to observe that the Greek word χειροτονέω, which here seems to have its earlier meaning of "appoint," is the very word which later was employed in the signification of "ordain." Thus upon these bishops and deacons, the parts of the body of Christ which were thought to be less honorable, upon them was soon bestowed the "more abundant honor" of ordination. As the financial questions, moreover, grew more important, and as the eucharist became the central service of the church, these less conspicuously spiritual offices became the most necessary of all. An elder or

bishop could preside at the Lord's Supper as worthily as a prophet, and could administer the church funds with greater acceptance. It is not surprising if eventually the apparent spiritual defect of these offices was made good by the service of ordination, to which an increasingly sacerdotal significance became attached for purposes of honor and discipline.

To sum up the historical facts regarding ordination. Our Lord founded no church and commissioned no church-officers. The one command savoring of church-problems which he gave those nearest him was: "Be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your teacher, and all ye are brethren. And call no man your father on the earth; for one is your Father, the heavenly." [2] The earliest Christian documents contain no allusion to ordination, nor to those officers who afterward claimed divine powers on its account. Not until the second century do we assuredly come upon a contemporaneous witness to the ceremony of ordination, and even then its sacerdotal quality is but little emphasized. Surely the question is in place, Is any ordination valid in the Christian church?

As this, however, is a question not of history but of spiritual predilection and temperament, brief suggestions rather than a closely knit argument are in place. We ask, therefore, whether ordination fits those Christian officers who are customarily ordained today for the functions now expected of them. We expect them to marry men and women; but even Christians recognize as lawful marriages which are performed by the state. We expect them to bury the dead; but what church would forbid any of its members from reading a committal service? Must a captain at sea be ordained for that purpose? We expect them to preach the gospel; but how often is the gospel preached as effectively by laymen! To ordain a man as a necessary qualification for preaching would be to outlaw both the Old and the New Testament prophets and many a successful evangelist. We expect them to baptize; but even the Roman Catholics allow this to be done in necessitous circumstances by lay Christians. We

[2] This cannot, however, be absolutely relied upon as a genuine word of our Lord. While far more primitive in its phrasing than the sayings of our Lord upon the church, which we have already considered, it comes to us from the Gospel of Matthew alone.

expect them to pray; but they certainly have no exclusive rights in prayer. The only service which is still widely withheld from laymen is the conduct of the Lord's Supper. But certainly that service is no more sacred than baptism or prayer. The presiding person at the feast seemed of such little importance to the apostle Paul, or even to the writer of the Acts, that it is impossible to say who it was. Only those who see some kind of pharmacological significance in the Lord's Supper can logically demand a specifically ordained person to distribute it. But to see such significance is to depart from the truth as it is in Jesus.

No one can believe in the freedom of the Spirit as Jesus and Paul believed in it and believe in a peculiar and saving sacramental grace. If the Spirit is supplied by the hearing of faith, if a child can repose on the love of God before it has ever sat at the Lord's table, if the teaching of Jesus is still regarded as a sufficient standard of faith, then sacramentalism is false. And any ordination that is supposed to convey a peculiar grace or an exclusive right to preside at the table of the Lord is a delusion, and is dangerously near being an enemy of the gospel. Much more in accord with the earliest practice of the church, and at first sight at least more conducive to the rule of the Spirit, would it be to do away completely with ordination of Christian ministers, as we have happily done away with ordination of Christian deacons. But is it necessary for us to follow the example of the Quakers and of the Separatists and do away with ordination altogether? We should, if we regard the act of ordination as conferring necessary grace; if we would define it with the Century Dictionary as the rite of investing with ministerial or sacerdotal power and authority. We need not, if we regard the act of ordination as a public recognition of grace. The service of ordination does in the church precisely what a degree does in a college. It testifies to the church at large that in the opinion of the representatives of a group of churches a certain man understands and reveres the gospel and the Lord sufficiently to preach them. It is a certificate of standing. And so it aids the churches in securing Christian men to perform functions for which Christian men are necessary. But such ordination should no more prevent other Christians from performing those same Christian

functions in churches where they are personally known than the absence of a college diploma should prohibit a scholar from writing and teaching. In my own opinion the Christianity of our churches would be considerably purified and deepened if the churches should choose from their own number an unordained and earnest Christian to preside at the sacred service of the Lord's Supper, a service no more sacred, however, than any reverent service of prayer.

For, after all, the church is an institution in a realm where institutions are bound to be inadequate. Only as every church recognizes its fundamental inadequacy can it do its work with the least fatal consequences. The church represents order in a realm where order seems utterly presumptuous. The very immensity of its task should keep it reverently fearful of everything systematic and stereotyped. The church is committed to a task which can never be committed to it. The moment it presumes to confine the Spirit of God in the bounds of its ceremonies, that moment the Spirit of God departs from it. For the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. High walls can keep out the Spirit of God, but they cannot hold the Spirit in. So long as the church held a semi-pagan view of redemption, so long could it consistently demand a pagan order of priests to perform it. For centuries the church identified redemption with everlasting life. This life was to be ingrafted upon our mortality by drugging our flesh with infusions of the body of Christ. This body was obtainable only through the sacraments of the church. And the sacraments were dependent for their efficacy upon the special grace bestowed upon the administrators of the same in the sacred service of ordination. But ordination, as a requisite for the performance of ministerial functions, stands or falls with this ancient semi-pagan theory of redemption. *When a man comes to believe that redemption consists in taking the filial attitude toward God and the brotherly attitude toward men, then ordination as an indispensable qualification for any Christian service becomes an impertinence.* By whom was Christ ordained? And whom did He ordain? When a man, through reverent trust in Jesus, makes His attitude to God and man his own, he has become a king and priest to God. No

ordination can give him more than an opportunity for the exercise of that priesthood that his faith has already bestowed upon him. The higher and more spiritual is our conception of redemption, the higher and more spiritual will be our conception of the task of the church. For the task of the church is nothing else than to spread the good news of redemption and to maintain in the world a fellowship founded on the glad experience of redemption. But when we define redemption as Jesus revealed it, that moment the church becomes simply one of God's agents in preparing the way for that supreme spiritual act which is consummated between God and each individual soul. All orders fall away, save as matters of convenience. There is but one order, as but one reward, in the Christian church. Whether a man comes to it at the first or at the eleventh hour, whether he works in it as Sunday-school teacher, or bishop, or reverent worshipper and obscure disciple, he receives the one order and the one reward; he comes into conscious spiritual communion with the Most High God, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. "So then neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase." "There can be neither Jew nor Greek," neither ordained nor unordained, "there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female: for ye all are one in Christ Jesus."

RECENT BOOKS ON PREACHING AND PREACHERS

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The books that have been written on the preparation and delivery of sermons are usually more helpful to ministers of some experience than to the students in divinity schools for whose instruction they were first of all intended. The man who is already a preacher, and who is also open-minded and willing to learn, sifts out from the detail of the numerous divisions and subdivisions of such books much that is suggestive and stimulating; his own experience interprets the precepts and warnings that are given, confirms their wisdom, and brings home their application. To the average student, on the other hand, the elaborate analysis easily becomes confusing; the sermon is made to appear a thing highly technical, if not artificial, and, in spite of any protest to the contrary which the book may contain, an end in itself instead of the means to an end. Learning to preach is like learning to do anything else. The rules for the beginner must be few and simple, and refinement and enrichment of method must come as part of the preacher's general growth, and with the gain in confidence and freedom which should naturally result from the continued practice of his calling. Many students would find it easier to begin to preach, and many preachers would be more effective, if they could understand from the first that the rules which govern the method of the sermon differ in no way from those of any other form of persuasive public speech.

Dr. Breed's *Preparing to Preach*[1] illustrates both the defects and the merits of these books. There is much that is wholesome throughout, the chapters on extemporaneous preaching are exceptionally definite in analysis and helpful in advice, and nothing could be better of its kind than the frank, pithy counsel of the chapter on pulpit manners. But one wishes that the four hundred and fifty pages had been condensed at least one-third, that

[1] Preparing to Preach, by David R. Breed, D.D., Professor of Homiletics in Western Theological Seminary, Pittsburgh, Pa. George H. Doran Company, 1911.

the preparation for the delivery of the sermon had been treated on broader lines, and that the writer had abstained from any part in perpetuating the artificial classification of sermons as "narrative," "doctrinal," "expository," and the rest.

Professor Hoyt also lends his authority to this kind of classification in his book on *The Preacher*.[2] But there is a quality in this book, as in Professor Hoyt's earlier book on preaching,[3] which disarms criticism of such formalism as he retains. Both books so overflow with the new wine of a warm, earnest personality, seeking and calling forth all that is most personal and living in those to whom the writer addresses himself, that the old bottles which are made to do duty become comparatively unimportant. "Christianity is a life; it can only be propagated by personal influence"; the "homiletic habit" is "the power to see and use truth for public speech"; "you must preach to yourself before you can preach to others": these sentences, taken almost at random from the earlier book, are characteristic of the spirit in which both books are written. They can hardly fail to accomplish the avowed purpose, "to help the preacher speak with authority, touch the conscience and form the moral habits of the age, and make his work educative of the abundant life."

Dr. Dykes also writes on the preparation of the sermon, though more concisely, in the third part of *The Christian Minister and his Duties*.[4] The style of the book is dry, and the treatment of the conduct of worship is so largely historical and descriptive that those who turn to it for practical suggestion may be disappointed. But, in what is said of the call to the ministry, those who are doubting whether they should or should not be ministers will find clear-cut answers to many of their questions; and the chapters on the minister's devotional life, his character, and his citizenship, contain much that is at once searching and stimulating.

[2] The Preacher, his Person, Message, and Method. A Book for the Classroom and Study. By Arthur S. Hoyt, Professor of Homiletics and Sociology in the Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909.

[3] The Work of Preaching. The Macmillan Company, 1905.

[4] The Christian Minister and his Duties, by J. Oswald Dykes, M.A., D.D., Principal Emeritus of Westminster College, Cambridge. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1909.

Nearly every teacher of homiletics advises students to inform themselves in regard to the lives and methods of great preachers. The advice is good if the student is not led into formal imitation, but reads to catch the spirit of the preacher. As a rule one's own direct resort to original sources is more satisfying, in such study, than any knowledge at second hand, in which one must depend on the judgment of another for selection and criticism. But the competent summary or review has its value in so far as it invites to a first acquaintance which might not be had otherwise. The collection of such summaries which Professor Brastow published in 1904[5] needs no word of appreciation at this late day for its just and sympathetic estimate of the life and work of the eight or nine spiritual leaders whom it describes. The same catholicity and discernment characterize Professor Brastow's later book, *The Modern Pulpit*,[6] and have made it especially instructive to those who wish to compare the preaching of the different Protestant denominations, and their work in general, and to see just what contribution each is making toward the larger and deeper spiritual life of the present time. The book must already have helped much toward a fuller mutual understanding and a more intelligent and sympathetic toleration among the denominations. The form of both volumes is attractive, but any future edition of *Representative Modern Preachers* would be more convenient for reference if the running titles of the chapters were to include the name of the preacher who is the subject of the essay.

There is a class of books the aim of which is not so much to instruct the minister as to quicken his spiritual life, or to reassure him in the face of the difficulties which the student foresees and which the settled minister has experienced. Professor Robertson has undertaken to do this in *The Glory of the Ministry*,[7] a study

[5] Representative Modern Preachers, by Lewis O. Brastow, D.D., Professor of Practical Theology in Yale University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904.

[6] The Modern Pulpit. A Study of Homiletic Sources and Characteristics. The Macmillan Company, 1906.

[7] The Glory of the Ministry. Paul's Exultation in Preaching, by A. T. Robertson, M.A., D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. Fleming H. Revell Company, 1911.

of Paul's triumph over the discouragements which met him as a preacher. The friendly candor of Dr. Robertson's preface makes one reluctant to criticise, but it is to be regretted that he did not allow himself more freedom from the exegetical method of the class-room. The very numerous references in the page and in the foot-notes make the book helpful as a commentary, but they make still more difficult the attempt to follow a sequence of thought, already far too much broken in the slow progress of the exegesis. *The Minister and the Spiritual Life*,[8] as indicated by its title, is another of the books intended to stimulate rather than to instruct. All who know anything of Dr. Gunsaulus will realize how much these Yale lectures of 1911 must have gained from his personality in the actual delivery. In print the uniform richness of illustration and figure which characterizes the style becomes burdensome, and the reader longs for an occasional thought more simply expressed. The main thesis, however, the need of spiritual vision in the church and of spiritual life in its leaders, is presented with sufficient clearness and force, and there is much that is stirring in the study of the various channels through which the spiritual life either is enriched or makes itself effective. At times, as in the discussion of the subliminal and subconscious in personal salvation, one feels on rather uncertain ground, and the sense in which Dr. Gunsaulus uses the term "orthodoxy" seems strained. But the vigor with which he declares that a great society becomes possible only as the individuals who compose it are worthy, is most timely in view of the readiness with which the opposite theory now often finds acceptance. In reading *The Theology of a Preacher*[9] one does not have to agree with Mr. Hough in his belief, or even in his point of view, in order to feel the contagion of his sincerity and enthusiasm. It is from the revelations of the spiritual in the material, the divine in the human, that the preacher is to construct his theology, and these he finds as he goes about his work and comes into daily contact with men. His belief in God, the special form which this belief is to take, the corollaries which

[8] The Minister and the Spiritual Life, by Frank W. Gunsaulus, D.D., LL.D., Minister of Central Church, Chicago. Fleming H. Revell Company, 1911.

[9] The Theology of a Preacher, by Lynn Harold Hough. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1912.

result from it, all become clear and assured as he responds with real consecration to the demands made upon him by the duties of his calling. Mr. Hough's theory is new only in the sense that he has discovered it for himself, but the ardor with which he makes, as it were, the confession of his own experience, and seeks to give to others the key to the satisfaction which he has found, is most quickening. The very human and at the same time very spiritual quality of the book will constitute for most readers its chief value, but from time to time there is some especially suggestive thought, as in the brief passage on free will. The chapter on the place of Jesus in the theology of the preacher probably will be helpful to many, but some will find a broader and at the same time deeper interpretation in what Dr. Gunsaulus says on the same subject, an interpretation which Mr. Hough himself presents indirectly in his chapter on "The Great Companionship."

To student and settled minister alike, and perhaps most of all to the man who is hesitating whether to enter the ministry, nothing is more helpful than a reasonable assurance that there is not only a place, but a demand for what the minister can do for the interpretation and development of men's lives under present conditions. In *The Church of To-Day* and *The Church of Tomorrow*[10] Dr. Crooker reviews these conditions frankly, with full recognition of the difficulties which they present; while in his conviction that the church must be the chief source and instrument of those forces which are to meet the difficulties, and preserve to both present and future all that makes life really worth living, he makes very plain the opportunity which the ministry offers for the exercise of a man's best powers. Of the two books, *The Church of Tomorrow* is the more critical in tone, and to some extent the more theoretical. Partly on this account and partly because of a certain repetition in the discussion, which Dr. Crooker himself recognizes, it is not likely to make so strong an appeal as the earlier book.

The little volume entitled *Scientific Management in the Churches*[11]

[10] The Church of To-Day. A Plea, by Joseph Henry Crooker. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1908. The Church of Tomorrow. The Pilgrim Press, 1911.

[11] Scientific Management in the Churches, by Shailer Mathews, Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1912.

gives more permanent form to a paper read by Professor Mathews at the Sagamore Sociological Conference of 1911, in which the principles of scientific management that make for greater efficiency in business are applied to the activities of the Church. In so far as the author calls attention to the superficial character of what passes for organization in many churches and to the resulting inefficiency, he renders a real service, and all must be grateful to him both for his analysis of existing conditions and for the remedies he proposes, by which the church is to become a "coöperating group of spiritual workmen." His conception should also help to make the calling of the ministry more inviting to those to whom administration, and concrete, measurable forms of service, especially appeal. It is unfortunate, however, that Professor Mathews is not wholly clear or consistent in the distinction which he makes between the minister and his education as they are assumed to be, and the education and the minister as he would have them. For example, every one will agree that ministers should be trained to become "leaders of men rather than merely exhorters of men," and that schools of divinity should send out men "trained in efficiency rather than merely informed as to orthodoxy." But when it is said that the "fundamental conception of the minister's education must be changed from that of a man with a message to that of a leader of a social group with a definitely religious and moral function," one is not so sure. The "man with a message" is very apt to become a leader of men, whether an exhorter or not, and whatever his orthodoxy or heterodoxy. In *The Educational Ideal in the Ministry*[12] President Faunce develops a conception of the minister which is as essential as it is timely. For in its fundamental idea, as he says, the church has anticipated in various ways the emphasis which our age lays on education as its "characteristic activity." But the chief educational work of the church, Dr. Faunce holds, can be done, not as it reaches a few "through formal schools and curricula," but only "in and through its regular services and functions." "If the aim of education is 'preparation for complete living,'

[12] The Educational Ideal in the Ministry. The Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale University in the Year 1908, by William Herbert Perry Faunce, President of Brown University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908.

and the aim of the church is 'that the man of God may be thoroughly furnished unto all good works,' then the church is fundamentally an educational institution, and the minister is in essence a teacher of his generation." Dr. Faunce discusses the questions suggested by this thesis, and the conclusions which follow, with characteristic insight, breadth, and judgment, and with the authority of an experience, both as parish minister and as educator, which has been peculiarly rich in opportunity for observation. The eight chapters or lectures are all full of suggestion and encouragement for the minister who is in earnest in his desire to justify his calling; but the concluding chapter, "The Education of the Minister by his Task," is peculiarly valuable in that it makes plain the challenge to intellectual and spiritual growth and to the development of originality in its best sense, which the ministry gives beyond any other calling. Incidentally the long pastorate is shown to be necessary, not only that the minister may attain the full strengthening and ripening of his powers, but also that the relation in which he stands to the church and the community may be assured "time for growth as well as for appeal."

It is suggestive that these books, representing various sympathies and methods, have one characteristic in common. All emphasize the personality of the preacher and the quality of that personality. The minister is to be first and always a man among men, and he is to be a spiritually-minded man. It is a good omen for the continued and increasing usefulness of the Christian ministry when those who enter it are thus reminded that, although changing times bring changed conditions, the one great essential of their calling is still the same, and that they are to come as their Master came, that men "may have life, and may have it abundantly."

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THE MESSAGE OF THE DISCIPLES FOR THE UNION OF THE CHURCH, INCLUDING THEIR ORIGIN AND HISTORY. *By Peter Ainslie.* (Lectures delivered before the Yale Divinity School, New Haven.) pp. 212. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. cop. 1913. $1.00 net.

THE FUNDAMENTAL CHRISTIAN FAITH; THE ORIGIN, HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE APOSTLES' AND NICENE CREEDS. *By Charles Augustus Briggs.* pp. 12+332. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. $1.50 net.

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THE BOOK OF WISDOM, WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES. *Edited by the Rev. A. T. S. Goodrick.* (The Oxford Church Bible Commentary.) pp. 12+437. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. $2.00 net.

A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. *By George Buchanan Gray.* pp. 11+253. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 75 cents net.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION. *By F. B. Jevons.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 7+154. Cambridge: University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. 40 cents net.

ANCIENT BABYLONIA. *By C. H. W. Johns.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 7+148. Cambridge: University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. 40 cents net.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON. *By Édouard Le Roy.* Translated from the French by Vincent Benson. pp. 10+235. New York, etc.: Henry Holt & Company. 1913. $1.25 net.

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EVOLUTION AND THE NEED OF ATONEMENT. *By Stewart A. McDowall.* pp. 16+155. Cambridge: University Press. 1912. 3 shillings net.

CHRISTIAN UNITY AT WORK. THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA IN QUADRENNIAL SESSION AT CHICAGO, ILL., 1912. *Edited by Charles S. MacFarland.* pp. 291. New York: The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. cop. 1913. $1.00 net.

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